Iraq: the neocon strategy

As is well known, in the months after 11 September 2001, the United States developed its strategy for a ‘global war on terror’. This strategy, the Bush Doctrine, signaled a strong preparedness to act unilaterally and pre-emptively and identified an ‘axis of evil’ — Iraq, Iran and North Korea — as its principal target. These states were singled out because they were deemed to be most likely to equip terrorist groups with weapons of mass destruction (WMD)

Architecture of Security

We cannot expect in East Asia over the foreseeable future to see the sort of conflation of sovereign states that has occurred in Europe. We must anticipate that, for the foreseeable future, the requirement will be for the sensible management and containment of competitive instincts. The establishment of a multilateral security body in East Asia that includes all the key players, and which the major powers invest with the authority to tackle the shaping of the regional security order, remains a critical piece of unfinished business

The cruise missile and arms control

In 1972 the United States made the rather surprising announcement that it would develop a submarine-launched strategic cruise missile. Within a short time the cruise missile was being labeled as one of the most significant weapons developments of the decade with major applications in theatre and tactical as well as strategic roles. The characteristics of a cruise missile are such that its range and type of warhead - and therefore its role - cannot be reliably determined by external inspection, monitoring test flights or noting the platform on which it is deployed. Largely because of this ambiguity, the cruise missile became one of the most contentious issues in the negotiations on a second strategic arms limitation treaty (SALT II). More generally, the cruise missile played an instrumental role in widening the scope of these negotiations to include long-range in theatre nuclear systems that occupy the gray area between strategic and battlefield weapons. In this monograph Mr Huisken makes a detailed examination of the role played by cruise missiles in SALT II and offers some thoughts on their implications for SALT III

Southeast Asia : major power playground or finishing school?

Through the ASEAN Summit processes and the ASEAN Regional Forum, followed later in the 1990's by the ASEAN Plus Three, and, most recently, the East Asia Summit, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has sustained a near monopoly on pan-Asian multilateral processes. To get some perspective on the circumstances that have made this possible, and to provide a basis for assessing its real effectiveness, it is useful to look at how the United States, Japan and China relate to Southeast Asia and at what these postures suggest about the aspirations these states may have for the region. In short, it seems to me that the risk is very real that ASEAN will find that it lacks the muscle to pull off its experiment in geopolitical fine-tuning. ASEAN will need help, ideally in the form of a forum in which the major powers are in the driver's seat, accept responsibility and try to devise a trajectory toward a stable accommodation in the management of East Asia's development