Prevalence and predictors of health service use among Iraqi asylum seekers in the Netherlands

BACKGROUND. A long asylum procedure is associated with higher prevalence rates of psychiatric disorders, lower quality of life, higher disability and more physical health problems. Additional knowledge about health seeking behavior is necessary to guide governments and health professionals in their policies. OBJECTIVE. To measure service use among one of the biggest asylum seekers population in the Netherlands and to assess its relationships with predisposing and need variables (including post-migration living problems). METHOD. Two groups were randomly selected: Group 1 (n = 143), less than 6 months and Group 2 (n = 151), more than 2 years in the Netherlands. Respondents were interviewed with fully structured, culturally validated, translated questionnaires, which contained instruments to measure psychiatric disorders, quality of life, disability, physical health and post-migration living problems. Use of preventive and curative (physical and mental) health services was measured and the relationship with predisposing and need risk factors was estimated with univariate and multivariate logistic regression analyses. RESULTS. A long asylum procedure is not associated with higher service use, except for mental health service use and drug use. Use of mental health services is, however, low compared to the prevalence of psychiatric disorders. Low quality of perceived general health and functional disability are the most important predictors of services use. Psychopathology predicts use of a medical specialist (non-psychiatrist), but does not predict mental health service use. CONCLUSION. A high percentage of asylum seekers with a psychiatric disorder is not getting adequate treatment. There is a mismatch between the type of health problem and the type of health service use. The various health services should work together in education, detection, referral and care in order to provide help to this group of patients.De Open Ank

Hydropower dependency and climate change in sub-Saharan Africa: A nexus framework and evidence-based review

In sub-Saharan Africa, 160 million grid-connected electricity consumers live in countries where hydropower accounts for over 50% of total power supply. A warmer climate with more frequent and intense extremes could result in supply reliability issues. Here, (i) a robust framework to highlight the interdependencies between hydropower, water availability, and climate change is proposed, (ii) the state-of-the art literature on the projected impacts of climate change on hydropower in sub-Saharan Africa is reviewed, and (iii) supporting evidence on past trends and current pathways of power mix diversification, drought incidence, and climate change projections is provided. We find that only few countries have pursued a diversification strategy away from hydropower over the last three decades, while others' expansion plans will reinforce the dependency. This will occur irrespective of the fact that some of the largest river basins have experienced a significant drying during the last century. Agreement is found on likely positive impacts of climate change on East Africa's hydropower potential, negative impacts in West and Southern Africa, and substantial uncertainty in Central Africa. Irrespective of the absolute change in gross technical potential, more frequent and intense extremes are projected. One possible paradigm to increase resilience and fulfil the pledges of the Paris Agreement is a synergetic planning and management of hydropower and variable renewables

Evaluating the use of biomass energy with carbon capture and storage in low emission scenarios

Biomass Energy with Carbon Capture and Storage (BECCS) is heavily relied upon in scenarios of future emissions that are consistent with limiting global mean temperature increase to 1.5 °C or 2 °C above pre-industrial. These temperature limits are defined in the Paris Agreement in order to reduce the risks and impacts of climate change. Here, we explore the use of BECCS technologies in a reference scenario and three low emission scenarios generated by an integrated assessment model (IMAGE). Using these scenarios we investigate the feasibility of key implicit and explicit assumptions about these BECCS technologies, including biomass resource, land use, CO2 storage capacity and carbon capture and storage (CCS) deployment rate. In these scenarios, we find that half of all global CO2 storage required by 2100 occurs in USA, Western Europe, China and India, which is compatible with current estimates of regional CO2 storage capacity. CCS deployment rates in the scenarios are very challenging compared to historical rates of fossil, renewable or nuclear technologies and are entirely dependent on stringent policy action to incentivise CCS. In the scenarios, half of the biomass resource is derived from agricultural and forestry residues and half from dedicated bioenergy crops grown on abandoned agricultural land and expansion into grasslands (i.e. land for forests and food production is protected). Poor governance of the sustainability of bioenergy crop production can significantly limit the amount of CO2 removed by BECCS, through soil carbon loss from direct and indirect land use change. Only one-third of the bioenergy crops are grown in regions associated with more developed governance frameworks. Overall, the scenarios in IMAGE are ambitious but consistent with current relevant literature with respect to assumed biomass resource, land use and CO2 storage capacity

