What I've Learned About Teaching...So Far

Teaching/Communication/Extension/Profession,

Repeated Auctions with the Right of First Refusal

This paper characterizes a set of Nash equilibria in a first-price sealed-bid repeated auction with the right of first refusal using two bidders and asymmetric information regarding the bidders’ value distributions. When contract value is constant from one auction to the next and winners’ values are publicized, agents retain the value of incumbency and bids are identical to one-shot auctions. When each agents’ contract values are random across auctions, agents choose to bid away the full expected value of incumbency, providing a measure of the value of information in this context.repeated auction, right of first refusal

The Effects of Reducing Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Barriers to Trade on the Washington State Apple Industry

Health Economics and Policy,

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF RIVER RATS AND IDAHO'S FOUR RIVERS WHITEWATER RAFTING LOTTERY

Resource /Energy Economics and Policy,

Waiting for the Invisible Hand: Novel Products and the Role of Information in the Modern Market for Food

This paper places the modern spread of diet-related chronic disease in the United States within the context of more than a century of innovation in food processing technology, discovery in nutrition science, and corrective policy measures aimed at improving public health. We ask whether the current state of a airs represents a market failure, and if so what might be done about it. We argue that while today’s industrial food system has its advantages, the asymmetric information problems inherent to this system have resulted in a lemons-style break down in the market for processed foods. The appropriate policy response to such situations (namely, verifiable quality standards) is well known, but such policies are likely (in the short run) to reduce profit for existing large industrial producers of food. In light of the food industry’s long history of success at regulatory capture, we propose the formation of a new independent food standards agency devoted to protecting the interests of the American consumer.credence goods, history, food policy, certification

Waiting for the Invisible Hand: Market Power and Endogenous Information in the Modern Market for Food

In many ways, the modern market for food exemplifies the economist’s conception of perfect competition, with many buyers, many sellers, and a robust and dynamic marketplace. But over the course of the last century, the U.S. has witnessed a dramatic shift away from traditional diets and toward a diet comprised primarily of processed brand-name foods with deleterious long-term health effects. This, in turn, has generated increasingly urgent calls for policy interventions aimed at improving the quality of the American diet. In this paper, we ask whether the current state of affairs represents a market failure, and—if so—what might be done about it. We review evidence that most of the nutritional deficiencies associated with today’s processed foods were unknown to nutrition science at the time these products were introduced, promoted, and adopted by American consumers. Today more is known about the nutritional implications of various processing technologies, but a number of forces—including consumer habits, costly information, and the market power associated with both existing brands and scale economies—are working in concert to maintain the status quo. We argue that while the current brand-based industrial food system (adopted and maintained historically as a means of preventing competition from small producers) has its advantages, the time may have come to consider expanding the system of quality grading employed in commodity markets into the retail market for food.credence goods, history, food policy, certification

Welfare Trade-offs between Transferable and Non-Transferable Lotteries

The Four Rivers lottery run by the National Forest Service distributes the opportunity to raft four sections of rivers in Idaho through a non-transferable lottery. The restriction of trade and focus on equity in distribution creates a deadweight loss in total surplus compared with a market or auction system. If the NFS allowed the transferring of permits, then there exists a potential for rafters to gain surplus in trade. However, non-rafters have an incentive to enter the transferable lottery to make a profit from trade. Using the NFS lottery as a guide, this paper examines welfare under the two lottery system to understand how changes in transferability affect the welfare of users and non-users, and the revenues of the government. Since variables, such as number of permits, permit fees, and application fees, also impact welfare, we derive comparative statics for these variables to demonstrate how these government controls affect rafter welfare, non-rafter welfare, and government revenue differently under transferable and non-transferable lotteries. Our results show the welfare trade-offs rafters have between transferable and non-transferable lotteries.Resource /Energy Economics and Policy,

ALL TUNA IS NOT CREATED EQUAL: THE EXISTENCE OF QUANTITY SURCHARGES DUE TO PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION.

Quantity surcharges exist when unit prices are higher for larger packages. We hypothesize that various sizes of goods are differentiated products, and this explains some surcharges. Estimating a random-coefficients logit demand model, we examine own and cross elasticities to determine the level of differentiation between products with different size packages.Marketing,

Interst Group Incentives for Post-lottery Trade Restrictions

The rights to use publicly-managed natural resources are sometimes distributed by lottery,and typically these rights are non-transferable. Prohibition of post-lottery permit transfers discourages applicants from entering the lottery solely for protable permit sale, so only those who personally value the use of the resource apply. However, because permits are distributed randomly and trade is restricted, permits may not be used by those who value them most. We examine a possible rationale for restrictions on permit transfers based on the distribution of welfare across interest groups, and characterize the economic conditions under which post-lottery prohibitions on trade are likely to arise. We develop our model using the specic case of the Four Rivers Lottery used to allocate rafting permits on four river sections in Idaho and Oregon.lottery, trade prohibition, interest groups

Effects of Generic Advertisement on Demand: The Case of the Washington State Apple Commission

The Washington Apple Commission (WAC) generically promoted apples for the Washington state industry from 1937 until 2003. This paper provides an analysis of the effects on demand attributable to these activities. Demand movement associated with promotion tends to be positive, though the results are mixed. Overall, WAC promotion increased growers’ total revenue by approximately $53.4 million for 2002. The estimated average return to advertising topped$8.7 per dollar of advertising. Continuing selected promotional activities could increase revenue for growers if these activities could be carried out by voluntary, coordinated efforts.Demand and Price Analysis,