Elections and strategic positioning games

We formalize the interplay between expected voting behavior and stragetic positioning behavior of candidates as a common agency problem in which the candidates (i.e. the principals) compete for voters (i.e. agents) via the issues they choose and the positions they take. A political situation is defined as a feasible combination of candidate positions and expected political payoffs to the candidates. Taking this approach, we are led naturally to a particular formalization of the candidates’ positioning game, called a political situation game. Within the context of this game, we define the notion of farsighted stability (introduced in an abstract setting by Chwe (1994)) and apply Chwe’s result to obtain existence of farsightedly stable outcomes. We compute the farsightedly stable sets for several examples of political situations games, with outcomes that conform to real-world observations

Endogenous Network Dynamics

In all social and economic interactions, individuals or coalitions choose not only with whom to interact but how to interact, and over time both the structure (the “with whom”) and the strategy (“the how”) of interactions change. Our objectives here are to model the structure and strategy of interactions prevailing at any point in time as a directed network and to address the following open question in the theory of social and economic network formation: given the rules of network and coalition formation, the preferences of individuals over networks, the strategic behavior of coalitions in forming networks, and the trembles of nature, what network and coalitional dynamics are likely to emerge and persist. Our main contributions are (i) to formulate the problem of network and coalition formation as a dynamic, stochastic game, (ii) to show that this game possesses a stationary correlated equilibrium (in network and coalition formation strategies), (iii) to show that, together with the trembles of nature, this stationary correlated equilibrium determines an equilibrium Markov process of network and coalition formation, and (iv) to show that this endogenous process possesses a finite, nonempty set of ergodic measures, and generates a finite, disjoint collection of nonempty subsets of networks and coalitions, each constituting a basin of attraction. We also extend to the setting of endogenous Markov dynamics the notions of pairwise stability (Jackson-Wolinsky, 1996), strong stability (Jacksonvan den Nouweland, 2005), and Nash stability (Bala-Goyal, 2000), and we show that in order for any network-coalition pair to persist and be stable (pairwise, strong, or Nash) it is necessary and sufficient that the pair reside in one of finitely many basins of attraction. The results we obtain here for endogenous network dynamics and stochastic basins of attraction are the dynamic analogs of our earlier results on endogenous network formation and strategic basins of attraction in static, abstract games of network formation (Page and Wooders, 2008), and build on the seminal contributions of Jackson and Watts (2002), Konishi and Ray (2003), and Dutta, Ghosal, and Ray (2005).Endogenous Network Dynamics, Dynamic Stochastic Games of Network Formation, Equilibrium Markov Process of Network Formation, Basins of Attraction, Harris Decomposition, Ergodic Probability Measures, Dynamic Path Dominance Core, Dynamic Pairwise Stability

Strategic Basins of Attraction, the Farsighted Core, and Network Formation Games

We make four main contributions to the theory of network formation. (1) The problem of network formation with farsighted agents can be formulated as an abstract network formation game. (2) In any farsighted network formation game the feasible set of networks contains a unique, finite, disjoint collection of nonempty subsets having the property that each subset forms a strategic basin of attraction. These basins of attraction contain all the networks that are likely to emerge and persist if individuals behave farsightedly in playing the network formation game. (3) A von Neumann Morgenstern stable set of the farsighted network formation game is constructed by selecting one network from each basin of attraction. We refer to any such von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set as a farsighted basis. (4) The core of the farsighted network formation game is constructed by selecting one network from each basin of attraction containing a single network. We call this notion of the core, the farsighted core. We conclude that the farsighted core is nonempty if and only if there exists at least one farsighted basin of attraction containing a single network. To relate our three equilibrium and stability notions (basins of attraction, farsighted basis, and farsighted core) to recent work by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996), we define a notion of pairwise stability similar to the Jackson-Wolinsky notion and we show that the farsighted core is contained in the set of pairwise stable networks. Finally, we introduce, via an example, competitive contracting networks and highlight how the analysis of these networks requires the new features of our network formation model.Basins of attraction, Network formation, Supernetworks, Farsighted core, Nash networks

Hypercritical Accretion onto a Newborn Neutron Star and Magnetic Field Submergence

We present magnetohydrodynamic numerical simulations of the late post-supernova hypercritical accretion to understand its effect on the magnetic field of the new-born neutron star. We consider as an example the case of a magnetic field loop protruding from the star's surface. The accreting matter is assumed to be non magnetized and, due to the high accretion rate, matter pressure dominates over magnetic pressure. We find that an accretion envelope develops very rapidly and once it becomes convectively stable the magnetic field is easily buried and pushed into the newly forming neutron star crust. However, for low enough accretion rates the accretion envelope remains convective for an extended period of time and only partial submergence of the magnetic field occurs due to a residual field that is maintained at the interface between the forming crust and the convective envelope. In this latter case, the outcome should be a weakly magnetized neutron star with a likely complicated field geometry. In our simulations we find the transition from total to partial submergence to occur around dotM ~ 10 M_sun/yr. Back-diffusion of the submerged magnetic field toward the surface, and the resulting growth of the dipolar component, may result in a delayed switch-on of a pulsar on time-scales of centuries to millenia.Comment: 11 pages, 10 figure

