Democracy, inequality and the environment when citizens can mitigate privately or act collectively

We study the political economy of the environment in autocratic, weak and strong democracies when individuals can either mitigate the health consequences of domestic pollution privately or reduce pollution collectively through public policy. The setting is that of a small open economy in which incomes depend importantly on trade in dirty goods, where income inequality and the degree to which ordinary citizens exert voice in each dimension of the policy process distinguishes elites and ordinary citizens. The recognition that the health consequences of pollution can be dealt with privately at a cost adds an important dimension to the analysis of the political economy of environmental regulation, especially for an open economy. When private mitigation is feasible, inequality of incomes leads to an unequal distribution of the health burden of pollution (in accordance with the epidemiologic evidence), thus polarizing the interests of citizens in democracies and of ordinary citizens and elites in non-democratic regimes. Inequality in the willingness to bear the cost of private mitigation in turn interacts with the pollution costs and income benefits of trade in dirty goods to further polarize interests concerning both environmental stringency and the regulation of trade openness. In this context, we show how the eco-friendliness ranking of different political regimes varies with the cost of private mitigation and with the extent of income inequality, tending to converge when mitigation costs are high, and even producing a ranking reversal between democracies and autocracies, and between weak and strong democracies, when costs lie in an intermediate range.pollution, environmental regulation, private mitigation, income inequality, democracy, trade, welfare, collective choice, political economy

On the redistributive impact of privitazing a resource under imperfect enforcement

We consider the redistributive effects of privatizing a resource previously exploited under free access. We assume that illegal extraction is punished but that the sanction is bounded by individual's wealth. First, we show that a segment of intermediate-wea lth individuals is the most adversely affected from the regime change, while the poorest segment is not only less severely affected, but may actually gain from it. Next, we show how the authorities may prefer to choose an intermediate enforcement level in order to maximize the political acceptability of the regime switch among the local community.PROPERTY RIGHTS; ENFORCEMENT; WEALTH DISTRIBUTION; NATURAL RESOURCES; ILLEGAL EXTRACTION

The Demands for Environmental Regulation and for Trade in the Presence of Private Mitigation

We study the nature of individual demands for environmental regulation and for trade openness in the general equilibrium of a small open economy where the environment is an input to production. Differences in the ability of individuals to afford private mitigation of the adverse consequences of pollution is a central feature of the analysis. Private mitigation leads to an endogenous, unequal distribution of the health-related consequences of pollution across income groups in a manner consistent with epidemiologic studies, in contrast to much of the literature which assumes equal health effects for all. We show that when private mitigation is possible at a cost, trade polarizes the interests of rich and poor with respect to the stringency of regulation. Moreover, even though trade has the potential to benefit everyone, the poor may oppose trade openness because of a concern that laxer environmental regulation will then be imposed in the interest of the rich. We explain why and how heterogeneity in the intensity of preferences, and not just in their direction, is likely to play a role in the determination of collective choices with respect to the regulation of the environment and of trade. We conclude by drawing out the general implications of the analysis for the study of the political economy of the environmenttrade- welfare nexus.regulation, environment, pollution, private mitigation, trade, welfare, collective choice

The Demands for Environmental Regulation and for Trade in the Presence of Private Mitigation

We study the nature of individual demands for environmental regulation and for trade openness in the general equilibrium of a small open economy where the environment is an input to production. Differences in the ability of individuals to afford private mitigation of the adverse consequences of pollution is a central feature of the analysis. Private mitigation leads to an endogenous, unequal distribution of the health-related consequences of pollution across income groups in a manner consistent with epidemiologic studies, in contrast to much of the literature which assumes equal health effects for all. We show that when private mitigation is possible at a cost, trade polarizes the interests of rich and poor with respect to the stringency of regulation. Moreover, even though trade has the potential to benefit everyone, the poor may oppose trade openness because of a concern that laxer environmental regulation will then be imposed in the interest of the rich. We explain why heterogeneity in the intensity of preferences, and not just in their direction, is likely to play a role in the determination of collective choices with respect to the regulation of the environment and of trade. We conclude by drawing out the implications of the analysis for the study of the political economy of the environment-trade-welfare nexus.regulation, environment, pollution, private mitigation, trade, welfare, health, collective choice

