Paleoenvironmental analysis of the Mangere Formation, Mangere Island, Chatham Islands, New Zealand : a thesis submitted in Earth Science for the degree of Master of Science at Massey University

Mangere Island consists almost entirely of alkali basalt of the late Miocene early Pliocene Rangiauria Formation (Campbell et al., 1993) with outcrops of the sedimentary Tupuangi Formation on the east coast and the Mangere Formation (Campbell, et al., 1993), a sedimentary remnant, mainly lacustrine but also partly marine, lying between the northeastern and southwestern groups of volcanic vents of Mangere Island: As a result of the present work the sedimentary Mangere Formation of Campbell et al. (1993) has been divided into two formations, Mangere Formation and the overlying Parakeet Formation. Mangere Formation consists of (1) a Basal member (32m of mudstone), and (2) a Cyclic member (12.6m of alternating sandstones and mudstones). Parakeet Formation has (1) a Carbonaceous member (0.6m Of organic rich mudstones), (2) a Skua member (16.8m of tuffaceous siltstone), and (3) a capping rhyolitic tephra. The Basal member of the Mangere Formation is underlain by a breccia that is texturally extremely variable (Bag End breccia). A sedimentary outcrop on the eastern coast of Mangere Island is lithologically and mineralogically identical to Tupuangi Formation on Pitt Island as well as having the same Cretaceous pollen suite. Thus it is inferred that, at the time of Rangiauria volcanism, Tupuangi Formation and its overlying Tertiary strata extended from Pitt Island at least as far as Mangere Island. An arm of the sea between two Mangere Island volcanic centres extended towards Waihere Bay, Pitt Island. At some time in the late Pliocene, volcanic debris avalanches from the northeast and southwest groups of vents formed a debris dam that blocked off the seaward side of the sea arm, resulting in the formation an oligotrophic fresh water lake. As a result of a low energy regime and vegetated slopes, the lake filled to ca. 30m with very fine sediment (the Basal member) from both the volcanics of Mangere Island and the quartzofelspathic Tupuangi Formation of Pitt/Mangere Island. Following this a debris dam, formed by volcanic debris avalanches, was breached by a rising sea. Local marine influence in storms destablised the slopes surrounding the then shallow lake resulting in the influx of coarse sands which alternated with mudstones deposited during quieter periods (the Cyclic Member). At the end of this period there was a eustatic fall of sea level or tectonic uplift or both, probably resulting in subaerial erosion and an unconformity between the Cyclic and Carbonaceous Members. A second shallow fresh water lake (the Carbonaceous member) was established on the top of the Cyclic member. This lake was later overwhelmed by wind-blown material derived from a deposit of Paleocene Red Bluff Tuff exposed probably by a falling sea level or marine erosion. The reworked Red Bluff Tuff was later covered by a layer of rhyolitic tephra probably from the Taupo Volcanic Zone (TVZ), North Island, New Zealand. The distinctive jointing pattern seen in the sandstone units of the Cyclic member resulted from doming with a principal stress directed northwest-southeast. This probably correlates with tectonic uplift in the Castlecliffian. The lack of any positive time markers makes dating the formation rather indeterminate, but the Basal and Cyclic members (Mangere Formation) are probably upper Mangapanian and the Skua member probably Quaternary. The sequence is generally lacking in fossils, except for palynomorphs which occur throughout, and ostracods which occur only in the Cyclic member. Neither proved useful for dating the sequence. The pollen diagrams show a consistent coastal plant association of small trees, shrubs, herbs and ferns throughout the history of the sequence, with the implication that climate during this time did not vary greatly from a mild, moist, equable mean

Human-automation collaboration in manufacturing: identifying key implementation factors

Human-automation collaboration refers to the concept of human operators and intelligent automation working together interactively within the same workspace without conventional physical separation. This concept has commanded significant attention in manufacturing because of the potential applications, such as the installation of large sub-assemblies. However, the key human factors relevant to human-automation collaboration have not yet been fully investigated. To maximise effective implementation and reduce development costs for future projects these factors need to be examined. In this paper, a collection of human factors likely to influence human-automation collaboration are identified from current literature. To test the validity of these and explore further factors associated with implementation success, different types of production processes in terms of stage of maturity are being explored via industrial case studies from the project’s stakeholders. Data was collected through a series of semi-structured interviews with shop floor operators, engineers, system designers and management personnel

Your new colleague is a robot. Is that ok?

