Abkhazia’s ‘creeping’ incorporation. The end of the experiment of a separatist democracy. OSW Commentary 164, 2015-03-12

On 5 March 2015 a Russian-Abkhazian treaty on alliance and strategic partnership came into effect; it had been signed on 24 November 2014. In fact, the treaty provides a “roadmap” for the incorporation of Abkhazia into the Russian area of defence and economic and social affairs: as soon as the transition periods defined in the treaty expire, Russian standards and legal regulations will be rolled out in these areas. Despite maintaining the formal status of the Abkhazian government institutions and attributes of statehood (which, however, is a fact of minor importance, as Abkhazia is not internationally recognised as a state), the treaty’s entry into force will de facto bring the current model of functioning of this para-state to an end

Russia's position on the events in Kyrgyzstan (April-June 2010). OSW Commentary No. 38, 2010-07-27

Russia was the first state in the world to de facto recognise the regime change in Kyrgyzstan that took place on 7 April 2010. This recognition, along with a previous campaign by the Russian media against the then President Kurmanbek Bakiyev, has given rise to suspicion that the events of April were provoked by Russia. However, it seems no more than reasonable to say that Russia provided some inspiration and lobbying in that direction. Russia offered support to the new Kyrgyz government almost immediately, albeit conditionally. Russia’s relations with Roza Otunbayeva’s government have been changing in nature; they are currently much cooler than they had been immediately after the coup. There are many indications that this change was a reaction to the extension of the lease agreement for the American military base in the Manas airport. At the same time, Moscow remains in contact with the political rivals to the current regime, which suggests that the Kremlin is preparing for different developments, and does not regard the current crisis as having been fully resolved. Despite the interim government’s plea for help, Russia refused to undertake military intervention in southern Kyrgyzstan, which plunged into ethnic unrest in June. This shows that Russia is wary of being dragged into a long-standing and bloody conflict in the region, which could entail considerable expenses and jeopardise Russia’s authority. It should be expected that after the October parliamentary elections in Kyrgyzstan, Russia will return to its plans to establish a second military base in this country (in addition to the Kant base) to reinforce its dominant position in the region. This is the first time that Russia has had a real chance to play a stabilising role in the CIS area. How Russia copes with this challenge may decide its position in post-Soviet Central Asia – and in a wider context, its relations with NATO, the USA and China

A revolution in instalments. Whither Pashinyan’s Armenia now? OSW Commentary NUMBER 285 | 10.09.2018

In mid-August, a hundred days passed since Nikol Pashinyan took office as Armenia’s Prime Minister, which is an office of key importance for the Armenian political system. Formerly an opposition MP, Pashinyan rose to power as a result of a bloodless revolution. He replaced Serzh Sargsyan, whose camp had ruled Armenia for the last two decades. The country’s domestic situation is stable and its economy is growing. However, the parliamentary majority and significant business assets remain in the hands of the old elite, which considerably reduces the present leadership’s room for manoeuvre

"Creeping" civil war in the North Caucasus. OSW Commentary No. 50, 2011-03-15

Over the last year, the situation in Russia’s North Caucasus has become further destabilised. Attacks and armed clashes happen daily, and destabilisation is spreading to an increasingly large area. The extent of violence in the region is so great that it can already be stated that a de facto civil war is taking place, the warring parties being the Islamic armed underground movement which operates under the banner of the so-called Emirate of the North Caucasus, and the secular governments of the individual republics, who are supported by local and federal branches of the Russian Federation’s Interior Ministry and Federal Security Service. Moscow has no idea how to successfully tackle the Caucasus rebellion. Force has proved to be costly and unproductive, while the attempts made since early 2010 to integrate the region with the rest of Russia by implementing development programmes have not brought the desired results, because of widespread corruption and faint interest from businessmen who are afraid to invest in such an unsafe region. A growing problem for Moscow, particularly for the prestige of the state, is attacks by militants on areas near Sochi, where the 2014 Winter Olympics is to take place. It must be assumed that over the next 3 years before the Olympics, Moscow’s priority in the region will be to ensure the safety of Olympic preparations, and then the games themselves. It cannot be ruled out that the North Caucasus Federal District with its ‘troubled republics’ will be surrounded by a kind of cordon sanitaire (Sochi is situated in the neighbouring Southern Federal District). This could in turn strengthen these republics’ isolation, maintain the state of permanent instability, and postpone the prospects of solving the region’s acute economic and social problems

The Gordian knot of the Caucasus: The conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh.

The conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh is the ‘mother’ of all post-Soviet conflicts. It is the oldest of them, it involves the largest number of actors (including mediators and intermediaries), and also covers the most dimensions: military, political, economic and social. The Karabakh issue has come to dominate the post-Soviet history of Armenia and Azerbaijan, shaping their modern statehoods; left a lasting mark on the region, including its transport infrastructure; and has become an instrument of control over the South Caucasus for Russia. Despite the fact that the present significance of the conflict has decreased since the wars in Georgia and Ukraine, it remains an important element of politics at the junction of post-Soviet Eurasia and the Middle East. Each decision made in this connection will set a certain standard for the area of ​​the former USSR and for Moscow's relations with the former Soviet republics. A possible new war would violate the security system in this part of the world. Such a scenario is unlikely, but not unrealistic. It is made more likely by the fact that the current state of political suspension does not represent a ‘freezing’ of the conflict, but is rather a form of ‘stable instability’: armed incidents occur every day, and people are killed regularly. This report is intended as a handy compendium of the conflict. It has been produced more than 30 years after its outbreak and over 25 years since the end of the Karabakh war. It describes its changing dynamics over time, the interests of the participants and external actors, the course of the peace process, the current state of affairs, and the prospects for the future

The union between Maronitae and Rome (1182) as the context of relationships between the Franks and the Oriental Churches in the Crusader states in the 12ᵗʰ century

The origin of the Crusader states in the territory of Asia caused an accumulation of new problems concerning co-existence among various groups of people. The groups included peoples from Europe and the Near East: the crusaders called Franks, Catholics and different groups of Oriental Christians, Muslims and Jews. This paper tries to explain how the crusaders and Maronitae could have adjusted to the agreement.  The paper illustrates the situation of the Crusader states and gives some analysis of the relationships between the Franks and the Oriental Christians and, finally, it attempts to explain the problems of the union between Latin Christians and Maronitae.The origin of the Crusader states in the territory of Asia caused an accumulation of new problems concerning co-existence among various groups of people. The groups included peoples from Europe and the Near East: the crusaders called Franks, Catholics and different groups of Oriental Christians, Muslims and Jews. This paper tries to explain how the crusaders and Maronitae could have adjusted to the agreement.  The paper illustrates the situation of the Crusader states and gives some analysis of the relationships between the Franks and the Oriental Christians and, finally, it attempts to explain the problems of the union between Latin Christians and Maronitae

The Autumn of the (Georgian) Patriarch. The role of the Orthodox Church in Georgia and in Georgian politics. OSW Commentary 2020-05-18.

Analyses dedicated to Georgia’s domestic situation usually omit the religious aspect and the relation between the state and the country’s predominant religious organisation, i.e. the autocephalous Georgian Orthodox Church (GOC). The relatively few papers focused on this particular issue are exceptions. Meanwhile, the fact that Georgians as a nation are very devout (religion is an element of their national identity) and that Catholicos-Patriarch Ilia II is an indisputable authority has a direct impact on the choices they make and on the policy pursued by the state. It can be said that one important reason behind the electoral success of Georgian Dream in 2012 was the support offered, albeit informally, by hierarchs of the GOC to the party’s leader Bidzina Ivanishvili. Easter celebrations attended by large numbers of believers on 19 April 2020 were an open display of the GOC’s power. The celebrations took place despite the restrictions due to a state of emergency declared nationwide in connection with the epidemic. Moreover, the GOC is on the eve of a succession – Ilia II who has been patriarch for more than 42 years, recently turned 87. This is causing internal tension in the Church which in turn acts as a catalyst for accelerating secularisation

The peninsula as an island. Crimea in its third year since annexation. OSW POINT OF VIEW No. 61, November 2016

More than two and a half years after its annexation, Crimea is more reminiscent of an island than a peninsula, and its population`s impeded access to the mainland is adversely affecting its conditions and quality of life. Regardless of the transport and social problems, the vast majority of the population have remained on the peninsula adapting to the new situation. They are willing to blame the present difficulties on sanctions, the West’s policies and the Ukrainian diversion. This attitude has been reinforced by Moscow’s policy of ‘facts on the ground’, its harsh rhetoric, its refusal to consider revising the status quo, and Kyiv’s lack of determination to restore its jurisdiction over Crimea. If this situation does not change, within a generation the peninsula may be fully integrated with Russia, due to the bridges being constructed over the Kerch Strait, as well as the expansion of Russian media and cultural ties. Crimean Tatars as a community have suffered most as a result of the annexation. Their representative body, the Mejlis, has been recognised as an extremist organisation in Russia, which prevents it from operating on the peninsula