Landreformer og jordleie i Etiopia : implikasjoner for likhet, produktivitet og velferd

The land holding system in most developing countries is not purely an economic affair. It is very much intertwined with people’s culture and identity. That is partly why land-related issues usually generate intense emotional reactions particularly in rural areas. Obviously, for rural residents of most developing countries,l and is a primary means of production used to generate a livelihood for households.It is also an important asset that farmers use to further accumulate wealth when possible and,equally importantly, what they transfer in the form of wealth to future generations (Deininger and Binswanger1999). Accordingly, the size of the land they own, the feeling of security that they have on their holdings, and the process through which land disputes are adjudicated all affect the households’ income, their incentive to work and invest, their desire to use their land in a sustainable manner,and even their social and economic status in their respective communities. In predominantly agrarian societies, all these factors combine to affect agricultural output and productivity and, along with it, the socio-economic welfare of its citizens.NORAD ; Norwegian Research Council ; The World Ban

Technical Efficiency and Productivity Differential Effects of Land Right Certification: A Quasi-Experimental Evidence

PRIFPRI3; CRP2DSGD; PIMCGIAR Research Program on Policies, Institutions, and Markets (PIM

Landowners’ bargaining power and sharecroppers’ productivity

While there are ample empirical studies that claim the potential disincentive effects of sharecropping arrangements, the existing literature is shallow in explaining why share tenancy contracts are prevalent and diffusing in many developing countries. Using a unique tenant-landlord matched dataset from the Tigray region of Ethiopia, we are able to show how the tenants’ strategic response to the varying economic and tenure-security status of the landlords can explain sharecroppers’ productivity differentials.Non-PRIFPRI1; Theme 5; Subtheme 5.2DSG

Reverse share-tenancy and marshallian inefficiency : bargaining power of landowners and the sharecroppers’ productivity

Making use of a unique tenant-landlord matched data from the Tigray region of Ethiopia, we are able to show how strategic response of tenants - to varying economic and tenure security status of the landlords - is important in explaining productivity differentials of sharecroppers. The results show that sharecroppers‟ yield are significantly lower on plots leased from landlords who are non-kin; female; with lower income generating opportunity; and tenure insecure households, than on plots leased from landlords with contrasting characteristics. While, on aggregate, the result shows no significant efficiency loss on kin-operated sharecropped plots, a more decomposed analyses indicate strong evidences of Marshallian inefficiency on kin-operated plots leased from landlords with weaker bargaining power and higher tenure insecurity. This study, thus, shows how failure to control for such heterogeneity of landowners' characteristics can explain the lack of clarity in the existing empirical literature on the extent of moral hazard problems in sharecropping contracts

Farm-level evidence from Ethiopia

PRIFPRI3; ISI; CRP2PIM; DSGDCGIAR Research Program on Policies, Institutions, and Markets (PIM

Reverse share-tenancy and marshallian inefficiency : bargaining power of landowners and the sharecroppers’ productivity

Making use of a unique tenant-landlord matched data from the Tigray region of Ethiopia, we are able to show how strategic response of tenants - to varying economic and tenure security status of the landlords - is important in explaining productivity differentials of sharecroppers. The results show that sharecroppers‟ yield are significantly lower on plots leased from landlords who are non-kin; female; with lower income generating opportunity; and tenure insecure households, than on plots leased from landlords with contrasting characteristics. While, on aggregate, the result shows no significant efficiency loss on kin-operated sharecropped plots, a more decomposed analyses indicate strong evidences of Marshallian inefficiency on kin-operated plots leased from landlords with weaker bargaining power and higher tenure insecurity. This study, thus, shows how failure to control for such heterogeneity of landowners' characteristics can explain the lack of clarity in the existing empirical literature on the extent of moral hazard problems in sharecropping contracts