The biological origin of linguistic diversity

In contrast with animal communication systems, diversity is characteristic of almost every aspect of human language. Languages variously employ tones, clicks, or manual signs to signal differences in meaning; some languages lack the noun-verb distinction (e.g., Straits Salish), whereas others have a proliferation of fine-grained syntactic categories (e.g., Tzeltal); and some languages do without morphology (e.g., Mandarin), while others pack a whole sentence into a single word (e.g., Cayuga). A challenge for evolutionary biology is to reconcile the diversity of languages with the high degree of biological uniformity of their speakers. Here, we model processes of language change and geographical dispersion and find a consistent pressure for flexible learning, irrespective of the language being spoken. This pressure arises because flexible learners can best cope with the observed high rates of linguistic change associated with divergent cultural evolution following human migration. Thus, rather than genetic adaptations for specific aspects of language, such as recursion, the coevolution of genes and fast-changing linguistic structure provides the biological basis for linguistic diversity. Only biological adaptations for flexible learning combined with cultural evolution can explain how each child has the potential to learn any human language

Computing the common zeros of two bivariate functions via Bézout resultants

The common zeros of two bivariate functions can be computed by finding the common zeros of their polynomial interpolants expressed in a tensor Chebyshev basis. From here we develop a bivariate rootfinding algorithm based on the hidden variable resultant method and Bézout matrices with polynomial entries. Using techniques including domain subdivision, Bézoutian regularization, and local refinement we are able to reliably and accurately compute the simple common zeros of two smooth functions with polynomial interpolants of very high degree (≥ 1000). We analyze the resultant method and its conditioning by noting that the Bézout matrices are matrix polynomials. Two implementations are available: one on the Matlab Central File Exchange and another in the roots command in Chebfun2 that is adapted to suit Chebfun’s methodology

Clustering in large networks does not promote upstream reciprocity

Upstream reciprocity (also called generalized reciprocity) is a putative mechanism for cooperation in social dilemma situations with which players help others when they are helped by somebody else. It is a type of indirect reciprocity. Although upstream reciprocity is often observed in experiments, most theories suggest that it is operative only when players form short cycles such as triangles, implying a small population size, or when it is combined with other mechanisms that promote cooperation on their own. An expectation is that real social networks, which are known to be full of triangles and other short cycles, may accommodate upstream reciprocity. In this study, I extend the upstream reciprocity game proposed for a directed cycle by Boyd and Richerson to the case of general networks. The model is not evolutionary and concerns the conditions under which the unanimity of cooperative players is a Nash equilibrium. I show that an abundance of triangles or other short cycles in a network does little to promote upstream reciprocity. Cooperation is less likely for a larger population size even if triangles are abundant in the network. In addition, in contrast to the results for evolutionary social dilemma games on networks, scale-free networks lead to less cooperation than networks with a homogeneous degree distribution.Comment: 5 figure

The Emergence of Cooperation in Public Goods Games on Randomly Growing Dynamic Networks

According to evolutionary game theory, cooperation in public goods games is eliminated by free-riders, yet in nature, cooperation is ubiquitous. Artificial models resolve this contradiction via the mechanism of network reciprocity. However, existing research only addresses pre-existing networks and does not specifically consider their origins. Further, much work has focused on scale-free networks and so pre-supposes attachment mechanisms which may not exist in nature. We present a coevolutionary model of public goods games in networks, growing by random attachment, from small founding populations of simple agents. The model demonstrates the emergence of cooperation in moderately heterogeneous networks, regardless of original founders' behaviour, and absent higher cognitive abilities such as recognition or memory. It may thus illustrate a more general mechanism for the evolution of cooperation, from early origins, in minimally cognitive organisms. It is the first example of a model explaining cooperation in public goods games on growing networks.Comment: Accepted for (and presented at) Evostar 2016 conference (in EvoApps

Quality versus quantity of social ties in experimental cooperative networks

Recent studies suggest that allowing individuals to choose their partners can help to maintain cooperation in human social networks; this behaviour can supplement behavioural reciprocity, whereby humans are influenced to cooperate by peer pressure. However, it is unknown how the rate of forming and breaking social ties affects our capacity to cooperate. Here we use a series of online experiments involving 1,529 unique participants embedded in 90 experimental networks, to show that there is a ‘Goldilocks’ effect of network dynamism on cooperation. When the rate of change in social ties is too low, subjects choose to have many ties, even if they attach to defectors. When the rate is too high, cooperators cannot detach from defectors as much as defectors re-attach and, hence, subjects resort to behavioural reciprocity and switch their behaviour to defection. Optimal levels of cooperation are achieved at intermediate levels of change in social ties

