109 research outputs found

    Abnormal reward prediction-error signalling in antipsychotic naive individuals with first-episode psychosis or clinical risk for psychosis.

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    Ongoing research suggests preliminary, though not entirely consistent, evidence of neural abnormalities in signalling prediction errors in schizophrenia. Supporting theories suggest mechanistic links between the disruption of these processes and the generation of psychotic symptoms. However, it is unknown at what stage in the pathogenesis of psychosis these impairments in prediction-error signalling develop. One major confound in prior studies is the use of medicated patients with strongly varying disease durations. Our study aims to investigate the involvement of the meso-cortico-striatal circuitry during reward prediction-error signalling in earliest stages of psychosis. We studied patients with first-episode psychosis (FEP) and help-seeking individuals at-risk for psychosis due to sub-threshold prodromal psychotic symptoms. Patients with either FEP (n = 14), or at-risk for developing psychosis (n = 30), and healthy volunteers (n = 39) performed a reinforcement learning task during fMRI scanning. ANOVA revealed significant (p < 0.05 family-wise error corrected) prediction-error signalling differences between groups in the dopaminergic midbrain and right middle frontal gyrus (dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, DLPFC). FEP patients showed disrupted reward prediction-error signalling compared to controls in both regions. At-risk patients showed intermediate activation in the midbrain that significantly differed from controls and from FEP patients, but DLPFC activation that did not differ from controls. Our study confirms that FEP patients have abnormal meso-cortical signalling of reward-prediction errors, whereas reward-prediction-error dysfunction in the at-risk patients appears to show a more nuanced pattern of activation with a degree of midbrain impairment but preserved cortical function

    The development of path integration: combining estimations of distance and heading

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    Efficient daily navigation is underpinned by path integration, the mechanism by which we use self-movement information to update our position in space. This process is well-understood in adulthood, but there has been relatively little study of path integration in childhood, leading to an underrepresentation in accounts of navigational development. Previous research has shown that calculation of distance and heading both tend to be less accurate in children as they are in adults, although there have been no studies of the combined calculation of distance and heading that typifies naturalistic path integration. In the present study 5-year-olds and 7-year-olds took part in a triangle-completion task, where they were required to return to the startpoint of a multi-element path using only idiothetic information. Performance was compared to a sample of adult participants, who were found to be more accurate than children on measures of landing error, heading error, and distance error. 7-year-olds were significantly more accurate than 5-year-olds on measures of landing error and heading error, although the difference between groups was much smaller for distance error. All measures were reliably correlated with age, demonstrating a clear development of path integration abilities within the age range tested. Taken together, these data make a strong case for the inclusion of path integration within developmental models of spatial navigational processing

    Incentive motivation in first-episode psychosis: A behavioural study

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    <p>Abstract</p> <p>Background:</p> <p>It has been proposed that there are abnormalities in incentive motivational processing in psychosis, possibly secondary to subcortical dopamine abnormalities, but few empirical studies have addressed this issue.</p> <p>Methods:</p> <p>We studied incentive motivation in 18 first-episode psychosis patients from the Cambridge early psychosis service CAMEO and 19 control participants using the Cued Reinforcement Reaction Time Task, which measures motivationally driven behaviour. We also gathered information on participants' attentional, executive and spatial working memory function in order to determine whether any incentive motivation deficits were secondary to generalised cognitive impairment.</p> <p>Results:</p> <p>We demonstrated the anticipated "reinforcement-related speeding" effect in controls (17 out of 19 control participants responded faster during an "odd-one-out" task in response to a cue that indicated a high likelihood of a large points reward). Only 4 out of 18 patients showed this effect and there was a significant interaction effect between reinforcement probability and diagnosis on reaction time (F<sub>1,35 </sub>= 14.2, p = 0.001). This deficit was present in spite of preserved executive and attentional function in patients, and persisted even in antipsychotic medication free patients.</p> <p>Conclusion:</p> <p>There are incentive motivation processing abnormalities in first-episode psychosis; these may be secondary to dopamine dysfunction and are not attributable to generalised cognitive impairment.</p

    Pavlovian Reward Prediction and Receipt in Schizophrenia: Relationship to Anhedonia