Multimode propagation in phononic crystals with overlapping Bragg and hybridization effects

Unusual dispersion properties are observed in a phononic crystal of nylon rods in water when the lattice constant is adjusted so that Bragg and hybridization gaps overlap in frequency. On the basis of experimental and numerical analyses of time-dependent transmission and spatial field maps, the presence of two coexisting propagation modes of similar amplitude is demonstrated near the resonance frequency. This phenomenon is attributed to the coupling of the rod resonances arranged in a triangular lattice, with phase shifts driven by the Bragg condition.Comment: 5 pages, 5 figure

Networks and Farsighted Stability

We make two main contributions to the theory of economic and social network formation. First, we introduce the notion of a network formation network or a supernetwork. Supernetworks provide a framework in which we can formally define and analyze farsightedness in network formation. Second, we introduce a new notion of equilibrium corresponding to farsightedness. In particular, we introduce the notion of a farsightedly basic network, as well as the notion of a farsighted basis, and we show that all supernetworks possess a farsighted basis. A farsightedly basic network contained in the farsighted basis of a given supernetwork represents a possible final resting point (or absorbing state) of a network formation process in which agents behave farsightedly. Given the supernetwork representation of the rules governing network formation and the preferences of the individuals, a farsighted basis contains networks which are likely to emerge and persist if individuals behave farsightedlynetwork formation ; supernetworks ; farsighted stability

Remittances, consumption and investment in Ghana

This paper uses a new, nationally-representative household survey from Ghana to analyze within a rigorous econometric framework how the receipt of internal remittances (from within Ghana) and international remittances (from African or other countries) affects the marginal spending behavior of households on a broad range of consumption and investment goods, including food, education and housing. Contrary to other studies, which find that remittances are spent disproportionately on consumption (food and consumer goods/durables) or investment goods (education and housing), the findings show that households receiving remittances in Ghana do not spend more at the margin on food, education and housing than households with similar income levels and characteristics that do not receive remittances. When the analysis controls for endogeneity and selection bias, the findings show that any differences in the marginal spending behavior between remittance-receiving and non-receiving households are explained completely by the observed and unobserved characteristics of households. Households in Ghana treat remittances just like any other source of income, and there are no changes in marginal spending patterns for households with the receipt of remittance income.Population Policies,Access to Finance,Debt Markets,Remittances,

Endogenous Network Dynamics

In all social and economic interactions, individuals or coalitions choose not only with whom to interact but how to interact, and over time both the structure (the “with whom”) and the strategy (“the how”) of interactions change. Our objectives here are to model the structure and strategy of interactions prevailing at any point in time as a directed network and to address the following open question in the theory of social and economic network formation: given the rules of network and coalition formation, the preferences of individuals over networks, the strategic behavior of coalitions in forming networks, and the trembles of nature, what network and coalitional dynamics are likely to emergence and persist. Our main contributions are (i) to formulate the problem of network and coalition formation as a dynamic, stochastic game, (ii) to show that this game possesses a stationary correlated equilibrium (in network and coalition formation strategies), (iii) to show that, together with the trembles of nature, this stationary correlated equilibrium determines an equilibrium Markov process of network and coalition formation which respects the rules of network and coalition formation and the preferences of individuals, and (iv) to show that, although uncountably many networks may form, this endogenous process of network and coalition formation possesses a nonempty finite set of ergodic measures and generates a finite, disjoint collection of nonempty subsets of networks and coalitions, each constituting a basin of attraction. Moreover, we extend to the setting of endogenous Markov dynamics the notions of pairwise stability (Jackson-Wolinsky, 1996), strong stability (Jackson-van den Nouweland, 2005), and Nash stability (Bala-Goyal, 2000), and we show that in order for any network-coalition pair to be stable (pairwise, strong, or Nash) it is necessary and sufficient that the pair reside in one of finitely many basins of attraction - and hence reside in the support of an ergodic measure. The results we obtain here for endogenous network dynamics and stochastic basins of attraction are the dynamic analogs of our earlier results on endogenous network formation and strategic basins of attraction in static, abstract games of network formation (Page and Wooders, 2008), and build on the seminal contributions of Jackson and Watts (2002), Konishi and Ray (2003), and Dutta, Ghosal, and Ray (2005).

Control of rotordynamic instability in a typical gas turbine's power system

The effect of rotor internal friction on the system's stability was studied when operated above the first critical speed. This internal friction is commonly caused by sliding press fits or sliding splines. Under conditions of high speed and low bearing damping, these systems will occassionally whirl at a frequency less than the shaft's rotational speed. This subsynchronous precession is a self excited phenomenon and stress reversals are created. This phenomenon was observed during engine testing. The reduction of spline friction and/or the inclusion of squeeze film damping have controlled the instability. Case history and the detail design of the squeeze film dampers is discussed