State Capacity, Inequality and Inter-group Violence in Sub-Saharan Africa

Why do non-state groups engage in armed conflict with each other? Most studies on internal conflict focus on the dyadic interaction between the state and a rebel group, providing less attention to inter-group fighting. In an attempt to contribute to the limited body of quantitative research on non-state violence, I argue that the opportunity structures and security problems created by weak state institutions may help explain the occurrence of violence between groups. Drawing on the argument that state capacity is important for domestic peace, I claim that non-state violence is more likely when groups are forced to provide for their own security within the state sphere. However, although weak state capacity structures create opportunities for groups to engage in fighting, an anarchical environment in itself might not explain inter-group violence. Thus, I argue that the interplay between economic and political exclusion of groups and weak state capacity further increases the risk of non-state conflict, creating both opportunities and motivation to engage in conflict. Whereas the majority of quantitative studies that focus on marginalization emphasize rebel groups in relation to the state, I argue that violence to ameliorate uneven distribution is just as likely to be directed at non-state groups who receive a larger share of economic and political welfare. Utilizing data on Sub-Saharan Africa from 1989 to 2011, I conduct a quantitative analysis studying the effect of weak state capacity on inter-group violence. The empirical analysis provides support for the theoretical expectation that weak state capacity increases the risk of inter-group violence, and that the combined presence of economic marginalization and weak state capacity further increases this risk. However, I find no support for a combined effect of weak state structures and political marginalization. The findings highlight the importance of state capacity for internal peace, and lend support to the literature emphasizing the relationship between state strength and conflict. Also, they illustrate the advantages of a more uniform theoretical framework, focusing on a specific type of violence between organized groups

Fighting For Food? : Investigating Food Insecurity as a Source of Urban Unrest

Under what conditions does food insecurity lead to urban unrest? This dissertation contributes to the burgeoning literature on this topic by introducing a multifaceted conceptualization of experienced food insecurity, and by developing a context-specific framework for food-related unrest. It investigates the effect of experienced food insecurity on citizens’ willingness to participate in unrest, and how a favourable structural context in the form of organizational networks moderates this relationship. By going beyond aggregate food insecurity proxies and direct effects, the dissertation makes theoretical and empirical contributions to existing knowledge. The thesis consists of an introductory chapter and four independent essays. Essay I reviews the literature on food insecurity and social upheaval, identifies main research gaps, and provides suggestions for future research. Focusing on urban Africa between 1990 to 2014, Essay II examines the moderating role of societal organizations on urban unrest when food prices increase. It finds that the manifestations of food-related unrest are contingent on the level of state repression of societal organizations. Essay III and IV use unique survey data of residents in Johannesburg, South Africa. Essay III applies a vignette experiment to investigate the assumption that food is an especially potent driver for people’s willingness to engage in unrest. The results indicate a higher willingness to engage in unrest when presented with a scenario of increasing living expenses, but this effect does not appear to be stronger for the price of food. Essay IV conceptualizes experienced food insecurity on the individual level, and finds that food insecurity increases unrest participation, where some types of organizational networks act as catalysts in this relationship. Taken together, the dissertation furthers our understanding of the relationship between food insecurity and social upheaval, suggesting that both food-related grievances and a favourable organizational context have significant influence on the likelihood of urban unrest.Fel serie i tryckt bok /Wrong series in the printed bookCorrect series and series number:Report / Department of Peace and Conflict Research (ISSN 0566-8808), no. 125</p

Are Muslim countries more prone to violence?

In recent years, most armed conflicts have taken place in Muslim countries. Are Muslim countries more war-prone? Not necessarily, if we look at data for the whole period after World War II. But in the post-Cold War era, most wars are civil wars and Muslim countries have a disproportionate share of these. This is not mainly because conflicts among Muslims have increased, but because other conflicts have declined. Muslim countries are also overrepresented among countries with high levels of other forms of internal violence, including non-state conflict, one-sided violence, highly repressive human rights policies, and countries that practice capital punishment. They also have a higher than average participation in interstate conflicts. This is not a "clash of civilizations"-most of the victims are Muslims. We list several hypotheses, apart from religion itself, for why this pattern has emerged, including colonial history, interventions from major powers, and economic and political development. Finally, on a more optimistic note, while many Muslims are exposed to violence, four of the five countries with the largest Muslim populations do not currently experience civil war

Replication Data for: Are Muslim countries more violent?

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What Is Driving Gender Equality in Secondary Education? Evidence from 57 Developing Countries, 1970–2010

Despite global efforts to expand educational opportunities for women, gender inequalities persist in many developing countries. Addressing the root causes of gender inequalities in secondary education we ask whether such disparities persist because of low state capacity or low willingness. Based on gender- and age-specific educational attainment data for 57 developing countries in 1970–2010, our analysis indicates that willingness factors are central to understanding gender equality in education: ethnically heterogeneous countries and countries where Islam is the primary religion experience lower levels of equality. However, key capacity factors like a country’s income level are unrelated to gender differences in education