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    Reward processing abnormalities have been implicated in the pathophysiology of negative symptoms such as anhedonia and avolition in schizophrenia. However, studies examining neural responses to reward anticipation and receipt have largely relied on instrumental tasks, which may confound reward processing abnormalities with deficits in response selection and execution. 25 chronic, medicated outpatients with schizophrenia and 20 healthy controls underwent functional magnetic resonance imaging using a Pavlovian reward prediction paradigm with no response requirements. Subjects passively viewed cues that predicted subsequent receipt of monetary reward or non-reward, and blood-oxygen-level-dependent signal was measured at the time of cue presentation and receipt. At the group level, neural responses to both reward anticipation and receipt were largely similar between groups. At the time of cue presentation, striatal anticipatory responses did not differ between patients and controls. Right anterior insula demonstrated greater activation for nonreward than reward cues in controls, and for reward than nonreward cues in patients. At the time of receipt, robust responses to receipt of reward vs. nonreward were seen in striatum, midbrain, and frontal cortex in both groups. Furthermore, both groups demonstrated responses to unexpected versus expected outcomes in cortical areas including bilateral dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. Individual difference analyses in patients revealed an association between physical anhedonia and activity in ventral striatum and ventromedial prefrontal cortex during anticipation of reward, in which greater anhedonia severity was associated with reduced activation to money versus no-money cues. In ventromedial prefrontal cortex, this relationship held among both controls and patients, suggesting a relationship between anticipatory activity and anhedonia irrespective of diagnosis. These findings suggest that in the absence of response requirements, brain responses to reward receipt are largely intact in medicated individuals with chronic schizophrenia, while reward anticipation responses in left ventral striatum are reduced in those patients with greater anhedonia severity

    Adults with autism overestimate the volatility of the sensory environment.

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    Insistence on sameness and intolerance of change are among the diagnostic criteria for autism spectrum disorder (ASD), but little research has addressed how people with ASD represent and respond to environmental change. Here, behavioral and pupillometric measurements indicated that adults with ASD are less surprised than neurotypical adults when their expectations are violated, and decreased surprise is predictive of greater symptom severity. A hierarchical Bayesian model of learning suggested that in ASD, a tendency to overlearn about volatility in the face of environmental change drives a corresponding reduction in learning about probabilistically aberrant events, thus putatively rendering these events less surprising. Participant-specific modeled estimates of surprise about environmental conditions were linked to pupil size in the ASD group, thus suggesting heightened noradrenergic responsivity in line with compromised neural gain. This study offers insights into the behavioral, algorithmic and physiological mechanisms underlying responses to environmental volatility in ASD

    Active inference, sensory attenuation and illusions.

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    Active inference provides a simple and neurobiologically plausible account of how action and perception are coupled in producing (Bayes) optimal behaviour. This can be seen most easily as minimising prediction error: we can either change our predictions to explain sensory input through perception. Alternatively, we can actively change sensory input to fulfil our predictions. In active inference, this action is mediated by classical reflex arcs that minimise proprioceptive prediction error created by descending proprioceptive predictions. However, this creates a conflict between action and perception; in that, self-generated movements require predictions to override the sensory evidence that one is not actually moving. However, ignoring sensory evidence means that externally generated sensations will not be perceived. Conversely, attending to (proprioceptive and somatosensory) sensations enables the detection of externally generated events but precludes generation of actions. This conflict can be resolved by attenuating the precision of sensory evidence during movement or, equivalently, attending away from the consequences of self-made acts. We propose that this Bayes optimal withdrawal of precise sensory evidence during movement is the cause of psychophysical sensory attenuation. Furthermore, it explains the force-matching illusion and reproduces empirical results almost exactly. Finally, if attenuation is removed, the force-matching illusion disappears and false (delusional) inferences about agency emerge. This is important, given the negative correlation between sensory attenuation and delusional beliefs in normal subjects--and the reduction in the magnitude of the illusion in schizophrenia. Active inference therefore links the neuromodulatory optimisation of precision to sensory attenuation and illusory phenomena during the attribution of agency in normal subjects. It also provides a functional account of deficits in syndromes characterised by false inference and impaired movement--like schizophrenia and Parkinsonism--syndromes that implicate abnormal modulatory neurotransmission
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