16+1, a New Issue in China-EU Relations?

The present paper investigates the positions of individual member states, European institutions and organizations towards the 16+1 cooperation framework. At the institutional level, the European Commission’s Joint communication on elements for a new EU strategy on China of June 2016, the reports and joint statements of the European Economic and Social Committee and China Economic and Social Council (May 2016 and June 2017) and European Parliament publications underline: the absence of a common EU-level strategy on recent large scale Chinese initiatives and some member states pursue individual economic interests, which do not correspond to those of the EU as a whole; 16+1 format as “controversial”, as its arrangements are “in conflict with the EU law” which leads to the “erosion of EU norms”; the necessity to “cooperate with the Commission, the EEAS and other Member States to help ensure that relevant aspects to the EU are in line with EU law, rules and policies, and that the overall outcome is beneficial for the EU as a whole”. We analyze the concerns and make specific proposals so that the 16+1 format might cease to be an issue in China-EU relations

16+1, a New Issue in China-EU Relations?

The present paper investigates the positions of individual member states, European institutions and organizations towards the 16+1 cooperation framework. At the institutional level, the European Commission’s Joint communication on elements for a new EU strategy on China of June 2016, the reports and joint statements of the European Economic and Social Committee and China Economic and Social Council (May 2016 and June 2017) and European Parliament publications underline: the absence of a common EU-level strategy on recent large scale Chinese initiatives and some member states pursue individual economic interests, which do not correspond to those of the EU as a whole; 16+1 format as “controversial”, as its arrangements are “in conflict with the EU law” which leads to the “erosion of EU norms”; the necessity to “cooperate with the Commission, the EEAS and other Member States to help ensure that relevant aspects to the EU are in line with EU law, rules and policies, and that the overall outcome is beneficial for the EU as a whole”. We analyze the concerns and make specific proposals so that the 16+1 format might cease to be an issue in China-EU relations

Pros and Cons of the EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment

The main objectives of the present paper are to elaborate on the EUChina Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI), its provisions, advantages and potential risks, and to detach various standpoints of relevant actors, related to this agreement. The ad referendum CAI, complemented by additional documents by the European Commission, underscores that it goes well beyond the investment protection issues, usually addressed in bilateral investment treaties and it additionally includes rules for: a better market access for the EU companies, a fairer investment environment in China and sustainable development. Despite its support by the European Commission, there has been formulated a strong criticism of the deal from various directions, both European and non-European. Besides, the conclusion of the pact induced not only tensions at the extra-EU level, but also intra-EU. The largest two obstacles to the adoption of the treaty are the conflicting interests of the EU Member States and the opposition of the European Parliament. Therefore a common position is needed inside the EU. The research is complemented by an analysis of the broader circumstances of rising FDI protectionism worldwide, under the increased complexity of the system of international relations and recent trends, harmful to multilateralism

European Union and Big Four’s Position Towards the 16+1 Cooperation Platform

The aim of the present paper is to investigate the position towards the 16+1 framework from the standpoint of the EU as an entity and also the four largest EU countries in terms of GDP, namely Germany, Great Britain, France and Italy. The Big Four are the main recipients of Chinese FDI and are also the most active European exporters to China, while CEE concentrates only a small share of the EU-Chinese trade and investment flows. However, the Big Four are apprehensive with regard to China’s rising competitiveness through national reform policies (such as China 2025 Program) but also via acquisition of high-tech companies. In the competition with a stronger China, these countries and especially Germany consider that the Chinese presence in CEE, alongside the proposed investment projects in infrastructure, including harbours, represent a threat to their established positions in this region and their companies will lose market shares and big infrastructure contracts. Seen from another perspective, in the literature the new framework is considered as a lobby platform, intended to influence the EU decisions through CEE players, which is incompatible with the strategic Sino-EU partnership. As a matter of fact, the EU foreign policy is incoherent in major aspects, including EU-China relation as well. Therefore our investigation focuses on three main aspects. First, we explain how the lack of harmonization between the Big Four and the other EU member states is influencing EU policy towards China. Conferring the Big Four observer status at the 16+1 summits might mitigate tensions. Second we investigate whether the Big Four detain the supremacy in the EU to the detriment of the EU periphery. Third, we underline that the EU needs a common vision towards the Eurasian cooperation, as it includes a new element: the Belt and Road Initiative. One cannot support the BRI by criticizing the 16+1, as the latter is considered by the Chinese authorities a significant component of the BRI. In conclusion, if the CEE countries become a bridge or a wall in the Chinese-EU relations depends only on the ability of all actors to have a balanced relationship with each other

