62 research outputs found
Designing Virtuous Sex Robots
We propose that virtue ethics can be used to address ethical issues central to discussions about sex robots. In particular, we argue virtue ethics is well equipped to focus on the implications of sex robots for human moral character. Our evaluation develops in four steps. First, we present virtue ethics as a suitable framework for the evaluation of humanârobot relationships. Second, we show the advantages of our virtue ethical account of sex robots by comparing it to current instrumentalist approaches, showing how the former better captures the reciprocal interaction between robots and their users. Third, we examine how a virtue ethical analysis of intimate humanârobot relationships could inspire the design of robots that support the cultivation of virtues. We suggest that a sex robot which is equipped with a consent-module could support the cultivation of compassion when used in supervised, therapeutic scenarios. Fourth, we discuss the ethical implications of our analysis for user autonomy and responsibility
Why we may not find intentions in the brain
Intentions are commonly conceived of as discrete mental states that are the direct cause of actions. In the last several decades, neuroscientists have taken up the project of finding the neural implementation of intentions, and a number of areas have been posited as implementing these states. We argue, however, that the processes underlying action initiation and control are considerably more dynamic and context sensitive than the concept of intention can allow for. Therefore, adopting the notion of âintentionâ in neuroscientific explanations can easily lead to misinterpretation of the data, and can negatively influence investigation into the neural correlates of intentional action.We suggest reinterpreting the mechanisms underlying intentional action, and we will discuss the elements that such a reinterpretation needs to account for
Deep Analogical Inference as the Origin of Hypotheses
The ability to generate novel hypotheses is an important problem-solving capacity of humans. This ability is vital for making sense of the complex and unfamiliar world we live in. Often, this capacity is characterized as an inference to the best explanationâselecting the âbestâ explanation from a given set of candidate hypotheses. However, it remains unclear where these candidate hypotheses originate from. In this paper we contribute to computationally explaining these origins by providing the contours of the computational problem solved when humans generate hypotheses. The origin of hypotheses, otherwise known as abduction proper, is hallmarked by seven properties: (1) isotropy, (2) open-endedness, (3) novelty, (4) groundedness, (5) sensibility, (6) psychological realism, and (7) computational tractability. In this paper we provide a computational-level theory of abduction proper that unifies the first six of these properties and lays the groundwork for the seventh property of computational tractability. We conjecture that abduction proper is best seen as a process of deep analogical inference
Ignorance is Bliss: A Complexity Perspective on Adapting Reactive Architectures
Abstract-We study the computational complexity of adapting a reactive architecture to meet task constraints. This computational problem has application in a wide variety of fields, including cognitive and evolutionary robotics and cognitive neuroscience. We show that-even for a rather simple world and a simple task-adapting a reactive architecture to perform a given task in the given world is N P -hard. This result implies that adapting reactive architectures is computationally intractable regardless the nature of the adaptation process (e.g., engineering, development, evolution, learning, etc.) unless very special conditions apply. In order to find such special conditions for tractability, we have performed parameterized complexity analyses. One of our main findings is that architectures with limited sensory and perceptual abilities are efficiently adaptable
âThe Neuroscience of ResponsibilityââWorkshop Report
This is a report on the 3-day workshop âThe Neuroscience of Responsibilityâ that was held in the Philosophy Department at Delft University of Technology in The Netherlands during February 11thâ13th, 2010. The workshop had 25 participants from The Netherlands, Germany, Italy, UK, USA, Canada and Australia, with expertise in philosophy, neuroscience, psychology, psychiatry and law. Its aim was to identify current trends in neurolaw research related specifically to the topic of responsibility, and to foster international collaborative research on this topic. The workshop agenda was constructed by the participants at the start of each day by surveying the topics of greatest interest and relevance to participants. In what follows, we summarize (1) the questions which participants identified as most important for future research in this field, (2) the most prominent themes that emerged from the discussions, and (3) the two main international collaborative research project plans that came out of this meeting
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