Culture and Cooperation

Does the cultural background influence the success with which genetically unrelated individuals cooperate in social dilemma situations? In this paper we provide an answer by analyzing the data of Herrmann et al. (Science 2008, pp. 1362-1367), who study cooperation and punishment in sixteen subject pools from six different world cultures (as classified by Inglehart & Baker (American Sociological Review 2000, pp. 19-51)). We use analysis of variance to disentangle the importance of cultural background relative to individual heterogeneity and group-level differences in cooperation. We find that culture has a substantial influence on the extent of cooperation, in addition to individual heterogeneity and group-level differences identified by previous research. The significance of this result is that cultural background has a substantial influence on cooperation in otherwise identical environments. This is particularly true in the presence of punishment opportunities.human cooperation, punishment, culture, experimental public good games

The limits of self-governance in the presence of spite: experimental evidence from urban and rural Russia

We report evidence from public goods experiments with and without punishment which we conducted in Russia with 566 urban and rural participants of young and mature age cohorts. Russia is interesting for studying voluntary cooperation because of its long history of collectivism, and a huge urban-rural gap. In contrast to previous experiments we find no cooperation-enhancing effect of punishment. An important reason is that there is substantial spiteful punishment of high contributors in all four subject pools. Thus, spite undermines the scope for self-governance in the sense of high levels of voluntary cooperation that are sustained by sanctioning free riders only

Social comparison in the workplace: evidence from a field experiment

We conducted a randomized field experiment to examine how workers respond to wage cuts, and whether their response depends on the wages paid to coworkers. Workers were assigned to teams of two, performed identical individual tasks, and received the same performance‐independent hourly wage. Cutting both team members’ wages caused a substantial decrease in performance. When only one team member’s wage was cut, the performance decrease for the workers who received the cut was more than twice as large as the individual performance decrease when both workers’ wages were cut. This finding indicates that social comparison processes among workers affect effort provision because the only difference between the two wage cut conditions is the other team member’s wage level. In contrast, workers whose wage was not cut but who witnessed their team member’s pay being cut displayed no change in performance relative to the baseline treatment in which both workers’ wages remained unchanged, indicating that social comparison exerts asymmetric effects on effort.Compensation, fairness, field experiment, social comparison

Inter-Group Conflict and Intra-Group Punishment in an Experimental Contest Game

We study how conflict in a contest game is influenced by rival parties being groups and by group members being able to punish each other. Our main motivation stems from the analysis of socio-political conflict. The relevant theoretical prediction in our setting is that conflict expenditures are independent of group size and independent of whether punishment is available or not. We find, first, that our results contradict the independence of group-size prediction: conflict expenditures of groups are substantially larger than those of individuals, and both are substantially above equilibrium. Towards the end of the experiment material losses in groups are 257% of the predicted level. There is, however, substantial heterogeneity in the investment behaviour of individual group members. Second, allowing group members to punish each other after individual contributions to the contest effort are revealed leads to even larger conflict expenditures. Now material losses are 869% of the equilibrium level and there is much less heterogeneity in individual group members? investments. These results contrast strongly with those from public goods experiments where punishment enhances efficiency and leads to higher material payoffs.Laboratory experiments, Rent-seeking, Conflict, Group competitiveness

How Does Communicating Herd Immunity Affect Immunization Intentions?

While previous studies have shown that communicating herd immunity can increase immunization intentions, it is unclear how the definition of the beneficiaries influences intentions. In a vignette study, using a new hypothetical influenza virus, 4,172 participants from five European countries (Bulgaria, N=873; Denmark, N=896; England, N=873; Estonia, N=916; and Italy, N=745) were randomized to one of three experimental conditions: (1) control (no mention of herd immunity), (2) society (social benefit of immunization for overall society mentioned), and (3) friends (social benefit for friends and family members mentioned). While the study did not find that communicating herd immunity influenced overall immunization intentions across the five countries, it found substantial cross-country differences in the effect of the communication. In England, friends increased intentions, while society increased intentions in Denmark but decreased it in Italy. While communicating the social benefit of immunization can influence intentions, its contrasting effects highlight the importance of empirically testing

The limits of self-governance when cooperators get punished: Experimental evidence from urban and rural Russia

We report evidence from public goods experiments with and without punishment which we onducted in Russia with 566 urban and rural participants of young and mature age cohorts. Russia is interesting for studying voluntary cooperation because of its long history of collectivism, and a huge urban-rural gap. In contrast to previous experiments we find no cooperation-enhancing effect of punishment. An important reason is that there is punishment of contributors in all four subject pools. Thus, punishment can also undermine the scope for self-governance in the sense of high levels of voluntary cooperation that are sustained by sanctioning free riders only

