43 research outputs found

    The Case of Markets versus Standards for Pollution Policy

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    Simpler is Better: Predicting Consumer Vehicle Purchases in the Short Run

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    When agencies such as the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) establish future greenhouse gas emissions standards for new vehicles, forecasting future vehicle purchases due to changes in fuel economy and prices provides insight into regulatory impacts. We compare predictions from a nested logit model independently developed for US EPA to a simple model where past market share predicts future market share using data from model years 2008, 2010, and 2016. The simple model outperforms the nested logit model for all goodness-of-prediction measures for both prediction years. Including changes in vehicle price and fuel economy increases bias in forecasted market shares. This bias suggests price increases are correlated with unobserved increases in vehicle quality, changes in preferences, or brand-specific changes in market size but not cost pass-through. For 2010, past shares predict better than a nested logit model despite a major shock, the economic disruption caused by the Great Recession. Observed share changes during this turbulent period may offer upper bounds for policy changes in other contexts: the largest observed change in market share across the two horizons is 6.6% for manufacturers in 2016 and 3.4% for an individual vehicle in 2010

    The Economics of Native Plants in Residential Landscape Designs

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    Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/50426/1/HelfandParknassauer06.pd

    The General Equilibrium Incidence of Environmental Mandates

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    Pollution regulations affect factor demands, relative returns, production, and output prices. In our model, one sector includes pollution as an input that can be a complement or substitute for labor or capital. For each type of mandate, we find conditions where more burden is on labor or on capital. Stricter regulation does not always place less burden on the better substitute for pollution. Also, restrictions on pollution per unit output create an “output-subsidy effect” on factor prices that can reverse the usual output and substitution effects. We find analogous effects for a restriction on pollution per unit capital

    The Effects on Production and Profits of Different Pollution Control Standards

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    Five different specifications of a pollution control restriction are analyzed for their comparative effects on input use, output, and profits. Because of the different effects, interest groups are likely to pressure politicians for their preferred outcomes. The politically optimal regulatory instrument may then not correspond to the efficient instrument

    Letter: Consider the Consumer Side of the Market for Catastrophe Insurance

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    Gloria Helfand argues that consumer misperception of risk or the availability of disaster relief may reduce consumer participation in a catastrophe insurance market.
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