40 research outputs found
In Defence of Chalmers: A Comment on Korf
In “Qualia in a Contemporary Neurobiological Perspective”, Korf tackles the perennial issue of qualia in the philosophy of mind. His discussion is partly a response to Chalmers’ hard problem, which, as evidenced by other recent discussions in Dialogues, remains fresh after nearly two decades. Korf highlights the importance of regarding each brain as a particular shaped by unique contingencies and suggests how neurobiological research might proceed in light of this. However, I argue that his discussion does not address what is at the core of Chalmers’ hard problem, and so fails to bridge the gap between neurobiological processes and qualia
Repenser l’argument de la concevabilité pour le dualisme dans la philosophie de l’esprit
In the philosophical literature on consciousness and the mind-body problem, the conceivability argument against physicalism is usually taken to support a form of dualism between physicality and phenomenality. Usually, the discussion focuses on the qualitative character of experience, which is what the phenomenal feel of a given experience is like. By contrast, the subjective character of experience, or its individuation to a given first-person subject, tends to be set aside. The aim of this paper is to present a new and more robust version of the conceivability argument for dualism that appeals to the subjective character of experience. Drawing on insights by philosophers in the phenomenological tradition, I conceptualise the first-person subjective character of experience as a transcendental condition of possibility for phenomenality that cannot be reduced to third-person facts about the physical world. Given this, the mind-body problem as it pertains to consciousness does not merely concern the inability of the set of physical facts about a brain state to capture the qualitative character of experience, but concerns the existential issue of why this brain state is accompanied by first-person subjectivity at all. This allows us to reconceive the conceivability argument in a way that presents a stronger case for dualism than the traditional version of the argument.U filozofskoj literaturi o svijesti i problemu odnosa uma i tijela, argument pojmljivosti protiv fizikalizma obično se uzima kao podrška obliku dualizma između fizikalnosti i fenomenalnosti. Obično se rasprava usredotočuje na kvalitativni karakter iskustva, što je fenomenalni osjećaj određenog iskustva. Nasuprot tome, subjektivni karakter iskustva – tj. njegova individuacija danom subjektu u prvom licu – nastoji se ostaviti po strani. Cilj je ovog rada predstaviti novu i snažniju verziju argumenta pojmljivosti za dualizam koji se poziva na subjektivni karakter iskustva. Oslanjajući se na uvide filozofa u fenomenološkoj tradiciji, konceptualiziram subjektivni karakter iskustva u prvom licu kao transcendentalni uvjet mogućnosti fenomenalnosti koji se ne može svesti na činjenice trećeg lica o fizičkom svijetu. S obzirom na to, problem uma i tijela koji se odnosi na svijest ne tiče se samo nemogućnosti skupa fizičkih činjenica o stanju mozga da uhvati kvalitativni karakter iskustva nego i egzistencijalnog pitanja o tome zašto je to stanje mozga uopće popraćeno subjektivnošću prvog lica. To nam omogućuje da ponovno zamislimo argument pojmljivosti na način koji predstavlja jaču argumentaciju za dualizam od tradicionalne verzije argumenta.In der philosophischen Literatur zum Bewusstsein und dem Leib-Seele-Problem, wird das Argument der Vorstellbarkeit gegen den Physikalismus gewöhnlich als Unterstützung einer Form des Dualismus zwischen Physikalität und Phänomenalität genommen. Üblicherweise ist die Diskussion auf den qualitativen Charakter der Erfahrung fokussiert, welches das phä nomenale Gefühl einer bestimmten Erfahrung ist. Im Gegensatz dazu, wird der subjektive Charakter der Erfahrung, beziehungsweise ihre Individualisierung dem gegebenen erste-Person-Subjekt, oft beiseite gelassen. Das Ziel dieser Arbeit ist eine neue und robustere Version des Arguments der Vorstellbarkeit für den Dualismus zu präsentieren, die an den subjektiven Charakter der Erfahrung appelliert. Aufgrund der Einsichten der Philosophen der phänomenologischen Tradition, konzipiere ich den subjektiven Charakter der Ehrfahrung in erster Person als eine transzendentale Möglichkeitsbedingung für die Phänomenalität, die sich nicht auf Fakten einer dritten Person über die physische Welt reduzieren lässt. Angesichts dessen, betrifft das Leib-Seele-Problem, das sich auf das Bewusstsein