NO2 sensing properties of macroporous In2O3-based powders fabricated by utilizing ultrasonic spray pyrolysis employing polymethylmethacrylate microspheres as a template

Macroporous (mp-) In2O3-based microspheres as a NO2 sensing material were prepared by the pyrolysis of atomized In(NO3)3 aqueous solutions containing polymethylmethacrylate (PMMA) microspheres (150 nm in diameter) as a template. Well-developed spherical macropores (less than 100 nm in diameter) reflecting the morphology of the PMMA microsphere templates could be formed in the In2O3-based microspheres. The introduction of macropores into In2O3-based microspheres was very effective in improving the NO2 response of their thick films fabricated on an alumina substrate equipped with interdigitated Pt electrodes (gap size: ca. 200 μm) by screen-printing. In addition, the addition of a little amount of SnO2 to the mp-In2O3 microspheres not only lowered the resistance in air but also improved the NO2 response. NO2 sensing properties of non-stacked microspheres of the mp-In2O3 mixed with SnO2 were also investigated by utilizing nano-gap Au electrodes (gap size: ca. 200 nm). The non-stacked microspheres showed fast response and recovery speeds to NO2, because of better diffusion capability of NO2

Ageing and political institutions : comparative political economy of long-term care for frail older people

Defense date: 29 January 2010Examining Board: Ellen Immergut (Humboldt University, Berlin), Martin Kohli (EUI), Toshimitsu Shinkawa (Kyoto University), Sven Steinmo (EUI) (Supervisor)Despite common socio-demographic pressures such as longer longevity, lower fertility rate, and feminization of labor market, public elderly care policy is remarkably diverse across advanced industrialized countries. This dissertation is an attempt to explain the cross-national variation of elderly care programs from the perspective of historical institutionalism. Specifically, it maintains that the statesociety relations structured by electoral rules and party system affect the development of elderly care programs. Since universalistic social policy, including public elderly care programs, faces collective action problems, it is less likely to thrive unless the state relatively autonomous from societal interests is able to coordinate its benefits and costs in an equitable way. And, then, to what extent the state retains its relative autonomy is contingent on the predominant mode of intra- and inter-party competition in each country. On the intra-party dimension, whereas personal-vote-oriented electoral rules create a decentralized party and clientalistic political competition through particularistic benefits, party-vote-oriented electoral rules generate a centralized party and party-based political competition. On the inter-party dimension, while a ruling coalition fragmented along various social cleavages promotes particularistic party competition, one-party dominance is capable of internalizing the benefits and expenses of social protection programs within its broader constituencies unless the dominant party itself is decentralized. Hence, this thesis claims that oneparty dominance under the party-vote-oriented electoral system allows the state to be autonomous from societal interests and expand public elderly care programs. To verify the above theoretical argument, this thesis conducts quantitative as well as qualitative analysis. Its quantitative analysis, using pooled cross-section and timeseries data of 15 OECD countries from 1980 until 2001, shows that electoral rules structure the process translating demographic changes into public spending for elderly care programs. Qualitative case studies, which cover Sweden, Japan, and the U.S., demonstrate that the state plays a critical role in developing and reforming public elderly care programs in these countries. Overall, this thesis concludes that although the effects of party system are inconclusive, the degree of state autonomy structured by electoral rules is an important determinant of public elderly care policy

Ageing and political institutions : comparative political economy of long-term care for frail older people

