43 research outputs found
Simpler is Better: Predicting Consumer Vehicle Purchases in the Short Run
When agencies such as the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) establish future greenhouse gas emissions standards for new vehicles, forecasting future vehicle purchases due to changes in fuel economy and prices provides insight into regulatory impacts. We compare predictions from a nested logit model independently developed for US EPA to a simple model where past market share predicts future market share using data from model years 2008, 2010, and 2016. The simple model outperforms the nested logit model for all goodness-of-prediction measures for both prediction years. Including changes in vehicle price and fuel economy increases bias in forecasted market shares. This bias suggests price increases are correlated with unobserved increases in vehicle quality, changes in preferences, or brand-specific changes in market size but not cost pass-through. For 2010, past shares predict better than a nested logit model despite a major shock, the economic disruption caused by the Great Recession. Observed share changes during this turbulent period may offer upper bounds for policy changes in other contexts: the largest observed change in market share across the two horizons is 6.6% for manufacturers in 2016 and 3.4% for an individual vehicle in 2010
The Economics of Native Plants in Residential Landscape Designs
Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/50426/1/HelfandParknassauer06.pd
The General Equilibrium Incidence of Environmental Mandates
Pollution regulations affect factor demands, relative returns, production, and output prices. In our model, one sector includes pollution as an input that can be a complement or substitute for labor or capital. For each type of mandate, we find conditions where more burden is on labor or on capital. Stricter regulation does not always place less burden on the better substitute for pollution. Also, restrictions on pollution per unit output create an “output-subsidy effect” on factor prices that can reverse the usual output and substitution effects. We find analogous effects for a restriction on pollution per unit capital
The Effects on Production and Profits of Different Pollution Control Standards
Five different specifications of a pollution control restriction are analyzed for their comparative effects on input use, output, and profits. Because of the different effects, interest groups are likely to pressure politicians for their preferred outcomes. The politically optimal regulatory instrument may then not correspond to the efficient instrument
Letter: Consider the Consumer Side of the Market for Catastrophe Insurance
Gloria Helfand argues that consumer misperception of risk or the availability of disaster relief may reduce consumer participation in a catastrophe insurance market.
Mathematical Appendcies for: Reconciling the Von Liebig and Differentiable Crop Production Functions
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Evaluating the Consumer Response to Fuel Economy: A Review of the Literature
How consumers evaluate trade-offs between the cost of buying additional fuel economy and the expected fuel savings that result is an important underlying determinant of the overall cost of national fuel economy standards. Models of vehicle choice are a means to predict the change in consumers’ vehicle purchase patterns, as well as the effects of these changes on compliance costs and consumer surplus. This paper surveys the literature on vehicle choice models and finds a wide range in methods and results. A large puzzle raised is whether automakers build into their vehicles as much fuel economy as consumers are willing to purchase. This paper examines possible reasons why there may be a gap between the amount consumers are willing to pay for fuel economy and the amount that automakers provide, though there is insufficient evidence on the relative roles of these various hypotheses. Further research on the role of fuel economy in consumer vehicle purchases is needed to assist in understanding the welfare effects of fuel economy regulation