Patient-Relativity in Morality

It is common to distinguish moral rules, reasons, or values that are agent-relative from those that are agent-neutral. One can also distinguish moral rules, reasons, or values that are moment-relative from those that are moment-neutral. In this article, I introduce a third distinction that stands alongside these two distinctions—the distinction between moral rules, reasons, or values that are patient-relative and those that are patient-neutral. I then show how patient-relativity plays an important role in several moral theories, gives us a better understanding of agent-relativity and moment-relativity, and provides a novel objection to Derek Parfit’s “appeal to full relativity” argument

Analysis of the unstable Tollmien--Schlichting mode on bodies with a rounded leading edge using the parabolized stability equation

The interaction between free-stream disturbances and the boundary layer on a body with a rounded leading edge is considered in this paper. A method which incorporates calculations using the parabolized stability equation in the Orr-Sommerfeld region, along with an upstream boundary condition derived from asymptotic theory in the vicinity of the leading edge, is generalized to bodies with an inviscid slip velocity which tends to a constant far downstream. We present results for the position of the lower branch neutral stability point and the magnitude of the unstable Tollmien-Schlichting (T-S) mode at this point for both a parabolic body and the Rankine body. For the Rankine body, which has an adverse pressure gradient along its surface far from the nose, we find a double maximum in the T-S wave amplitude for sufficiently large Reynolds numbers

Integration of multimedia technology into the curriculum of forensic science courses using crime scene investigations.

Virtual reality technology is a powerful tool for the development of experimental learning in practical situations. Creation of software packages with some element of virtual learning allows educators to broaden the available experience of students beyond the scope that a standard curriculum provides. This teaching methodology is widely used in the delivery of medical education with many surgical techniques being practised via virtual reality technologies (see Engum et al., 2003). Use has been made of this technology for a wide range of teaching applications such as virtual field trials for an environmental science course (Ramasundaram et al., 2005), and community nursing visiting education scenarios (Nelson et al., 2005) for example. Nelson et al. (2005) imaged three-dimensional representations of patient living accommodation incorporating views of patient medication in order to deliver care modules via a problem-based learning approach. The use of virtual reality in the teaching of crime scene science was pioneered by the National Institute of Forensic Science in Australia as part of their Science Proficiency Advisory Committee testing programme. A number of scenarios were created using CDROM interfacing, allowing as near as possible normal procedures to be adopted. This package included proficiency testing integrated into the package and serves as a paradigm for the creation of virtual reality crime scene scenarios (Horswell, 2000). The package is commercially available on CD-ROM as part of the series ‘After the Fact’ (http://www.nfis.com.au). The CD-ROM package is geared to proficiency training of serving scenes of crime officers and thus contains details that may not be needed in the education of other parties with a need for forensic awareness. These include undergraduate students studying towards forensic science degree programmes in the UK as well as serving Police Officers. These groups may need virtual reality crime scene material geared to their specific knowledge requirements. In addition, Prof J Fraser, President of the Forensic Science Society and a former police Scientific Support Manager, speaking to the United Kingdom, House of Commons Science and Technology Select Committee in its report ‘Forensic Science on Trial’ (2005) states: ‘The documented evidence in relation to police knowledge of forensic science, in terms of making the best use of forensic science, is consistently clear, that their knowledge needs to improve and therefore their training needs to improve’. This clearly identifies a need for further training of serving police officers in forensic science. It was with this in mind that staff at the University collaborated with the West Midlands Police Service. The aim was to create a virtual reality CD-ROM that could serve as part of the continuing professional development of serving police officers in the area of scene management. Adaptation of the CD-ROM could allow some introductory materials to help undergraduate students of forensic science

Relativized Rankings

In traditional consequentialism the good is position-neutral. A single evaluative ranking of states of affairs is correct for everyone, everywhere regardless of their positions. Recently, position-relative forms of consequentialism have been developed. These allow for the correct rankings of states to depend on connections that hold between the state being evaluated and the position of the evaluator. For example, perhaps being an agent who acts in a certain state requires me to rank that state differently from someone else who lacks this connection. In this chapter several different kinds of position-relative rankings related to agents, times, physical locations, and possible worlds are explored. Arguments for and against adopting a position-relative axiology are examined, and it is suggested that position-relative consequentialism is a promising moral theory that has been underestimated

