Making Deliberative Democracy Practical: Public Consultation and Dispute Resolution

Published in cooperation with the American Bar Association Section of Dispute Resolutio

The Quest for Justice

A Review of Affirmative Action and Justice: A Philosophical and Constitutional Inquiry by Michel Rosenfel

Deliberative Agenda Setting: Piloting Reform of Direct Democracy in California

Can the people deliberate to set the agenda for direct democracy in large scale states? How might such an institution work? The 2011 California Deliberative Poll piloted a solution to this problem helping to produce proposals that went to the ballot and also to the legislature. The paper reports on how this pilot worked and what it suggests about a possible institution to solve the deliberative agenda setting problem. The legislative proposal passed the legislature but the ballot proposition (Prop 31) failed. However, we show that the proposals actually deliberated on by the people might well have passed if not encumbered by additional elements not deliberated on by the public that drew opposition. The paper ends with an outline of how the process of deliberative agenda setting for the initiative might work, vetting proposals once every two years that could get on the ballot for a greatly reduced cost in signature collections. Adding deliberation to the agenda setting process would allow for a thoughtful and informed public will formation to determine the agenda for direct democracy

Lesson to political parties: here is the method for really listening to citizen

Political parties in Italy are in crisis. Why not really make parties "the tools by which citizens contribute to national politics"? Why not encourage parties (and governments) to listen to the people-for issues, for candidates and for how to change the system itself? Would it not be easier for parties to regain the trust of voters if they used public funding also to involve citizens in their decisions

Antitrust Merger Efficiencies in the Shadow of the Law

This Essay provides an overview of U.S. antitrust merger practice in addressing efficiencies both in terms of actual practice before the agencies and in scholarly work as a response to Jamie Henikoff Moffitt\u27s Vanderbilt Law Review article Merging in the Shadow of the Law: The Case for Consistent Judicial Efficiency Analysis. Moffitt’s analysis could have benefited from a more thorough discussion of the Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission’s (collectively, the “agencies”) analysis of efficiencies during investigations and the broader process of negotiations involving mergers. For instance, the article does not discuss the empirical work addressing when the agencies use efficiencies, the role antitrust practitioners play during the merger process in shaping whether or not the agencies will litigate a case, or the types of issues that end in litigation. Moreover, the article does not sufficiently analyze merger enforcement decisions at the agencies based on the efficiencies section of the 1997 Revisions to the Horizontal Merger Guidelines (“1997 Revisions”) and the new 2010 Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission Horizontal Merger Guidelines (“2010 Merger Guidelines”). Moffitt also overlooks the importance of the 2006 Commentary on the Horizontal Merger Guidelines (“Commentary”) and fails to address the chapter within the Commentary that specifically addresses how the agencies consider efficiencies. Lastly, Moffitt’s claims stressing the importance of her work in a broader context of business issues (such as the financial crisis) and policy debates regarding shifts in antitrust merger enforcement are without empirical support. This Response addresses each of these issues in turn

Antitrust Merger Efficiencies in the Shadow of the Law

This Essay provides an overview of U.S. antitrust merger practice in addressing efficiencies both in terms of actual practice before the agencies and in scholarly work as a response to Jamie Henikoff Moffitt\u27s Vanderbilt Law Review article Merging in the Shadow of the Law: The Case for Consistent Judicial Efficiency Analysis. Moffitt’s analysis could have benefited from a more thorough discussion of the Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission’s (collectively, the “agencies”) analysis of efficiencies during investigations and the broader process of negotiations involving mergers. For instance, the article does not discuss the empirical work addressing when the agencies use efficiencies, the role antitrust practitioners play during the merger process in shaping whether or not the agencies will litigate a case, or the types of issues that end in litigation. Moreover, the article does not sufficiently analyze merger enforcement decisions at the agencies based on the efficiencies section of the 1997 Revisions to the Horizontal Merger Guidelines (“1997 Revisions”) and the new 2010 Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission Horizontal Merger Guidelines (“2010 Merger Guidelines”). Moffitt also overlooks the importance of the 2006 Commentary on the Horizontal Merger Guidelines (“Commentary”) and fails to address the chapter within the Commentary that specifically addresses how the agencies consider efficiencies. Lastly, Moffitt’s claims stressing the importance of her work in a broader context of business issues (such as the financial crisis) and policy debates regarding shifts in antitrust merger enforcement are without empirical support. This Response addresses each of these issues in turn