Human robot collaboration is a concept under development that will be applied within manufacturing environments in the near future to increase efficiency and quality. While there have been significant advances in technology to enable this progress there is still little known about the wider human factors issues of employing such systems in High Value Manufacturing environments. This paper sets out our current understanding of key organisational and individual factors which need to be explored

The development of a Human Factors Readiness Level tool for implementing industrial human-robot collaboration

The concept of industrial human-robot collaboration (HRC) is becoming increasingly attractive as a means for enhancing manufacturing productivity and product. However, due to traditional preventive health and safety standards, there have been few operational examples of true HRC, so it has not been possible to explore the organisational human factors that need to be considered by manufacturing organisations to realise the benefits of industrial HRC until recently. Charalambous, Fletcher and Webb (2015) made the first attempt to identify the key organisational human factors for the successful implementation of industrial HRC through an industrial exploratory case study. This work enabled (i) development of a theoretical framework of key organisational human factors relevant to industrial HRC and (ii) identification of these factors as enablers or barriers. Although identifying the key organisational human factors (HF) was an important step, it presented a crucial question: when should practitioners involved in HRC design and implementation consider these factors? New industrial processes are typically designed and implemented using a maturity or readiness evaluation system, but these do not incorporate of or link to any formal considerations of HF. The aim of this paper is to expand on the previous findings and link the key human factors in the theoretical framework directly to a recognised industrial maturity readiness level system to develop a new Human Factors Readiness Level (HFRL) tool for system design practitioners to optimise successful implementation of industrial HRC

Holism, Hermeneutics, and Heterophenomenology: A Critique of Daniel Dennett\u27s Intentional Stance

Heterophenomenology downplays the reality of the internal experiential aspects of consciousness in deference to an intentional, language-based model of consciousness that places emphasis on the neutral acceptance of the speech reports of subjects as the basis for understanding consciousness – thus placing the foundations of consciousness in a physical, monistic (physical sans soul), computational device (the brain). I shall argue that this methodology can be seen as a form of empathic extrapolation of self-understanding onto the other in dialogue, akin to the work of early hermeneutics. 11 This methodology is closely tied in with a contemporary connectionist conception of computability that Dennett develops in his book Consciousness Explained

Linguistic Defense and Offense

When I first wrote about linguistic self-defense (discussed in Liav Orgad’s book pp. 198-200) I had a conception of languages in danger, The most visible potential victim were the French in Quebec. But with the help of Charles de Gaulle, the Quebecois have held on well to their culture (majority at home, minority at large, but supported by a large nation in Europe). One form of linguistic self-defense I proposed at the time was insisting on speaking your language in commercial transactions. For the sake of profit, store keepers would play along. Also, public advertising is a critical mode of making a language seem like the background state of normalcy. The key case in Quebec, as I recall, was called Chaussures Brown Shoes. That was the way they wanted their sign to read. The Anglophones objected and lost

The Unmet Challenge of Criminal Theory

The last several decades have witnessed an outpouring of serious articles bringing to bear the methods of analytic philosophy to the issues of substantive criminal law. J. L. Austin, a philosopher and not a lawyer, may have been the first to demonstrate the potential of probing legal concepts such as mistake and accident, justification and excuse, for their philosophical potential. H.L.A. Hart carried forward the literature with several path breaking essays on criminal law. It is only in the last few years, however, that we have encountered an explosion of interest in the basic questions of criminal law. As the essays in this volume, as well as other works in progress, demonstrate, we now have a critical mass of scholars interested in the philosophical dimensions of punishment, self-defense, justification, excuse, omissions, and causation

