International Fisheries Agreements: The Feasibility and Impacts of Partial Cooperation

This paper deals with partial cooperation among countries involved in the exploitation of straddling and highly migratory fish stocks.We analyse the feasibility of coalition structures and their impacts on fishing e.orts by means of games in partition function form.Furthermore, we demonstrate that the modified Shapley value is an appropriate device for the division of the gains from cooperation.international fisheries;overexploitation;partial cooperation;games in partition function form;competitive equilibrium;modified Shapley value.

Transboundary Fishery Management: A Game Theoretic Approach

A basic issue in transboundary fishery management is the new member problem. In this paper we address the problem of allocating the profits between the charter members and the entrants, once the nations concerned have expressed an interest in achieving an agreement.Using game theory we argue that in the case of independent countries adjustment from the Nash equilibrium can be achieved by means of the proportional rule.Furthermore, we propose the population monotonic allocation scheme as management rule for division of profits within a coalition. Finally, we show that the equal division of the net gain value can be used to expand a coalition.game theory;fishing industry;Nash equilibrium

Valuation of functions of the Wadden Area

The rationale of this position paper is to explore ways to employ valuation methods to assess the impacts of alternative policy decisions on the functions of the Wadden Area. Based on this rationale, this paper aims to bring an ecological-economic perspective on the benefits of the Wadden Area. It highlights key issues involved in the notion and application of monetary valuation methods for valuing the (ecological) functions of the area. It also pays attention to the development of policy handles on the basis of the outcome of the valuation of ecological functions. Particularly, the paper discuss Payment for Environmental Services (PES), which aims at preservation and protection by purchasing conservation. The use of a valuation instrument within a Payment for Environmental Services Scheme is new. Valuation is of course an established technique within a Cost-Benefit framework. However, Payment for Environmental Services is an innovative way of designing policy instruments in the collaboration between ecologists and economist

International Fisheries Agreements:The Feasibility and Impacts of Partial Cooperation

This paper deals with partial cooperation among countries involved in the exploitation of straddling and highly migratory fish stocks.We analyse the feasibility of coalition structures and their impacts on fishing e.orts by means of games in partition function form.Furthermore, we demonstrate that the modified Shapley value is an appropriate device for the division of the gains from cooperation.

Transboundary Fishery Management:A Game Theoretic Approach

A basic issue in transboundary fishery management is the new member problem. In this paper we address the problem of allocating the profits between the charter members and the entrants, once the nations concerned have expressed an interest in achieving an agreement.Using game theory we argue that in the case of independent countries adjustment from the Nash equilibrium can be achieved by means of the proportional rule.Furthermore, we propose the population monotonic allocation scheme as management rule for division of profits within a coalition. Finally, we show that the equal division of the net gain value can be used to expand a coalition.

What determines the Succes of States in the SBIR Program?

This paper analyzes the interstate distribution of awards made through the SmallBusiness Innovation Research (SBIR) Program operated by the U.S federalgovernment. The main finding is that awards tend to be made to firms in centersof innovative activity, where knowledge is most easily created and spilloversbetween economic agents can occur most readily. State programs to assistprospective applicants for SBIR funding, on the other hand, appear to have hadlittle effect in overcoming this seemingly powerful factor. Thus, thepercentage distribution of awards by state has remained roughly constant sincethe inception of the program. A possible implication of these results is thatthe SBIR program may exacerbate interstate differences in economic growth to theextent that growth of states is associated with their ability to create newknowledge