Jamming of GPS & GLONASS signals - a study of GPS performance in maritime environments under jamming conditions, and benefits of applying GLONASS in Northern areas under such conditions

Project thesis submitted in part fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science in Positioning and Navigation Technology, The University of Nottingham.Growing dependence on Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS), especially GPS, for positioning and navigation at sea has raised a concern about the potential risks of signal interference. Technology for jamming is easily available, and in recent years there have been many cases of intentional jamming. As GPS is the principal means of position fixing used by the Norwegian Navy, important questions to find answers to is how vulnerable the GPS and the Electronic Chart Display and Information System (ECDIS) are to a jamming attack, and further whether employing the Glonass satellite system in addition to GPS will provide better performance regarding robustness and redundancy when receivers are exposed to jamming. By having a Coast Guard Vessel operating inshore the Norwegian fjords as case, this research aims to explore these issues and it does so by asking the following research questions: - Will employing Glonass in addition to GPS provide better performance in Northern areas when the systems are exposed to GNSS jammers? - How is the ability of the existing GPS system on board a Norwegian Coastguard Vessel to provide a reliable position when there is a jamming threat, and how will the ECDIS system on board handle an eventually loss of GPS position? The study consists of two jamming tests: A static test where focus is to analyze and compare the GPS and Glonass system and a dynamic test where the GPS and ECDIS system on board is analyzed when exposed to jamming. The results from the static test showed that the jammer has effect on large distances, and that the different receivers used react differently when exposed to jamming. Further, the carrier-to-noise ratios for Glonass are less affected by the jammer, and the receiver is able to track Glonass satellites with lower carrier-to-noise ratios than GPS satellites. We have seen that utilizing Glonass satellites in addition to GPS satellites in the receiver contribute to a later loss of position fix and an earlier calculation of new position under difficult jamming conditions. The dynamic test showed that the marine grade GPS receiver is easy to jam. A weak jamming signal caused the GPS receivers to give misleading information without any warning from itself or the ECDIS system. The ECDIS system provided an adequate DR positioning, but there are issues that need to be resolved for better functionality. As Glonass signals has shown to be more resistant to jamming than GPS signals, applying the Glonass system in addition to GPS might provide benefits with regards to reliability and redundancy, especially for maritime navigation in Northern areas where the Glonass satellites also have higher elevation and better coverage than GPS

Developing a High-Speed Craft Route Monitor Window

High-speed navigation in littoral waters is an advanced maritime operation. Reliable, timely and consistent data provided by the integrated navigation systems increases safe navigation. The workload of the navigator is high, together with the interaction between the navigator and the navigation system. Information from the graphical user interface in bridge displays must facilitate the demands for the high-speed navigator, and this article presents how eye tracking data was used to identify user requirements which in combination with a human-centred design process led to the development of an improved software application on essential navigation equipment.The Royal Norwegian Nav

Mot en fredeligere verdenskrig? Hybride virkemidler og den nye verdensorden

Master i samfunnsvitenskap med fordypning i internasjonale relasjoner 202

GNSS jamming resilience for close to shore navigation in the Northern Sea

avigational error accounts for half of the accidents and serious incidents in close to shore maritime transport in Norway predominantly due to the rapidly changing weather conditions and the dangerous nature of the narrow inshore waters found along the Norwegian coast. This creates a dependence on Differential Global Positioning System (DGPS) use and any disruption to this service can lead to an increased accident rate. The aim of this paper is to research the jamming vulnerability of existing maritime receivers and to understand if an upgrade to a multi-constellation or multi-frequency receiver would improve system resilience. The novelty of this work is a comparison of jamming resilience between different combinations of multiple constellations (GPS and Globalnaya Navigatsionnaya Sputnikovaya Sistema (GLONASS)) and multi-frequency Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) signals. This paper presents results from GNSS jamming trials conducted in the northern part of Norway, confirming previous research and indicating that typical maritime GPS receivers are easy to jam and may produce erroneous positional information. Results demonstrate that the single frequency multi-constellation receivers offer better jamming resilience than multi-frequency (L1 + L2) GPS receivers. Further, the GLONASS constellation demonstrated a better resilience than GPS. Results demonstrate a known correlation between GPS L1 and L2 frequencies, as well as a probable over-dependence on GPS for signal acquisition, meaning that no signal can be received without GPS L1 present. With these limitations in mind, the authors suggest that the most economic update to the single frequency GPS receivers, currently used for maritime applications, should be multi-constellation GPS + GLONASS receivers. This solution is cheaper and it also offer better jamming resistance for close to shore navigation than dual frequency receivers

Validation of a maritime usability study with eye tracking data

publishedVersio

Avoiding the internet of insecure industrial things

Security incidents such as targeted distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks on power grids and hacking of factory industrial control systems (ICS) are on the increase. This paper unpacks where emerging security risks lie for the industrial internet of things, drawing on both technical and regulatory perspectives. Legal changes are being ushered by the European Union (EU) Network and Information Security (NIS) Directive 2016 and the General Data Protection Regulation 2016 (GDPR) (both to be enforced from May 2018). We use the case study of the emergent smart energy supply chain to frame, scope out and consolidate the breadth of security concerns at play, and the regulatory responses. We argue the industrial IoT brings four security concerns to the fore, namely: appreciating the shift from offline to online infrastructure; managing temporal dimensions of security; addressing the implementation gap for best practice; and engaging with infrastructural complexity. Our goal is to surface risks and foster dialogue to avoid the emergence of an Internet of Insecure Industrial Things