Paradoxes in Legal Thought

Traditional legal thought has generated few anomalies, antinomies, and paradoxes. These factual and logical tensions arise only when theorists press for a complete and comprehensive body of thought. Discrete, unconnected solutions to problems and particularized precedents spare us the logical tensions that have troubled scientific inquiry. Anomalies arise from data that do not fit the prevailing scientific theory. Paradoxes and antinomies, on the other hand, reflect problems of logical rather than factual consistency. To follow Quine\u27s definitions, paradoxes are contradictions that result from overlooking an accepted canon of consistent thought. They are resolved by pointing to the fallacy that generates them. When we confront the special form of paradox called an antinomy, however, we have no such easy way out. The resolution of these more troubling contradictions requires reexamination of our fundamental premises. The solution typically represents a conceptual innovation, a new way of looking at the field of life that generates the contradiction. For these factual and logical puzzles to become significant in a body of thought, theorists must be committed both to the completeness and to the consistency of their theoretical accounts. The impulse toward completeness renders anomalies disturbing. Confronted by data not explainable by the prevailing theory, theorists must either confess the incompleteness and inadequacy of their system or revise their tools of analysis to accommodate the anomaly. For example, those committed to the economic analysis of law initially regarded comparative negligence as anomalous under their system. The criteria of crime, criminal responsibility, and punishment have yet to receive an adequate account in the literature of law and economics. If anomalies like these accumulate, they can, as Kuhn has taught us, overthrow the theory that causes them to stand out. Until that overthrow occurs, the recognition of anomalies bears witness to the importance of the theoretical enterprise. That anomalies are troubling reflects a shared commitment to the development of a complete theory, not merely the accumulation of discrete formulae for unrelated factual data. The commitment to the consistency of logical structures – as contrasted with the completeness of their theories – drives theorists to grapple with paradoxes and antinomies. This drive has been evident, as we shall see, in the philosophical tradition. Oddly, the commitment to consistency has generated little progress in legal theory. The Holmesian belief that the life of the law has been experience rather than logic provides a good excuse for ignoring seeming contradictions in the structures of legal argument. This aversion to logical thought is buttressed by the ubiquitous misreading of Emerson\u27s branding consistency as the hobgoblin of little minds. What Emerson deplored is the foolish consistency \u27 of those unwilling to change their views over time. Yet criticizing inflexibility provides no excuse for accepting contradictory positions. In some circles of supposedly critical thought, it is even fashionable to tolerate contradictions as an inescapable feature of legal thought. These antitheoretical and antirational strains in legal thought discourage dialogue and preclude advances in our understanding of legal phenomena. This Article commits itself to logical consistency as the indispensable foundation for effective dialogue and coherent criticism. Only if we accept consistency as an overriding legal value will we be troubled by the paradoxes and antinomies that lie latent in our undeveloped systems of legal thought. Grappling with uncovered paradoxes and antinomies will impel us toward consistent theoretical structures. None of this, I submit, requires us to suppress our sensitivities to policies, principles, or other questions of value

Two Modes of Legal Thought

We should begin with a confession of ignorance. We have no jurisprudence of legal scholarship. Scholars expatiate at length on the work of other actors in the legal culture – legislators, judges, prosecutors, and even practicing lawyers. Yet we reflect little about what we are doing when we write about the law. We have a journal about the craft of teaching, but none about the craft of scholarship. In view of our ignorance, we should pay particular heed to our point of departure. I start with the observation that legal scholarship expresses itself in a variety of verbal forms. Descriptive propositions about the law, normative claims about what the law ought to be, and exhortations to decisionmakers to change the law are but examples of the variety of forms that appear in scholarly writing about the law. My initial task in this article is to work out some important distinctions among these verbal forms. Those distinctions generate a framework that I then use to make two more adventurous claims. I claim first that we can usefully distinguish between two modes of legal thought, which I shall call committed argument and detached observation ; and further, that whether we engage exclusively in one form of legal scholarship or another depends on our implicit assumptions about the nature of law. With these bolder theses defended, I then analyze how scholars can and do make persuasive claims in the mode of committed argument