Antitrust Merger Efficiencies in the Shadow of the Law

This Essay provides an overview of U.S. antitrust merger practice in addressing efficiencies both in terms of actual practice before the agencies and in scholarly work as a response to Jamie Henikoff Moffitt\u27s Vanderbilt Law Review article Merging in the Shadow of the Law: The Case for Consistent Judicial Efficiency Analysis. Moffitt’s analysis could have benefited from a more thorough discussion of the Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission’s (collectively, the “agencies”) analysis of efficiencies during investigations and the broader process of negotiations involving mergers. For instance, the article does not discuss the empirical work addressing when the agencies use efficiencies, the role antitrust practitioners play during the merger process in shaping whether or not the agencies will litigate a case, or the types of issues that end in litigation. Moreover, the article does not sufficiently analyze merger enforcement decisions at the agencies based on the efficiencies section of the 1997 Revisions to the Horizontal Merger Guidelines (“1997 Revisions”) and the new 2010 Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission Horizontal Merger Guidelines (“2010 Merger Guidelines”). Moffitt also overlooks the importance of the 2006 Commentary on the Horizontal Merger Guidelines (“Commentary”) and fails to address the chapter within the Commentary that specifically addresses how the agencies consider efficiencies. Lastly, Moffitt’s claims stressing the importance of her work in a broader context of business issues (such as the financial crisis) and policy debates regarding shifts in antitrust merger enforcement are without empirical support. This Response addresses each of these issues in turn

Deliberative Democracy and Public Consultation

Streaming video requires RealPlayer to view.The University Archives has determined that this item is of continuing value to OSU's history.James Fishkin holds the Janet M. Peck Chair in International Communication at Stanford University. He is also professor of political science and communication, director of Stanford's Center for Deliberative Democracy, and chair of the Department of Communication. Fishkin is author of a number of books including Democracy and Deliberation: New Directions for Democratic Reform (Yale University Press, 1991), The Dialogue of Justice (Yale University Press, 1992 ), and The Voice of the People: Public Opinion and Democracy (Yale University Press, 1995). He is co-author with Bruce Ackerman of Deliberation Day (Yale University Press, 2004), and his most recent book When the People Speak: Deliberative Democracy and Public Consultation was published by Oxford University Press in 2009. Fishkin is best known for developing Deliberative Polling® -- a practice of public consultation that employs random samples of the citizenry to explore how opinions would change if they were more informed. Fishkin and his collaborators have conducted Deliberative Polls in the United States, Britain, Australia, Denmark, Bulgaria, China, Greece and other countries. Fishkin has been a Visiting Fellow Commoner at Trinity College, Cambridge as well as a Fellow of the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences at Stanford. He has held a fellowship at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars at the Smithsonian Institution in Washington D.C. and has also been awarded a Guggenheim Fellowship. Fishkin received his B.A. from Yale University in 1970. He holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from Yale and a Ph.D. in Philosophy from University of Cambridge.Ohio State University. Mershon Center for International Security StudiesEvent Web page, streaming video, event photo

Cristina Lafont’s Challenge to Deliberative Minipublics

This essay is a response to Cristina Lafont’s critique of deliberative minipublics. I consider the problem in these main steps: (1) The argument that such minipublics should not have any real ‘decisional-power’ and (2) that it is not democratically acceptable to rely on them as a ‘second best’ because they only engage a small portion of the population (138–139). Nothing but a ‘first best’ strategy will do in her view. (3) The challenge of achieving a ‘first best’ solution, which I have previously outlined in terms of what I call the ‘trilemma’ of democratic reform. (4) Why I believe Lafont’s solution, a ‘participatory conception of deliberative democracy’, does not actually offer a solution to the trilemma because it is insufficiently participatory (Lafont 2019: Part III). (5) My own approach to dealing with the trilemma, as outlined in my book Democracy When the People Are Thinking (Fishkin 2018), is, I will argue, both more participatory and more deliberative. I lay out an actual solution. While it is elaborate and expensive, there is no theoretical or practical impediment to realizing it, except for collective political will, except for a shared decision to move forward. The contrast between the two solutions is the focus of the last part of the essay

Vers une démocratie délibérative : L'expérimentation d'un idéal : Extrait de Citizen competence and democratic institutions, sous la direction de Stephen L. Elkin et de Karol Edward Soltan, Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999, chapitre XII, p. 279-290

Le texte de Fishkin que nous publions ici montre qu'une filiation étonnamment claire l'unit à James Bryce et à George Gallup. Comme ses deux prédécesseurs, James S. Fishkin accorde un intérêt particulier aux mécanismes favorisant la manifestation des opinions, l'expression des préférences et la production des décisions collectives, dans une relation critique et distanciée avec les procédures électorales (...)