Francis Hutcheson and John Clarke on Desire and Self-Interest

Among the most animating debates in eighteenth-century British ethics was the debate over psychological egoism, the view that our most basic desires are self-interested. An important episode in that debate, less well known than it should be, was the exchange between Francis Hutcheson and John Clarke of Hull. In the early editions of his Inquiry into Virtue, Hutcheson argued ingeniously against psychological egoism; in his Foundation of Morality, Clarke argued ingeniously against Hutcheson’s arguments. Later, Hutcheson attempted new arguments against psychological egoism, designed to overcome Clarke’s objections. This article examines the exchange between these philosophers. Its conclusion, influenced partly by Clarke, is that psychological egoism withstands Hutcheson’s arguments. This is not to belittle those arguments—indeed, they are among the most resourceful and plausible of their kind. The fact that egoism withstands them is thus not a mere negative result, but a stimulus to consider carefully the ways in which progress in this area may be possible

Francis Hutcheson and John Clarke: Self-Interest, Desire, and Divine Impassibility

In this article I address a puzzle about one of Francis Hutcheson’s objections to psychological egoism. The puzzle concerns his premise that God receives no benefit from rewarding the virtuous. Why, in the early editions of his Inquiry Concerning Virtue, does Hutcheson leave this premise undefended? And why, in the later editions, does he continue to do so, knowing that in 1726 John Clarke of Hull had subjected the premise to plausible criticism, geared to the very audience for whom Hutcheson’s objection to egoism was written? This puzzle is not negligible. Some might claim that Hutcheson ruins his objection by ignoring Clarke’s criticism. To answer the puzzle we must consider not only Hutcheson’s philosophy but also some theological assumptions of Hutcheson’s time

Cultural Relativism

A brief reference article on cultural relativism, forthcoming in the Wiley-Blackwell Encyclopedia of Sociology, 2nd edition

Location Patterns of Confectionery Manufacturers in a Post NAFTA Environment

Changes in international trade agreements while retaining protectionist sugar policies have led to the opportunity for confectionery manufacturers to relocate to take advantage of favorable international trade policies. Results suggest that NAFTA did not have a significant impact on location decisions of confectionery manufacturers in the U.S.Agribusiness, International Relations/Trade,

INTERPERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS AND COMMUNITY IN KIERKEGAARD\u27S THOUGHT

Kierkegaard is generally regarded as a quintessential individualist who leaves no room for social or political engagement. This interpretation is the dominant lens through which many scholars view Kierkegaard, and it also shapes the way Kierkegaard’s thought has been received by his followers and critics. Many recent works have significantly challenged the traditional interpretation of Kierkegaard, but they have not examined the topic systematically. In order to remedy this deficit, this study provides a holistic account of Kierkegaard’s social thought. First, it challenges the dominant view that society as represented by the crowd is simply a foil for Kierkegaard’s individual by: (a) articulating a general approach for understanding how Kierkegaard’s negative comments about society and community do not constitute a rejection of sociality as such, and (b) demonstrating that Kierkegaard’s well-developed ideas on faith and religiosity are compatible with an account that emphasizes a broader social dimension in his thought. Second, I present a framework that outlines a positive theory of community, a ‘Dialectic of Community,’ which explains the importance of the Kierkegaardian single individual in the formation and development of community. This framework provides an interpretation of the social period of Kierkegaard’s authorship and its importance for the entirely of the authorship. Even though the interpretation is helpful for understanding Kierkegaard and his relationship to 19th and 20th century European moral, social, and political thought, Kierkegaard never explicitly describes how his conception of the self is consistent with his social thought. I address this problem by developing a narrative model of selfhood that illustrates the importance of subjectivity and the single individual for an adequate account of intersubjective selfhood. More specifically, I argue that narratives are important intersubjectively for becoming a person and a moral agent, but the concept of self is not exhausted in narrative. That is, having a self-narrative presupposes that the person is a subject who has a set of principles that organize one’s experiences and activities. This framework not only shows how Kierkegaard’s concept of subjectivity can be understood in a social context, but it also addresses a significant problem in narrative identity theory