European Union and Big Four’s Position Towards the 16+1 Cooperation Platform

The aim of the present paper is to investigate the position towards the 16+1 framework from the standpoint of the EU as an entity and also the four largest EU countries in terms of GDP, namely Germany, Great Britain, France and Italy. The Big Four are the main recipients of Chinese FDI and are also the most active European exporters to China, while CEE concentrates only a small share of the EU-Chinese trade and investment flows. However, the Big Four are apprehensive with regard to China’s rising competitiveness through national reform policies (such as China 2025 Program) but also via acquisition of high-tech companies. In the competition with a stronger China, these countries and especially Germany consider that the Chinese presence in CEE, alongside the proposed investment projects in infrastructure, including harbours, represent a threat to their established positions in this region and their companies will lose market shares and big infrastructure contracts. Seen from another perspective, in the literature the new framework is considered as a lobby platform, intended to influence the EU decisions through CEE players, which is incompatible with the strategic Sino-EU partnership. As a matter of fact, the EU foreign policy is incoherent in major aspects, including EU-China relation as well. Therefore our investigation focuses on three main aspects. First, we explain how the lack of harmonization between the Big Four and the other EU member states is influencing EU policy towards China. Conferring the Big Four observer status at the 16+1 summits might mitigate tensions. Second we investigate whether the Big Four detain the supremacy in the EU to the detriment of the EU periphery. Third, we underline that the EU needs a common vision towards the Eurasian cooperation, as it includes a new element: the Belt and Road Initiative. One cannot support the BRI by criticizing the 16+1, as the latter is considered by the Chinese authorities a significant component of the BRI. In conclusion, if the CEE countries become a bridge or a wall in the Chinese-EU relations depends only on the ability of all actors to have a balanced relationship with each other

Romanian Attitudes and Perceptions towards the 16+1 Cooperation Platform

The aim of this paper is to analyze Romanian citizens’ attitudes and perceptions towards the 16+1 framework, their determinants and effects. The influencing factors are correlated with the general perception of China and its image, while the effects are seen from the perspectives of the engagement and level of participation in joint initiatives. Recent literature underscores that although this platform offers a range of opportunities in each of the nine pillars of sectoral cooperation, Romania has adopted a passive attitude as regards large-scale projects developed with Chinese partners. Beyond EU specific technical barriers to such projects, the Romanian attitudes towards the 16+1 strongly affected cooperation intensity with China. Positions towards this initiative (opinions from general public, elites, politicians and experts) are identified through three main channels: mass media research, individual interviews and focus groups. The quantitative analysis, combined with qualitative research, emphasizes that in spite of the recognition by some groups of the potential benefits offered by the cooperation in the 16+1 format, reluctance remains. This is not due to China’s assets-liabilities balance or the lack of capacity to understand China, but on both insufficient information on 16+1 and political inertia

CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE: CORRELATIONS BETWEEN THE EU DEPENDENCE-ATTITUDE MATRIX AND COOPERATION INTENSITY WITH CHINA

Our first research objective is to outline the degree of dependence on EU trade and investment of the CEE countries included in the 16+1 platform, as well as their attitudes towards the EU. The resulting EU dependence/attitude matrix helps us to identify four groups of CEE countries according to their lower/higher dependence on EU trade and investment, alongside their negative/positive attitudes towards the EU. Our second objective is to classify CEE-16 according to their cooperation intensity with China, as mirrored by their economic and political ties with China. Our investigation underlines that: (1) higher levels of cooperation intensity with China are generally correlated with negative attitudes towards the EU, importance of national interests and need to develop balanced relations with major global actors; (2) lower levels of cooperation intensity with China correspond to euro-optimist/moderate stances, extreme dependence on the internal market or political inertia