Global and regional aggregate damages associated with global warming of 1.5 to 4 °C above pre-industrial levels

AbstractWe quantify global and regional aggregate damages from global warming of 1.5 to 4 °C above pre-industrial levels using a well-established integrated assessment model, PAGE09. We find mean global aggregate damages in 2100 of 0.29% of GDP if global warming is limited to about 1.5 °C (90% confidence interval 0.09–0.60%) and 0.40% for 2 °C (range 0.12–0.91%). These are, respectively, 92% and 89% lower than mean losses of 3.67% of GDP (range 0.64–10.77%) associated with global warming of 4 °C. The net present value of global aggregate damages for the 2008–2200 period is estimated at $48.7 trillion for ~ 1.5 °C global warming (range$13–108 trillion) and $60.7 trillion for 2 °C (range$15–140 trillion). These are, respectively, 92% and 90% lower than the mean NPV of $591.7 trillion of GDP for 4 °C warming (range$70–1920 trillion). This leads to a mean social cost of CO2 emitted in 2020 of ~ $150 for 4 °C warming as compared to$30 at ~ 1.5 °C warming. The benefits of limiting warming to 1.5 °C rather than 2 °C might be underestimated since PAGE09 is not recalibrated to reflect the recent understanding of the full range of risks at 1.5 °C warming.</jats:p

A Multi-model Analysis of Post-2020 Mitigation Efforts of Five Major Economies

This paper looks into the regional mitigation strategies of five major economies (China, EU, India, Japan and USA) in the context of the 2 degrees C target, using a multi-model comparison. In order to stay in line with the 2 degrees C target, a tripling or quadrupling of mitigation ambitions is required in all regions by 2050, employing vigorous decarbonization of the energy supply system and achieving negative emissions during the second half of the century. In all regions looked at, decarbonization of energy supply (and in particular power generation) is more important than reducing energy demand. Some differences in abatement strategies across the regions are projected: In India and the USA the emphasis is on prolonging fossil fuel use by coupling conventional technologies with carbon storage, whereas the other main strategy depicts a shift to carbon-neutral technologies with mostly renewables (China, EU) or nuclear power (Japan). Regions with access to large amounts of biomass, such as the USA, China and the EU, can make a trade-off between energy related emissions and land related emissions, as the use of bioenergy can lead to a net increase in land use emissions. After supply-side changes, the most important abatement strategy focuses on enduse efficiency improvements, leading to considerable emission reductions in both the industry and transport sectors across all regions. Abatement strategies for non-CO2 emissions and land use emissions are found to have a smaller potential. Inherent model, as well as collective, biases have been observed affecting the regional response strategy or the available reduction potential in specific (end-use) sectors

Early action on Paris Agreement allows for more time to change energy systems

The IMAGE integrated assessment model was used to develop a set of scenarios to evaluate the Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) submitted by Parties under the Paris Agreement. The scenarios project emissions and energy system changes under (i) current policies, (ii) implementation of the NDCs, and (iii) various trajectories to a radiative forcing level of 2.8 W/m2 in 2100, which gives a probability of about two thirds to limit warming to below 2 °C. The scenarios show that a cost-optimal pathway from 2020 onwards towards 2.8 W/m2 leads to a global greenhouse gas emission level of 38 gigatonne CO2 equivalent (GtCO2eq) by 2030, equal to a reduction of 20% compared to the 2010 level. The NDCs are projected to lead to 2030 emission levels of 50 GtCO2eq, which is still an increase compared to the 2010 level. A scenario that achieves the 2.8 W/m2 forcing level in 2100 from the 2030 NDC level requires more rapid transitions after 2030 to meet the forcing target. It shows an annual reduction rate in greenhouse gas emissions of 4.7% between 2030 and 2050, rapidly phasing out unabated coal-fired power plant capacity, more rapid scale-up of low-carbon energy, and higher mitigation costs. A bridge scenario shows that enhancing the ambition level of NDCs before 2030 allows for a smoother energy system transition, with average annual emission reduction rates of 4.5% between 2030 and 2050, and more time to phase out coal capacity

Decarbonising the critical sectors of aviation, shipping, road freight and industry to limit warming to 1.5–2°C