Defense date: 29 January 2010Examining Board: Ellen Immergut (Humboldt University, Berlin), Martin Kohli (EUI), Toshimitsu Shinkawa (Kyoto University), Sven Steinmo (EUI) (Supervisor)Despite common socio-demographic pressures such as longer longevity, lower fertility rate, and feminization of labor market, public elderly care policy is remarkably diverse across advanced industrialized countries. This dissertation is an attempt to explain the cross-national variation of elderly care programs from the perspective of historical institutionalism. Specifically, it maintains that the statesociety relations structured by electoral rules and party system affect the development of elderly care programs. Since universalistic social policy, including public elderly care programs, faces collective action problems, it is less likely to thrive unless the state relatively autonomous from societal interests is able to coordinate its benefits and costs in an equitable way. And, then, to what extent the state retains its relative autonomy is contingent on the predominant mode of intra- and inter-party competition in each country. On the intra-party dimension, whereas personal-vote-oriented electoral rules create a decentralized party and clientalistic political competition through particularistic benefits, party-vote-oriented electoral rules generate a centralized party and party-based political competition. On the inter-party dimension, while a ruling coalition fragmented along various social cleavages promotes particularistic party competition, one-party dominance is capable of internalizing the benefits and expenses of social protection programs within its broader constituencies unless the dominant party itself is decentralized. Hence, this thesis claims that oneparty dominance under the party-vote-oriented electoral system allows the state to be autonomous from societal interests and expand public elderly care programs. To verify the above theoretical argument, this thesis conducts quantitative as well as qualitative analysis. Its quantitative analysis, using pooled cross-section and timeseries data of 15 OECD countries from 1980 until 2001, shows that electoral rules structure the process translating demographic changes into public spending for elderly care programs. Qualitative case studies, which cover Sweden, Japan, and the U.S., demonstrate that the state plays a critical role in developing and reforming public elderly care programs in these countries. Overall, this thesis concludes that although the effects of party system are inconclusive, the degree of state autonomy structured by electoral rules is an important determinant of public elderly care policy

Political Institutions and Elderly Care Policy: Comparative politics of long-term care in advanced democracies

Although most advanced industrialized countries are facing population aging and other social changes, public long-term care programs for the aged are remarkably diverse across them. This book accounts for the variations in elderly care policy by combining statistical analysis with historical case studies of Sweden, Japan and the USA. Even though most advanced industrialized countries are facing population aging, feminization of the labour market and other social transformations, public long-term care programs for the aged are remarkably diverse across them. This book maintains that political institutions have generated the cross-national variations of public elderly care policy. It argues that when electoral rules and party systems encourage political parties to compete with each other over public policy, the welfare state is likely to promote the development of public elderly care programs. By contrast, when these political institutions foster patronage-based political competition, elderly care programs are less likely to thrive. This book offers a stylized theoretical model for the variation of social protection systems and proves its theoretical claim by combining sophisticated statistical analysis with in-depth historical case studies of Sweden, Japan and the U.S.-- List of Tables vii -- List of Figures viii -- List of Abbreviations ix -- Acknowledgements xi -- 1 Introduction 1 (11) -- 2 Understanding the Politics of Universalistic Social Care Services: A Theoretical Framework 12 (16) -- 3 Political Institutional Conditions for the Development of Elderly Care Programs: Quantitative Evidence 28 (21) -- 4 Sweden: The Manipulative State 49 (42) -- 5 Japan: `MHW and the Japanese Miracle', in a Sense 91 (49) -- 6 The United States of America: Evolution without Revolution 140 (42) -- 7 Conclusion: Political Institutions, Voter-Politician Linkage, and Universalistic Social Policy 182 (14) -- Notes 196 (13) -- Bibliography 209 (18) -- IndexPublished version of EUI PhD thesis, 201

The Political Economy of Welfare Recalibration: What Determines the State’s Responses to the Emergence of New Social Risks?

This study examines the conditions under which welfare states are likely to adapt their social policies to the transformation of social risk structures under post-industrialization. It argues that in the era of welfare retrenchment, while heterogeneous policy preferences among veto players impede the expansion of new social risk policies, the same institutional characteristics encourage the growth of old social risk policies. This study analyzes the time-series and cross-section data of advanced industrialized democracies from 1980 to 2001 with a fixedeffect model, and reveals that the composition of veto players structures the state’s ability to adjust its social policies to post-industrialization