On the Dual Nature of Weak Property Rights

In the natural resource literature, convertional wisdom holds that weak property rights will cause a resource to be over-exploited. This is because weak property rights are typically perceived as a problem of input exclusion. In this paper, we first present evidence to the effect that weak property rights often take the form of contestable output- or output theft - and that this has an impact or resource use. We then propose a theoretical model of natural resource use under generally weak prperty rights - or weak state presence - when resource users face the dual problem of input exclusion output appropriation. We show that introducing the possibility that outputs can be contested acts as an output tax, with the added twist that resource users effectively determine the level of the tax. This tax has a depressive effect on input use. As a result, whether the resource is under-or over-exploited in equilibrium will depend on the relative severity of output appropriation and input exclusion problems when property rights are generally weak.Natural Resources, Property Rights, Trespass, Theft, Over-Exploitation,Under-Exploitation

Errance et enracinement dans Visions de Jude de Daniel Poliquin

Cet article vise à cerner la question de l'errance et de l'enracinement dans l'oeuvre de Daniel Poliquin à partir d'une analyse des voyages et de la sédentarisation des personnages du roman La Côte de Sable. Ce roman, grâce principalement à son personnage principal, Jude le marin, l'explorateur, le découvreur, le géographe, permet une analyse détaillée de la symbolique de l'espace dans l'oeuvre de l'écrivain franco-ontarien. En effet, nomades et sédentaires y sont nombreux. Deux types de sédentaires coexistent : ceux qui n'ont jamais voyagé et ceux qui se sédentarisent après une période d'errance. Les premiers ont le plus souvent une existence morne alors que les seconds parviennent, en général, à trouver une certaine sagesse. Les « errants » perpétuels sont, pour leur part, constamment à la recherche d'une harmonie qui ne peut venir que de l'acception de leur identité propre. Cette quête infinie fait que ces êtres perpétuellement en mouvement ne trouvent jamais d'ancrage. Aussi, la narration ne peut-elle être assumée que par les sédentaires qui se trouvent dans la situation privilégiée de l'observateur.An analysis of Daniel Poliquin's novel La Côte de Sable, focusing on the characters' travels and the process by which they become sedentary, provides an approach to wandering and rootedness in the work of this Franco-Ontarian author. The novel's main character, Jude — sailor, explorer, discoverer and geographer — is the basis for a detailed analysis of Poliquin's symbolic use of space. The novel includes many nomads and sedentary characters. Two types of sedentary characters coexist: those who have never traveled and those who become sedentary after a period of wandering. In general, members of the first group lead a drab existence while those of the second type are able to attain a certain kind of wisdom. As for those who are perpetual wanderers, they are ceaselessly looking for a harmony that can only come from acceptance of their own specific identity. Because of their endless quest, these people are perpetually moving and can never find an anchor. Thus, only the sedentary characters, through their privileged position as observers, are capable of narrative

Examining the Socioeconomic Patterns of Service Utilization among Canadian Women at Risk for Developing Eating Disorders: A Prevalence Study

This study adapted Andersen’s behavioural model of service utilization (1995) to explore health and mental health service utilization amongst women at risk for developing an eating disorder in Canada. Specifically, secondary data analysis using the Canadian Community Health Survey (2012) were used to examine the relationship between body dissatisfaction, socioeconomic variables (ethnicity and income), and service utilization (health care utilization, mental health care utilization and unmet needs) amongst Canadian women. Results indicated that body dissatisfied women had high health and mental health service utilization, and higher reported unmet needs. Furthermore, increased age and lower educational attainment were associated with disparities in mental health service utilization. Finally, the majority of reasons that body dissatisfied women provided for unmet needs were based on structural barriers. This study highlighted significant barriers to service utilization for women at risk of eating disorders in Canada. Due to the high individual and social costs to eating disorders, barriers creating inequitable health services and mental health services need to be addressed in clinical practice, organizational structures, policy, and in research to improve treatment pathways