bezieht, nicht nur die Unfähigkeit der Reihe physischer Fakten zum Gehirnzustand, den qualitatieven Charakter der Erfahrung zu erfassen, sondern auch die existentielle Frage, warum überhaupt dieser Gehirnzustand von der Subjektivität der ersten Person begleitet wird. Dies ermöglicht uns, das Argument der Vorstellbarkeit neu zu denken, und zwar auf die Art, die eine stärkere Argumentation als die traditionelle Version des Arguments für den Dualismus präsentiert.Dans la littérature philosophique sur la conscience et la relation corps-esprit, l’argument de la concevabilité contre le physicalisme est généralement utilisé pour soutenir une forme de dualisme entre la physicalité et la phénoménalité. Généralement, la discussion se concentre sur le caractère qualitatif de l’expérience, ce qui est le sentiment phénoménal d’une expérience donnée. En revanche, le caractère subjectif de l’expérience ou son individuation à un sujet donné à la première personne, tend à être mis de côté. L’objectif de ce travail est de présenter une nouvelle et rigoureuse version de l’argument de la concevabilité pour le dualisme qui fait appel au caractère subjectif de l’expérience. En m’inspirant de théories philosophiques issues de la tradition phénoménologique, je conceptualise le caractère subjectif de l’expérience à la première personne en tant que condition transcendantale de la possibilité de phénoménalité qui ne peut être réduit aux faits relatifs au monde physique vécus à la troisième personne. Compte tenu de cela, le problème de l’esprit et du corps qui se rapporte à la conscience ne concerne pas seulement l’incapacité de l’ensemble des faits physique relatifs à l’état du cerveau capable de saisir le caractère qualitatif de l’expérience, mais touche au problème existentiel de savoir pourquoi cet état du cerveau est, par ailleurs, accompagné par la subjectivité de la première personne. Cela nous permet de repenser l’argument de la concevabilité d’une manière qui présente une argumentation plus solide pour le dualisme que les arguments mis en avant par la version traditionnelle
A Dilemma in Rape Crisis and a Contribution from Philosophy
The notion that rape is an act of violence rather than sex is a central tenet in rape crisis support and education. A therapeutic benefit of this conceptualisation of rape is that it counters shame and guilt by affirming that the victim was not a complicit partner in an act of sex. However, this conceptualisation has recently been criticised for not capturing what makes rape an especially serious kind of wrong. This raises an apparent dilemma for rape crisis support. Recent work in analytic moral philosophy on the nature of rape offers a way to resolve this dilemma. It is argued that rape is not sex, but is nonetheless sexual. This distinction allows for a charitable reformulation of the central tenet in rape crisis support, which can facilitate the dual therapeutic aims of countering the sense of shame and of recognising the especially serious kind of the harm suffered by the victim
The Paradox of Phenomenal Judgement and the Case Against Illusionism
Illusionism is the view that conscious experience is some sort of introspective illusion. According to illusionism, there is no conscious experience, but it merely seems like there is conscious experience. This would suggest that much phenomenological enquiry, including work on phenomenological psychopathology, rests on a mistake. Some philosophers have argued that illusionism is obviously false, because seeming is itself an experiential state, and so necessarily presupposes the reality of conscious experience. In response, the illusionist could suggest that the relevant sort of seeming here is not an experiential state, but is a cognitive state, such as a judgement or a belief, which is fully amenable to a physical or functionalist analysis. Herein, I argue that this response is unsuccessful and fails to undermine the reality of conscious experience. Nonetheless, the response does raise the problem of how a judgement or belief about the character of a conscious experience, even if it is true, can be justified if the conscious experience has no causal role in the formation of the judgement or belief. This is not a new problem, but is a reiteration of an old problem that is known in the philosophy of mind literature as the paradox of phenomenal judgement. I consider how the paradox of phenomenal judgement can be resolved and how the judgement or belief about conscious experience can be justified with appeal to the notion of acquaintance