Limiting warming to well below 2°C requires rapid and complete decarbonisation of energy systems. We compare economy-wide modelling of 1.5°C and 2°C scenarios with sector-focused analyses of four critical sectors that are difficult to decarbonise: aviation, shipping, road freight transport, and industry. We develop and apply a novel framework to analyse and track mitigation progress in these sectors. We find that emission reductions in the 1.5°C and 2°C scenarios of the IMAGE model come from deep cuts in CO2 intensities and lower energy intensities, with minimal demand reductions in these sectors’ activity. We identify a range of additional measures and policy levers that are not explicitly captured in modelled scenarios but could contribute significant emission reductions. These are demand reduction options, and include less air travel (aviation), reduced transportation of fossil fuels (shipping), more locally produced goods combined with high load factors (road freight), and a shift to a circular economy (industry). We discuss the challenges of reducing demand both for economy-wide modelling and for policy. Based on our sectoral analysis framework, we suggest modelling improvements and policy recommendations, calling on the relevant UN agencies to start tracking mitigation progress through monitoring key elements of the framework (CO2 intensity, energy efficiency, and demand for sectoral activity, as well as the underlying drivers), as a matter of urgency

Limited emission reductions from fuel subsidy removal except in energy exporting regions

Hopes are high that removing fossil fuel subsidies could help to mitigate climate change by discouraging inefficient energy consumption and levelling the playing field for renewables1–3. In September 2016, the G20 countries re-affirmed their 2009 commitment (at the G20 Leaders’ Summit) to phase out fossil fuel subsidies4,5 and many national governments are using today’s low oil prices as an opportunity to do so6–9. In practical terms, this means abandoning policies that decrease the price of fossil fuels and electricity generated from fossil fuels to below normal market prices10,11. However, whether the removal of subsidies, even if implemented worldwide, would have a large impact on climate change mitigation has not been systematically explored. Here we show that fossil fuel subsidy removal would have a small impact on global energy demand and carbon dioxide emissions and would not increase renewable energy use by 2030. Subsidy removal would reduce the carbon price necessary to stabilize greenhouse gas concentration at 550 parts per million by only 2–12 per cent under low oil prices. Removing subsidies in most regions would deliver smaller emission reductions than the Paris Agreement (2015) climate pledges and in some regions global subsidy removal may actually lead to an increase in emissions, owing to either coal replacing subsidized oil and natural gas or natural-gas use shifting from subsidizing, energy-exporting regions to non-subsidizing, importing regions. Our results show that subsidy removal would result in the largest CO2 emission reductions in oil- and gas-exporting regions, where reductions would exceed their climate pledges and where subsidy removal would also affect fewer people below the poverty line than in lower-income regions

Limited emission reductions from fuel subsidy removal except in energy-exporting regions

Hopes are high that removing fossil fuel subsidies could help to mitigate climate change by discouraging inefficient energy consumption and levelling the playing field for renewable energy. In September 2016, the G20 countries re-affirmed their 2009 commitment (at the G20 Leaders' Summit) to phase out fossil fuel subsidies and many national governments are using today's low oil prices as an opportunity to do so. In practical terms, this means abandoning policies that decrease the price of fossil fuels and electricity generated from fossil fuels to below normal market prices. However, whether the removal of subsidies, even if implemented worldwide, would have a large impact on climate change mitigation has not been systematically explored. Here we show that removing fossil fuel subsidies would have an unexpectedly small impact on global energy demand and carbon dioxide emissions and would not increase renewable energy use by 2030. Subsidy removal would reduce the carbon price necessary to stabilize greenhouse gas concentration at 550 parts per million by only 2-12 per cent under low oil prices. Removing subsidies in most regions would deliver smaller emission reductions than the Paris Agreement (2015) climate pledges and in some regions global subsidy removal may actually lead to an increase in emissions, owing to either coal replacing subsidized oil and natural gas or natural-gas use shifting from subsidizing, energy-exporting regions to non-subsidizing, importing regions. Our results show that subsidy removal would result in the largest CO 2 emission reductions in high-income oil- and gas-exporting regions, where the reductions would exceed the climate pledges of these regions and where subsidy removal would affect fewer people living below the poverty line than in lower-income regions