Distinguishing agent-relativity from agent-neutrality

The agent-relative/agent-neutral distinction is one of the most important in contemporary moral theory. Yet, providing an adequate formal account of it has proven difficult. In this article I defend a new formal account of the distinction, one that avoids various problems faced by other accounts. My account is based on an influential account of the distinction developed by McNaughton and Rawling. I argue that their approach is on the right track but that it succumbs to two serious objections. I then show how to formulate a new account that follows the key insights of McNaughton and Rawling’s approach yet avoids the two objections

Deontic Constraints are Maximizing Rules

Deontic constraints prohibit an agent performing acts of a certain type even when doing so will prevent more instances of that act being performed by others. In this article I show how deontic constraints can be interpreted as either maximizing or non-maximizing rules. I then argue that they should be interpreted as maximizing rules because interpreting them as non-maximizing rules results in a problem with moral advice. Given this conclusion, a strong case can be made that consequentialism provides the best account of deontic constraints

Agent-Relative Consequentialism and Collective Self-Defeat

Andrew Forcehimes and Luke Semrau argue that agent-relative consequentialism is implausible because in some circumstances it classes an act as impermissible yet holds that the outcome of all agents performing that impermissible act is preferable. I argue that their problem is closely related to Derek Parfit's problem of ‘direct collective self-defeat’ and show how Parfit's plausible solution to his problem can be adapted to solve their problem

Is agent-neutral deontology possible?

It is commonly held that all deontological moral theories are agent-relative in the sense that they give each agent a special concern that she does not perform acts of a certain type rather than a general concern with the actions of all agents. Recently, Tom Dougherty has challenged this orthodoxy by arguing that agent-neutral deontology is possible. In this article I counter Dougherty's arguments and show that agent-neutral deontology is not possible

Agent-Relativity and the Foundations of Moral Theory

This thesis is concerned with agent-relativity and its importance in understanding and evaluating moral theories. Many would agree with Thomas Hurka that the distinction between agent-relativity and agent-neutrality is one of “the greatest contributions of recent ethics”. Among other things, it is important because it has allowed moral philosophers to better explore the logical space of moral theories, enabling them to see promising moral theories that were previously absent from the debate. This thesis continues this project of exploring the logical space of moral theories, and then applies the insights gained to various debates in moral theory. It contains a preface and five chapters. Each chapter is an independent essay that can be read without reference to any of the other chapters. Yet the arguments made in the five chapters overlap in various ways and are united by their focus on agent-relativity. Taken together, here is roughly what these chapters say. There is an important distinction between moral rules and theories that are agent-relative and moral rules and theories that are agent-neutral. Despite some difficulties, this distinction can be made with formal precision. There is also an important related distinction between moment-relative rules and theories and moment-neutral rules and theories. Finally, there is a third important distinction between patient-relative rules and theories and patient-neutral rules and theories. Together, these three distinctions give us a precise way of understanding the structure of moral theories. Traditionally, deontology has been associated with agent-relativity and consequentialism with agent-neutrality. Several philosophers hold that consequentialism can also be agent-relative. For this to be true there must be agent-relative moral values. Some argue that such values are implausible, however, they can be defended by showing that commonsense morality is already committed to them. Thus, agent-relative consequentialism appears plausible. Other philosophers hold that deontology can be agent-neutral. I argue this is false—deontology is necessarily agent-relative. One of the main attractions of deontology is its ability to explain agent-centered constraints. However, when we think through cases involving agent-relativity and moment-relativity we see that deontology faces a trilemma with respect to agent-centered constraints. Either, (i) it is really a version of agent-relative consequentialism, or (ii) it fails to be uniquely action-guiding in cases where commonsense morality requires it, or (iii) it endorses a counterintuitive anti-aggregation principle. This trilemma poses a serious problem for the deontologist and suggests that agent-relative consequentialism is the better theory when it comes to accommodating commonsense morality