Ideas, Interests, and Institutional Change: the European Commission Debates the Delegation Problem

The forthcoming Commission White Paper on Governance devotes a good deal of attention to the possibility of delegating rule-making powers to independent European agencies. The extensive debate stimulated by thepreparation of this document has revealed deep differences of opinion. The orthodox doctrine, stubbornlydefended by the Legal Service, holds that such delegation would upset the balance of power among ECinstitutions, reduce the Commission’s ability to fulfill its duties under the treaties, and ultimately undermine theconstitutional foundations of the Community. By contrast, the reformers maintain that the received view ondelegation is by now completely outdated, and that the principle of institutional balance should be interpreteddynamically. These officials work at the cutting edge of regulatory policy and hence are particularly concernedabout the loss of status and credibility of the Commission. A career in an independent European agency isviewed as a promising alternative. The discourse of both reformers and defenders of the status quo depends crucially on the concept ofinstitutional balance. I argue that this concept can be properly understood only in the context of the venerabletheory of mixed government. This suggests that the European Community is not so much sui generis as the latterdayversion of a pre-modern model of governance.ideas; national interest; common interest; institutions; Europeanization; Europeanization

International Economic Integration, National Autonomy, Transnational Democracy: An Impossible Trinity?

democracy; constitutional change; WTO; national interest; Nation-state; supranationalism

The regulatory state and its legitimacy problems

Während der interventionistische Staat durch einen hohen Grad an Zentralisation in der Administration und Politik gekennzeichnet war, beruht der regulierende Staat auf einer ausgedehnten Delegierung von Befugnissen an unabhängige Institutionen: regulierende Agenturen oder Kommissionen, aber auch die Justizgewalt, die zu einem aktiven Mitspieler im Ordnungsspiel wird. Die Delegierung politischer Entscheidungsgewalt an nicht-mehrheitliche Institutionen ruft neue Probleme der demokratischen Legitimität hervor. Im vorliegenden Papier wird argumentiert, dass solche Probleme nicht durch eine Begrenzung der Unabhängigkeit der Regulatoren angegangen werden sollten, sondern durch eine Stärkung der Verantwortlichkeitsstruktur. Ähnliche Probleme tauchen auch auf der europäischen Ebene auf. Hier ist eine bessere Verantwortlichkeitsstruktur eher die richtige Lösung als eine zunehmende Politisierung. Die De-Politisierung der europäischen Politik ist eine Konsequenz der Tatsache, dass die große Mehrheit der Wähler Europas eine weitreichende ökonomische Integration unterstützen, sich aber einer wahren politischen Integration entgegenstellen. (ICIÜbers)'While the interventionist state was characterised by a high level of centralisation in administration and policy making, the regulatory state relies on extensive delegation of powers to independent institutions: regulatory agencies or commissions, but also the judiciary, which is becoming an increasingly active player in the regulatory game. Delegation of important policy-making powers to non-majoritarian institutions raises novel problems of democratic legitimacy. This paper argues that such problems should be tackled not by limiting the independence of the regulators, but by strengthening the accountability structure. Similar problems arise at the European level. Here, too, the correct solution is a better accountability structure rather than increased politicisation. The de-politicisation of European policy-making is a consequence of the fact that the large majority of Europe¿s voters support far-reaching economic integration but oppose true political integration.' (author's abstract)

Integración económica internacional, autonomía nacional, democracia trasnacional: ¿una trinidad imposible?

Este trabajo examina tres hipótesis que se refieren a la relación entre integración económica, el Estado-nación y la democracia. En la primera, la hipótesis de la "democracia disminuida", el autor afirma que en un mundo de economía mundial integradora los encargados de dictar las políticas nacionales se ven crecientemente constreñidos en su capacidad para producir los bienes públicos que demandan los electores. De acuerdo a la segunda hipótesis, "federalismo transnacional", este déficit se corregiría transformando la actual Unión en un Estado federal. La tercera hipótesis, "constitucionalismo transnacional", admite que la democracia no puede florecer por encima del nivel nacional puesto que la gente de los Estados miembro de la UE no constituyen un pueblo.This paper examines three hypothesis concerning the relationship among economic integration, the nation-State and democracy. The first one, the "diminished democracy" hypothesis, claims that in an integrating world economy national policymakers are increasingly constrained in their ability to produce the public goods the voters demand. According to the second hypothesis -"transnational federalism"- this deficit should be corrected by transforming the present Union into a federal State. The third hypothesis -"transnational constitutionalism"- acknowledges that democracy cannot flourish above the national level since the peoples of the member States of the EU do not form a demos

public policymaking and its analysis at national and european levels

The author describes the specific features of public policy process at the European Unionlevel and its differences related to policy-making at national level. He underlines, amongother things that the policy agenda in the European Union is being shaped differently.At the national level the agenda is under greater influence of politicians who are closelyinterconnected with voters. At the European Union level the technocratic (not directlyelected) European Commission has a monopoly of legislative initiative. Furthermore, atthe European level feasibility studies – as an element of the pre-decision stage in publicpolicy-making – tend to be ignored. In nation-states we can see such analyses as a resultof competition taking place between those who rule and their political opposition. Atthe European Union level it is not the case. The author points out that these mechanisms would have been beneficial for the EU member states. They would have haltedthe implementation of decisions which ran the excessive risk. He has also in mind thedecision related to the introduction of the monetary union. In his opinion, this decisionwas made without a proper feasibility analysis (costs and profits). Basically, the decisionon a common currency was made on political rather than substantive grounds. A largenumber of experts were against the idea as they perceived serious risks involved in it.The supporters of greater European integration ignored the fact that the monetary uniondeprived nation-states of many factors that affected the economic development in a positive way. The point is that they were under influence of "total optimism" expecting only good results of the monetary union. The mechanisms of crisis management, including exitscenario from the monetary union, or methods of supporting those members who needfinancial aid, have not been even created. Furthermore, the evaluation of the monetaryunion was not properly carried out as it was based on the assessment of the process (forexample, smooth introduction of euro notes and coins or phasing out of the nationalcurrencies in 2002) and not of its result

Who says what to whom? Alignments and arguments in EU policy-making

In the EU multilevel polity, domestic interest groups seek to shape EU legislation by accessing both national and EU institutions. Previous studies indicated that institutional and issue contexts, as well as organizational characteristics shape their strategies of interest representation. However, we know much less about how alignments and arguments impact on their participation in EU and national policy consultations. Addressing this gap, we investigate the lobbying strategies of almost 2,900 national interest organizations from five member states (Germany, the Netherlands, Slovenia, Sweden, and the United Kingdom) on 20 EU directive proposals bringing also a new empirical scope to the study of multilevel interest representation. The findings indicate that alignments and arguments shape the participation of domestic interest groups in consultations on EU policies. We infer from our study that some general predictions of interest group behaviour are overstretched and outline four variations of interest representation routines

Towards an Economy of Higher Education

This paper draws a distinction between ways thinking and acting, and hence of policy and practice in higher education, in terms of different kinds of economy: economies of exchange and economies of excess. Crucial features of economies of exchange are outlined and their presence in prevailing conceptions of teaching and learning is illustrated. These are contrasted with other possible forms of practice, which in turn bring to light the nature of an economy of excess. In more philosophical terms, and to expand on the picture, economies of excess are elaborated with reference, first, to the understanding of alterity in the work of Emmanuel Levinas and, second, to the idea of Dionysian intensity that is to be found in Nietzsche. In the light of critical comment on some current directions in policy and practice, the implications of these ways of thinking for the administrator, the teacher and the student in higher education are explored