Water Allocation Under Distribution Losses: Comparing Alternative Institutions

The distribution of water resources is characterized by increasing returns to scale. Distribution systems link water generation to its end-use. Standard economic analysis overlooks the interaction among these micro-markets - generation, distribution and end-use. We compare water allocation when there is market power in each micro-market. These outcomes are compared with benchmark cases - social planning and a competitive business-as-usual regime. Simulations suggest that institutions with market power in generation and end-use generate significantly higher welfare than the distribution monopoly and the competitive regime. However, if the policy goal is to maximize the size of the grid, a distribution monopoly is preferred.infrastructure; market power; spatial models; vertical integration; water markets

Contrasting dynamics of memory consolidation for novel word forms and meanings revealed by behavioral and neurophysiological markers

Learning novel words is a challenging process for our memory systems; we must be able to recall new word forms and meanings in order to communicate. However, the dynamics of the word memory formation is still unclear. Here, we addressed the temporal profile of two key cognitive markers of memory consolidation in the domain of word learning: i) the susceptibility of recently learned novel words to memory interference; ii) their lexical integration using a semantic judgment task while recording the ERPs responses. Young adults acquired a set of novel picture-label-meaning associations. In a first experiment, we performed a temporal gradient of retroactive interference (5 min, 30 min, 4 h and 24 h) and evaluated the memory retention 48 h after learning. In a second experiment, we studied the dynamics of the integration of these novel words, by measuring their N400 modulation when preceded by semantically related words, at 30 min or 48 h after learning. Our results showed that the word-form memory was affected by the interference treatment when it was presented 5 min after learning, but not at later times. On the other hand, only 48 h after learning it was possible to observe a neurophysiological index of semantic-priming (reduced N400 response). These results point to the existence of two contrasting processes that help to build the memory for word forms and meanings. A rapid mechanism would enable word learning while mitigating forgetting, while a slow consolidation would allow the novel meanings to be integrated into previous semantic networks.Fil: Kaczer, Laura. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Oficina de Coordinación Administrativa Ciudad Universitaria. Instituto de Fisiología, Biología Molecular y Neurociencias. Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Ciencias Exactas y Naturales. Instituto de Fisiología, Biología Molecular y Neurociencias; ArgentinaFil: Bavassi, Mariana Luz. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Oficina de Coordinación Administrativa Ciudad Universitaria. Instituto de Fisiología, Biología Molecular y Neurociencias. Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Ciencias Exactas y Naturales. Instituto de Fisiología, Biología Molecular y Neurociencias; ArgentinaFil: Petroni, Agustín. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Oficina de Coordinación Administrativa Ciudad Universitaria. Instituto de Fisiología, Biología Molecular y Neurociencias. Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Ciencias Exactas y Naturales. Instituto de Fisiología, Biología Molecular y Neurociencias; Argentina. Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Ciencias Exactas y Naturales. Departamento de Computación; ArgentinaFil: Fernández, Rodrigo Sebastián. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Oficina de Coordinación Administrativa Ciudad Universitaria. Instituto de Fisiología, Biología Molecular y Neurociencias. Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Ciencias Exactas y Naturales. Instituto de Fisiología, Biología Molecular y Neurociencias; ArgentinaFil: Laurino, Julieta. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Oficina de Coordinación Administrativa Ciudad Universitaria. Instituto de Fisiología, Biología Molecular y Neurociencias. Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Ciencias Exactas y Naturales. Instituto de Fisiología, Biología Molecular y Neurociencias; ArgentinaFil: Degiorgi, Sofía. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Oficina de Coordinación Administrativa Ciudad Universitaria. Instituto de Fisiología, Biología Molecular y Neurociencias. Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Ciencias Exactas y Naturales. Instituto de Fisiología, Biología Molecular y Neurociencias; ArgentinaFil: Hochman, Eithan. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Oficina de Coordinación Administrativa Ciudad Universitaria. Instituto de Fisiología, Biología Molecular y Neurociencias. Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Ciencias Exactas y Naturales. Instituto de Fisiología, Biología Molecular y Neurociencias; ArgentinaFil: Forcato, Cecilia. Universidad Nacional Arturo Jauretche; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; ArgentinaFil: Pedreira, Maria Eugenia. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Oficina de Coordinación Administrativa Ciudad Universitaria. Instituto de Fisiología, Biología Molecular y Neurociencias. Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Ciencias Exactas y Naturales. Instituto de Fisiología, Biología Molecular y Neurociencias; Argentin

An Optimal Stopping Problem of a Growing Inventory

This paper deals with the problem of explaining the behavior of a producer entering the period with growing inventory, while the current price and a stochastic distribution of prices for the following period are given. The conceptual framework is one of searching for an optimal stopping rule for this problem. It is shown that the optimal policy consists of finding a unique cutoff price function, which is non-increasing with respect to the age of the stock.

Allocation of Common Resources with Political Bargaining

This paper analyses the problem of the allocation of common resources within a situation of political bargaining. Using Zusman's cooperative bargaining framework the effects of property rights and policy tools (prices&quantities) on the efficiency of the allocation, are examined. It shows that the Coase theorem holds when political power is equally distributed and price is the policy tool of the decision maker. When aggregate quantity is the policy tool, the efficiency depends on the distribution of the property rights. Likewise, it demonstrates that when property rights are not well defined, the efficiency of the allocation process depends on both elasticity of demand and supply. Finally it proves that when property rights are not defined, using price as a policy tool results in a higher quantity allocation than in the situation when quantity is the policy tool

The Israeli Water Economy: Reform vs. Reality

Water has been heavily subsidized in Israel for many years and this policy has resulted in severe wastage of water. Drought, the peace process and the rapid, increase of urban demand has enforced the need for reform in the allocation and pricing of water. Water markets have been suggested in the past, as an efficient mechanism for the allocation of water, despite the lack of empirical evidence to support this claim. National ownership of land and water, as well as the nature of the settlement process in Israel, prevented the creation of Israeli water markets. The privatization of the Israeli water economy has been introduced through quasi-market mechanisms at both the regional and the national level. At the national level, a Hicksian type barter market is practised with given shares of the "initial endowments" while the aggregate water quantity is determined administratively by the central government. At the regional level, a "passive" water trading mechanism is introduced where at a price announced by the policy maker, each individual uses water according to his demand curve and pays a fine or receives monetary compensation according to his share in the aggregate water right. Regulation of a private firm which supplies water at the regional level, is conducted through monitoring the optimal ratio of conjunctive use of surface and underground water. Finally the efficiency of the current tiered pricing policy vs. the reform, is tested, using empirical data from several regions in Israel