Resource Scarcity, Spite and Cooperation

Using an experimental approach, this paper examines how scarcity of natural resources affects people's readiness to cooperate or engage in antisocial behavior. The experiments were carried out with pastoralists from southern Namibia, whose livelihoods greatly depend on grazing availability on collectively used rangelands. We split the study region into two areas according to exogenous differences in biomass production (a high-yield and a low-yield area) and conducted a one-shot public goods experiment and a joy-of-destruction experiment with pastoralists from both areas. Results from the joy-of-destruction experiment reveal that a substantial proportion of people are willing to reduce another subject's income, although this comes at a personal cost. We show that this kind of spiteful behavior occurs twice as often in the area where resources are scarcer and hence competitive pressure is higher. By contrast, levels of cooperation are very similar across areas. This indicates that scarcity does not hamper cooperation, at least as long as a subsurvival level has not been exceeded. Our data further reveal a coexistence of prosocial and antisocial behavior within individuals, suggesting that people's motivations depend on the experimental environment they are acting in. One possible explanation is that subjects are ready to cooperate when substantial net gains can be realized, but turn into spiteful money burners when there is no scope for efficiency improvements and the risk of falling behind is particularly salient

Two's company, three's a group: The impact of group identity and group size on in-group favouritism

In this study, we use an allocation game to study the effects of group identity and group size on in-group favouritism when the person's own payoff is not affected by her decision. We first show that in a triadic setting when the subjects are asked to allocate a fixed amount of resource between two other anonymous individuals, the majority of the subjects choose to allocate equal amounts to both the in-group and the out-group members. Contrary to previous studies, when group identity is induced artificially by simply telling the subjects that they belong to the same 'group', it does not appear to significantly increase the amount allocated to the in-group member relative to the out-group member in a triadic setting. However, once the number of the in-group recipients is increased from one to three, the same artificial group identity triggers a sharp increase in in-group favouritism. Our results suggest that in order for favouritism to be clearly observed, not only that group identity has to be present, but also the group needs to consist of more than two members

Disturbance, predation and competition in a flood-prone stream

Among the drivers of the patchy distribution of organisms in space and time are abiotic factors, including physical disturbance, and biotic interactions such as predation and competition. Our understanding of the interplay of these factors is far from complete, especially in frequently disturbed ecosystems. The first of three main experiments investigated the individual and combined effects of flood disturbance and fish predation on benthic invertebrates, algae and leaf decay rates in a reach of the flood-prone Kauru River in Otago, New Zealand. Bed movements during a mid-sized flood were simulated by removing substratum from 16 scour patches, depositing substratum in 16 fill patches, and leaving 16 stable patches unchanged (patch size 0.49m2). Fish were excluded from half the patches using electric exclosures. (My first data chapter describes how this method was adapted for use in the Kauru.) The community on ceramic tiles was studied for 58 days. Local bed disturbance had many short-term and long-term effects on invertebrate and algal biomass distributions. Fish presence had far fewer effects but four of six significant interactions between disturbance and predation indicated a stronger impact of predation in stable patches. I included competition among invertebrate grazers as a third factor in my second 43- day experiment in the Kauru River. The competition treatment consisted of twice-weekly removals of Potamopyrgus antipodarum from half the patches. Local bed disturbance affected the benthic community far more often than fish predation or snail grazing. The frequency of disturbance effects was highest shortly after the disturbance and decreased with time, whereas the few effects of biotic factors occurred on the last sampling date. In my final experiment, I used streamside channels to investigate two topics not addressed in the reach-scale experiments. First, predatory fish are known to influence stream invertebrates not only by direct consumption, but also by altering their behaviour. Second, different fish predators can affect prey communities in different ways. I investigated the individual and combined effects of flood-related bed disturbance and predation by two dominant fish species. Bed movements caused by floods were simulated by tumbling the substratum in half the channels at the start of the experiment. Six channels each were stocked with trout or upland bullies or had fish excluded. Biological response parameters were determined 0, 14 and 28 days after the disturbance, and invertebrates in the entire channel substrata on day 28. Disturbance frequently affected a range of response parameters. Presence or absence of predatory fish, by contrast, had no significant effects on overall invertebrate standing stocks but affected invertebrate densities on surface stones in 40% of cases and invertebrate activity on surface stones in all cases. Native bullies featured more often than exotic trout in causing density changes and equally often in causing changes to grazer behaviour. My combined experimental findings from a flood-prone river imply that in the presence of physical disturbance, biotic interactions may play a weaker role in determining the distribution of stream organisms than under stable conditions

Is it a norm to favour your own group?

This paper examines the relationship between norm enforcement and in-group favouritism behaviour. Using a new two-stage allocation experiment with punishments, we investigate whether in-group favouritism is considered as a social norm in itself or as a violation of a different norm, such as egalitarian norm. We find that which norm of behaviour is enforced depends on who the punisher is. If the punishers belong to the in-group, in-group favouritism is considered a norm and it does not get punished. If the punishers belong to the out-group, in-group favouritism is frequently punished. If the punishers belong to no group and merely observe in-group favouritism (the third-party), they do not seem to care sufficiently to be willing to punish this behaviour. Our results shed a new light on the effectiveness of altruistic norm enforcement when group identities are taken into account and help to explain why in-group favouritism is widespread across societies