Lender Liability in the Consumer Credit Market

In many countries consumer credit legislation provides for the extension of liability for product failure to the financial institution that advances credit to the consumer. In particular, lender liability is imposed on those credit grantors who closely operate with the supplier of the good. This paper provides a rationale for lender-responsibility in the consumer credit market. It shows that, when judicial enforcement is inefficient or there is risk of seller liquidation, lender-liability helps to protect consumers who systematically underestimate the probability of product failure and overestimate the extent to which they can obtain compensation

Contracts as threats: On a rationale for rewarding A while hoping for B

In this paper we explore theoretically the relationship between explicit and implicit/relational contracting distinguishing between the ex-ante decision to sign an explicit contract and the ex-post decision wheter to actually apply it. We show, among other things, that the relational efficient explicit contract tends to display overcontracting on tasks or qualitative requirements (A) that are verifiable but apparently of little use for the principal. The ex-post (non)implementation of such explicit contract can then be discretionally exchanged against the provision of non contractible tasks (B) that are highly valuable for the principal. An empirical implication of the result, consistent with casual observation in procurement, is that penalties for infringements established by explicit contracts are seldom exercised, even though violations take place and are easy to monitor and verify

Optimism and lender liability in the consumer credit market

Credit purchases of consumer goods are commonly made upon terms governed by an agreement between the lender and the seller. This type of purchase is generally subject to a legal principle of joint responsibility under which the lender and the seller are jointly liable to the consumer for breach of the sale contract by the seller. We study the rationale for this principle in situations where market failure arises because consumers underestimate the risk of product failure - for example due to seller misrepresentation - and it is difficult to enforce seller responsibility. We show that joint responsibility increases welfare and reduces the incentives of sellers to misrepresent the quality of their products

Decision rules and information provision: monitoring versus manipulation

The paper focuses on the organization of institutions designed to resolve disputes between two parties, when some information is not veri…able and decision makers may have vested preferences. It shows that the choice of how much discretional power to grant to the decision maker and who provides the information are intrinsically related. Direct involvement of the interested parties in the supply of information enhances monitoring over the decision maker, although at the cost of higher manipulation. Thus, it is desirable when the decision maker is granted high discretion. On the contrary, when the decision maker has limited discretional power, information provision is better assigned to an agent with no direct stake. The analysis helps to rationalize some organizational arrangements that are commonly observed in the context of judicial and antitrust decision-makin

Competition Among Universities and the Emergence of the Elite Institution

We consider an environment where two education institutions compete by selecting the proportion of their funding devoted to teaching and research and the criteria for admission for their students, and where students choose whether and where to attend university. We study the relationship between the cost incurred by students for attending a university located away from their home town and the equilibrium con…guration that emerges in the game played by the universities. Symmetric equilibria, where universities choose the same admission standard, only exist when the mobility cost is high; when the mobility cost is very low, there is no pure strategy equilibrium. For intermediate values of the mobility cost, only asymmetric equilibria may exist; the …nal section of the paper provides an example where asymmetric equilibria do indeed exist for a plausible and robust set of parameters

25th International Congress of the European Association for Endoscopic Surgery (EAES) Frankfurt, Germany, 14-17 June 2017 : Oral Presentations

Introduction: Ouyang has recently proposed hiatal surface area (HSA) calculation by multiplanar multislice computer tomography (MDCT) scan as a useful tool for planning treatment of hiatus defects with hiatal hernia (HH), with or without gastroesophageal reflux (MRGE). Preoperative upper endoscopy or barium swallow cannot predict the HSA and pillars conditions. Aim to asses the efficacy of MDCT’s calculation of HSA for planning the best approach for the hiatal defects treatment. Methods: We retrospectively analyzed 25 patients, candidates to laparoscopic antireflux surgery as primary surgery or hiatus repair concomitant with or after bariatric surgery. Patients were analyzed preoperatively and after one-year follow-up by MDCT scan measurement of esophageal hiatus surface. Five normal patients were enrolled as control group. The HSA’s intraoperative calculation was performed after complete dissection of the area considered a triangle. Postoperative CT-scan was done after 12 months or any time reflux symptoms appeared. Results: (1) Mean HSA in control patients with no HH, no MRGE was cm2 and similar in non-complicated patients with previous LSG and cruroplasty. (2) Mean HSA in patients candidates to cruroplasty was 7.40 cm2. (3) Mean HSA in patients candidates to redo cruroplasty for recurrence was 10.11 cm2. Discussion. MDCT scan offer the possibility to obtain an objective measurement of the HSA and the correlation with endoscopic findings and symptoms. The preoperative information allow to discuss with patients the proper technique when a HSA[5 cm2 is detected. During the follow-up a correlation between symptoms and failure of cruroplasty can be assessed. Conclusions: MDCT scan seems to be an effective non-invasive method to plan hiatal defect treatment and to check during the follow-up the potential recurrence. Future research should correlate in larger series imaging data with intraoperative findings