Natural-Resource Exploitation with Costly Enforcement of Property Rights

This paper proposes a model of natural-resource exploitation when private ownership requires costly enforcement activities. For a given wage rate, it is shown how enforcement costs can increase with labor's average productivity on a resource site. As a result, it is never optimal for the site owner to produce at the point where marginal productivity equals the wage rate. It may even be optimal to exploit at a point exhibiting negative marginal returns. An important parameter in the analysis is the prevailing wage rate. When wages are low, further decreases in the wage rates can reduce the returns from resource exploitation. At sufficiently low wages, positive returns can be rendered impossible to achieve and the site is abandoned to a free-access exploitation. The analysis provides some clues as to why property rights may be more difficult to delineate in less developed countries. It proposes a different framework from which to address normative issues such as the desirability of free trade with endogenous enforcement costs, the optimality of private decisions to enforce property rights, the effect of income distribution on property rights enforceability, etc.Cette étude propose un modèle d'exploitation des ressources naturelles lorsque les droits de propriété sont onéreux à faire respecter. Il y est démontré comment, sur un site de ressources naturelles, une hausse du produit moyen de la main-d'oeuvre peut contribuer à faire augmenter les coûts d'exclusion d'empiéteurs potentiels; il ne serait donc pas optimal, pour le propriétaire du site, d'exploiter à un niveau tel que le produit marginal de la main-d'oeuvre soit égal à son coût. Il serait même admissible que le propriétaire engage de la main-d'oeuvre dont le produit marginal soit négatif. Le niveau de salaire constitue un paramètre important de l'analyse. On trouve que lorsque le niveau de salaire de l'économie est déjà peu élevé, des réductions de salaire subséquentes peuvent contribuer à réduire les rentes découlant de l'exploitation du site. Et en deçà d'un certain seuil, des rentes positives deviennent inatteignables, forçant son propriétaire à abandonner le site; ce dernier devient alors soumis à un accès libre. L'analyse expliquerait le fait que les droits de propriété soient plus difficiles à faire observer dans les pays en voie de développement. De plus, elle suggère un cadre d'analyse à partir duquel certaines questions d'ordre normatif pourraient être abordées, telles que les bienfaits du commerce international avec coûts endogènes des droits de propriété, l'optimalité des décisions de définir les droits de propriété, l'effet de la distribution des revenus sur les coûts d'application des droits de propriété, etc

Democracy, Inequality and the Environment when Citizens can Mitigate Privately or Act Collectively

We study the political economy of the environment in autocratic, weak and strong democracies when individuals can either mitigate the health consequences of domestic pollution privately or reduce pollution collectively through public policy. The setting is that of a small open economy in which incomes depend importantly on trade in dirty goods, where income inequality and the degree to which ordinary citizens exert voice in each dimension of the policy process distinguishes elites and ordinary citizens. The recognition that the health consequences of pollution can be dealt with privately at a cost adds an important dimension to the analysis of the political economy of environmental regulation, especially for an open economy. When private mitigation is feasible, inequality of incomes leads to an unequal distribution of the health burden of pollution (in accordance with the epidemiologic evidence), thus polarizing the interests of citizens in democracies and of ordinary citizens and elites in non-democratic regimes. Inequality in the willingness to bear the cost of private mitigation in turn interacts with the pollution costs and income benefits of trade in dirty goods to further polarize interests concerning both environmental stringency and the regulation of trade openness. In this context, we show how the eco-friendliness ranking of different political regimes varies with the cost of private mitigation and with the extent of income inequality, tending to converge when mitigation costs are high, and even producing a ranking reversal between democracies and autocracies, and between weak and strong democracies, when costs lie in an intermediate range.pollution, environmental regulation, private mitigation, income inequality, democracy, trade, welfare, collective choice, political economy