The breakdown of authority

This paper studies organizations with autocratic decisionmaking, i.e., where superiors make the decisions and subordinates either defy or submit to the authority. Superiors differ in the degree to which they fear defiance. The superiors who need obedience most face a fundamental credibility problem, which, in fact, makes them the least likely to be obeyed. The subordinate’s competence has conflicting effects on the superior’s welfare: competent subordinates comprise better sources of information but also harsher yardsticks. The result is that superiors prefer subordinates of medium competence. -- In der Arbeit werden Organisationen mit autokratischen Entscheidungsprozeduren untersucht. Bei solchen Entscheidungsprozeduren treffen Vorgesetzte Entscheidungen. Mitarbeiter können sich den Entscheidungen des Vorgesetzten unterordnen oder sich widersetzen. Die Vorgesetzten, die vom Gehorsam ihrer Mitarbeiter am stärksten abhängig sind, sehen sich einem grundlegenden Glaubwürdigkeitsproblem gegenüber, dass dazu führt, dass sie am wenigsten mit dem Gehorsam seitens der Mitarbeiter rechnen können. Die Fähigkeit eines Mitarbeiters hat einander entgegenlaufende Wirkungen auf den Payoff des Vorgesetzten: Mitarbeiter mit hoher Fähigkeit sind nützlicher als Informationsquellen, aber zugleich setzen sie strengere Maßstäbe. Vorgesetzte bevorzugen deshalb Mitarbeiter von mittlerer Fähigkeit.Authority,organization theory,autocratic decision making

Lobbying, Information Transmission, and Unequal Representation

We study the effects of unequal representation in the interest-group system on the degree of information transmission between a lobbyist and a policymaker. Employing a dynamic cheap-talk model in which the lobbyist cares instrumentally about his reputation for truthtelling, we show that the larger is the inequality, the less information can credibly be transmitted to the policymaker. We also investigate the effects of inequality on welfare and discuss the welfare effects of institutions that increase transparency but which as well, as an unintended side-effect, lower the lobbyist’s incentives for truthtelling. ZUSAMMENFASSUNG - (Lobbying, Informationsübertragung und ungleiche Repräsentation) In diesem Papier wird untersucht, welche Wirkung die ungleiche Repräsentation in einem Interessengruppensystem auf den Grad an Informationsübertragung zwischen einem Lobbyisten und einem Politiker hat. Es wird ein dynamisches Modell für 'Cheap-talk' verwendet, in dem angenommen wird, dass der Lobbyist Wert auf seine Reputation als aufrichtiger Informationsvermittler legt. Dabei kann gezeigt werden, dass je größer die Ungleichheit im System, dem Politiker umso weniger Information glaubwürdig übermittelt werden kann. Darüber hinaus wird die Wohlfahrtswirkung der Ungleichheit untersucht und diskutiert, welche Effekte solche Institutionen haben, die zwar einerseits die Transparenz erhöhen, mit unerwünschtem Nebeneffekt aber den Anreiz für Lobbyisten, Informationen wahrheitsgemäß weiterzugeben, verringern.Lobbying, interest groups, reputation, information transmission, representation, inequality, bias

Lobbying, Information Transmission, and Unequal Representation

We study the effects of unequal representation in the interest-group system on the degree of information transmission between a lobbyist and a policymaker. Employing a dynamic cheap-talk model in which the lobbyist cares instrumentally about his reputation for truthtelling, we show that the larger is the inequality, the less information can credibly be transmitted to the policymaker. We also investigate the effects of inequality on welfare and discuss the welfare effects of institutions that increase transparency but which as well, as an unintended side-effect, lower the lobbyist's incentives for truthtelling.lobbying, interest groups, reputation, information transmission, representation, inequality, bias

Lobbying, Information Transmission, and Unequal Representation

We study the effects of unequal representation in the interest-group system on the degree of information transmission between a lobbyist and a policymaker. Employing a dynamic cheap-talk model in which the lobbyist cares instrumentally about his reputation for truthtelling, we show that the larger is the inequality, the less information can credibly be transmitted to the policymaker. We also investigate the effects of inequality on welfare and discuss the welfare effects of institutions that increase transparency but which as well, as an unintended side-effect, lower the lobbyist's incentives for truthtelling.lobbying, interest groups, reputation, information transmission, representation, inequality, bias

Eliciting Demand Information through Cheap Talk: An Argument in Favor of Price Regulations

