Ludwig's Ratchet and the Collapse of New England Groundfish Stocks: Extended Abstract

Abstract only. See the following for the published paper: T. Hennessey and M. Healey. 2000. Ludwig's ratchet and the collapse of New England groundfish stocks. Coastal Management 28:187-213The stocks of principal groundfish species off New England have collapsed creating economic hardship and dislocation in fishing communities from Rhode Island to Maine. In this paper we analyze the causes of this collapse using the Ratchet effect described by Ludwig et al. (1993, Science 260:36-37) as a framework. According to Ludwig et al., powerful economic and political interests drive fisheries to overcapitalize and overexploit despite scientific evidence that stocks are declining. When the fishery is no longer economically viable, governments provide financial assistance to minimize economic hardship. When stocks increase there is another rush to invest and the cycle repeats itself. The history of groundfish management in New England conforms well to this model. Optimism among fishers and government over US control of this fishery in 1977 stimulated successive rounds of investment that built up excessive fishing capacity despite warnings from scientists that stocks were becoming weaker. Management regimes designed by the New England Fishery Management Council were ineffective in constraining fishing effort. Collapse of the stocks has led to severe restrictions on fishing and government assistance. We suggest that the integration of science, management and harvesting sectors through ecosystem based management offers the best means of avoiding similar situations in the future

Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission Agenda for Telephonic Meeting on 8-19-2009

In the related resources section below you will find links to the following documents which were attached to the agenda for this telephonic meeting: a letter from Gretchen Newson to Phil Angelides regarding details of future meetings, and Agenda items 5 and 7

Agenda for Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission Closed Session Meeting on Wednesday, September 16, 2009

Attached to this document is agenda item

The Paradox of Fairness: The Impact of Escalating Complexity on Fishery Management (extended abstract)

Abstract only. For complete paper: M. C. Healey and T. Hennessey. 1998. The paradox of fairness: the impact of escalating complexity on fishery management. Marine Policy 22:109-118.In the US and Canada, a commitment to fairness leads to overly complex management regimes that contribute to overexploitation. We illustrate the pattern of increasing complexity in the Scotia/Fundy groundfish fishery in Atlantic Canada, the New England groundfish fishery and the Fraser River salmon fishery in British Columbia, all of which have collapsed or declined in recent years. Increasing complexity proceeds inexorably in publicly managed fisheries. However, the alternatives of transferring ownership to individual fishers or fishing communities appear not to be viable solutions. Rather, we suggest a co-management approach which may be unfair to some fishers but will greatly reduce the pressure to overfish