The “New Normal” of the Chinese Economy from the Standpoint of Investments

Investments and exports represented the main growth engines of the Chinese economy for more than three decades. China’s rise has been, and continues to be, one of the most noticeable transformations in the global economy. Nevertheless, as large internal imbalances have emerged and economies worldwide are unlikely to come back to growth rates similar to those prior to the financial and economic crisis, the need for the Chinese growth model to move towards a new stage is obvious. The current phase is dubbed by the Chinese authorities the “New Normal”. In this new stage, growth is supported mainly by domestic consumption. In spite of this major change, investments and trade will continue to be important drivers of China’s growth, going in parallel with the evolution of the standard of living and the increasing role of domestic consumption, as investment, trade and consumption are rather complementary. This paper aims to highlight: (1) the transition of the Chinese economy from a model based on export and investment towards a more balanced growth model supported by domestic consumption; (2) the drawbacks but also the advantages of the former development model based on investments, with a focus on recent developments in the real estate sector; (3) the importance of investments in infrastructure and the revival of the “Silk Road”. Hence, our research is structured around three sections, preceded by a short introduction and followed by some conclusions

THE STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF THE UK-INDIA PARTNERSHIP FROM THE BREXIT PERSPECTIVE

The main objective of this research is to identify commonalities between the British and Indian foreign policy in the current economic and geopolitical context. For the United Kingdom, strategic alliances have become once again the central element of its foreign policy in view of its likely exit from the EU at the horizon of 2019. Among these alliances, the Commonwealth plays a special role, with India being Britain's most important partner, not only in terms of the size of its economy and population, but also taking into account the scale and depth of bilateral economic relations. In turn, India focuses on extending its sphere of influence both in Asia-Pacific and globally. Its cooperation with the UK in various fields, including economy, military, defense and technology exchanges is considered an important way to achieve this goal. Such connections contribute to strengthening the Indo-British strategic partnership, which already has solid foundations from the standpoint of a common history, and a solid institutional cooperation and deep bilateral economic relations

Resetting the Growth Engines of the BRICS Countries as a Reaction to the Global Crisis

In the present paper, our main objective is to bring to the forefront two notable processes, as a result of the world financial and economic crisis. On the one side, we underline the increasing role of the emerging countries (especially that of China, Brazil, Russia and India) in the world economy and, on the other side, we underscore the remodelling of the patterns of economic growth and development in the case of the BRICS countries. The Russian Federation, Brazil and South Africa rapidly eased out of the recession in 2009, while China and India continued to record robust growth rates. Nevertheless, in 2012, one can remark the precipitate slowdown of the GDP growth in all the five analysed economies. This demonstrates that the emerging economies were not able to “decouple” from the world economy and, on the contrary, they were deeply affected by the adverse economic situation in the USA and the EU (especially the Euro Zone). At the same time, China’s economic slowdown negatively influences Brazil, Russia, India and South Africa, as China represents the largest trading partner for them, after the EU. At the same time, one should not ignore the actual weaknesses of these economies. For instance, inflation represents a “common vulnerability” of the BRICS. In this situation, the selection of the most viable instrument of monetary policy represents a veritable challenge for the authorities in these countries, as the economic growth should be stimulated but, at the same time, inflation has to be tempered. Besides, unemployment rate in South Africa is already at high levels. The fiscal deficit, as a percentage of GDP is excessive in India and South Africa and the public debt to GDP ratio is extremely high in India and Brazil. During the world financial and economic crisis, the authorities and companies, both public and private, concentrated their attention more and more on the internal markets, with a high absorption capacity. Without giving up exports and FDI as engines of economic growth, the administrative bodies at macro and microeconomic levels understood that the internal demand represents a complementary source of growth. In contrast with the most developed countries, which intensely resorted to austerity measures, the BRICS were able to adopt stimulus measures. Such Keynesian moves were possible, as the emerging countries entered the global crisis with strong macroeconomic and financial positions. As a matter of fact, the world financial and economic crisis erupted in a moment considered by the international experts as the “most prosperous” for these countries. The general measures adopted in order to stimulate the economy in the field of fiscal policy and monetary policy were combined with specific, sectoral ones. Such measures managed even to attenuate the negative effects of the global crisis at social level. Infrastructure development though public investment projects is used by the BRICS governments as one of the principal means to stimulate economic growth and jobs creation. Our paper concludes that, for the BRICS countries, the classical engines for economic growth like exports and inward FDI are complemented by additional growth engines: internal demand (spurred by the high level of remittances from abroad), the outward FDI, innovation and infrastructure development