A firm must decide whether to launch a new product. A launch implies considerable fixed costs, so the firm would like to assess downstream demand before it decides. We study under which conditions a potential buyer would be willing to reveal his willingness to pay under different pricing regimes. We show that the firm's welfare -- as well as consumers' -- may be higher with a commitment to linear pricing than when pricing is unrestricted. That is, if informational asymmetries are significant, price regulations such as the Robinson-Patman Act may be endorsed by all parties.Price regulations, price discrimination, incomplete information, cheap talk, Robinson-Patman Act

The breakdown of authority

"This paper studies organizations with autocratic decisionmaking, i.e., where superiors make the decisions and subordinates either defy or submit to the authority. Superiors differ in the degree to which they fear defiance. The superiors who need obedience most face a fundamental credibility problem, which, in fact, makes them the least likely to be obeyed. The subordinate's competence has conflicting effects on the superior's welfare: competent subordinates comprise better sources of information but also harsher yardsticks. The result is that superiors prefer subordinates of 'medium' competence." (author's abstract)"Die Arbeit untersucht eine Studie von Organisationen mit autokratischen Entscheidungsprozeduren. Bei solchen Entscheidungsprozeduren treffen Vorgesetzte Entscheidungen. Mitarbeiter entscheiden, ob sie sich den Entscheidungen des Vorgesetzten unterordnen oder sich widersetzen. Die Vorgesetzten, die vom Gehorsam ihrer Mitarbeiter am stärksten abhängig sind, sehen sich einem grundlegenden Glaubwürdigkeitsproblem gegenüber, dass dazu führt, dass sie am wenigsten mit dem Gehorsam seitens der Mitarbeiter rechnen können. Die Fähigkeit eines Mitarbeiters hat einander entgegenlaufende Wirkungen auf den Payoff des Vorgesetzten: Mitarbeiter mit hoher Fähigkeit sind nützlicher als Informationsquellen, aber zugleich setzen sie strengere Maßstäbe. Vorgesetzte bevorzugen deshalb Mitarbeiter von 'mittlerer' Fähigkeit." (Autorenreferat

Violent crime : addressing causation with family-based methods

Violent crime is an important public health problem, and incurs major costs for society. The effect of interventions has so far been modest, often attributed to a research focus on risk factors for crime, but a relative lack of understanding of the causal mechanisms behind these factors. The four studies in this thesis attempt to address different aspects of the etiology of violent crime by using family-based epidemiologic methods. It has long been known that antisocial behavior runs in families. In Paper I, a nested case-control was used to quantify the familial clustering of violent crime using a linkage of several Swedish total population registers. We were able to provide precise estimates of the familial aggregation among 1st, 2nd, and 3rd degree relatives, and also adoptive relations and spouses. Familial risks were moderate to strong, and were modified by gender, socioeconomic status, type of violent crime, and age at first conviction. Familial clustering suggests that genes and/or family environment influence the propensity for violent offending. In Paper II we attempted to estimate the relative importance of these factors by calculating the heritability in mixed probit regression. Comparing results from twin, adoptee-parent, adoptee-sibling, and sibling designs, and attempting to adjust for non-random mating, we found that about half the variation in violent offending could be attributed to genetic factors. We also found significant gender differences in the etiology of violent crime. In Paper III, we discussed the interpretation of sibling comparison designs. Sibling comparisons have been hailed for their ability to adjust for family-shared confounders, but have received little attention from a methodological standpoint. In line with previous research in economy, we showed that these models are subject to several caveats, and that they may in some situations increase rather than decrease bias. The implications of this were acknowledged in Paper IV, where we analysed the association of general cognitive ability and violent crime, and adjusted for shared family characteristics through sibling comparison analysis. Taking measurement error and non-shared confounding into account, the results indicated that the association was partly confounded by factors shared by siblings, but that most of the association could not be explained by such factors. Together, Papers I and II suggested that violent crime runs in families due to both genetic and environmental factors, and Paper IV offered some support for the hypothesis that intelligence may be one of the factors explaining this familial aggregation. The caveats of sibling comparisons pointed out in Paper III should be taken into account when using co-twin control and other sibling designs to address issues of causality

Populism

In their pursuit of being elected, politicians might not provide their constituents with independent viewpoints, but just try to outguess popular opinion. Although rational voters see through such populism, candidates can not resist resorting to it when the spoils of office are too large. For an intermediate parameter range, both populism and its opposite, candor, can be sustained as equilibria. This means that the publics trust or distrust in politicians may be self-fulfilling prophecies. Importantly, the more informed politicians are about public opinion, the more likely it is that populist behavior can be avoided