Social norms of cooperation in small-scale societies

Indirect reciprocity, besides providing a convenient framework to address the evolution of moral systems, offers a simple and plausible explanation for the prevalence of cooperation among unrelated individuals. By helping someone, an individual may increase her/his reputation, which may change the pre-disposition of others to help her/him in the future. This, however, depends on what is reckoned as a good or a bad action, i.e., on the adopted social norm responsible for raising or damaging a reputation. In particular, it remains an open question which social norms are able to foster cooperation in small-scale societies, while enduring the wide plethora of stochastic affects inherent to finite populations. Here we address this problem by studying the stochastic dynamics of cooperation under distinct social norms, showing that the leading norms capable of promoting cooperation depend on the community size. However, only a single norm systematically leads to the highest cooperative standards in small communities. That simple norm dictates that only whoever cooperates with good individuals, and defects against bad ones, deserves a good reputation, a pattern that proves robust to errors, mutations and variations in the intensity of selection.This research was supported by Fundacao para a Ciencia e Tecnologia (FCT) through grants SFRH/BD/94736/2013, PTDC/EEI-SII/5081/2014, PTDC/MAT/STA/3358/2014 and by multi-annual funding of CBMA and INESC-ID (under the projects UID/BIA/04050/2013 and UID/CEC/50021/2013 provided by FCT). The funders had no role in study design, data collection and analysis, decision to publish, or preparation of the manuscript.info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersio

Similar TKA designs with differences in clinical outcome: A randomized, controlled trial of 77 knees with a mean follow-up of 6 years

Contains fulltext : 96347.pdf (publisher's version ) (Open Access)Background and purpose To try to improve the outcome of our TKAs, we started to use the CKS prosthesis. However, in a retrospective analysis this design tended to give worse results. We therefore conducted a randomized, controlled trial comparing this CKS prosthesis and our standard PFC prosthesis. Because many randomized studies between different TKA concepts generally fail to show superiority of a particular design, we hypothesized that these seemingly similar designs would not lead to any difference in clinical outcome. Patients and methods 82 patients (90 knees) were randomly allocated to one or other prosthesis, and 39 CKS prostheses and 38 PFC prostheses could be followed for mean 5.6 years. No patients were lost to follow-up. At each follow-up, patients were evaluated clinically and radiographically, and the KSS, WOMAC, VAS patient satisfaction scores and VAS for pain were recorded. Results With total Knee Society score (KSS) as primary endpoint, there was a difference in favor of the PFC group at final follow-up (p = 0.04). Whereas there was one revision in the PFC group, there were 6 revisions in the CKS group (p = 0.1). The survival analysis with any reoperation as endpoint showed better survival in the PFC group (97% (95% CI: 92-100) for the PFC group vs. 79% (95% CI: 66-92) for the CKS group) (p = 0.02). Interpretation Our hypothesis that there would be no difference in clinical outcome was rejected in this study. The PFC system showed excellent results that were comparable to those in previous reports. The CKS design had differences that had considerable negative consequences clinically. The relatively poor results have discouraged us from using this design

Cost-effective external interference for promoting the evolution of cooperation.

The problem of promoting the evolution of cooperative behaviour within populations of self-regarding individuals has been intensively investigated across diverse fields of behavioural, social and computational sciences. In most studies, cooperation is assumed to emerge from the combined actions of participating individuals within the populations, without taking into account the possibility of external interference and how it can be performed in a cost-efficient way. Here, we bridge this gap by studying a cost-efficient interference model based on evolutionary game theory, where an exogenous decision-maker aims to ensure high levels of cooperation from a population of individuals playing the one-shot Prisoner's Dilemma, at a minimal cost. We derive analytical conditions for which an interference scheme or strategy can guarantee a given level of cooperation while at the same time minimising the total cost of investment (for rewarding cooperative behaviours), and show that the results are highly sensitive to the intensity of selection by interference. Interestingly, we show that a simple class of interference that makes investment decisions based on the population composition can lead to significantly more cost-efficient outcomes than standard institutional incentive strategies, especially in the case of weak selection.</p

Performance evaluation of IB-DFE-based strategies for SC-FDMA systems

The aim of this paper is to propose and evaluate multi-user iterative block decision feedback equalization (IB-DFE) schemes for the uplink of single-carrier frequency-division multiple access (SC-FDMA)-based systems. It is assumed that a set of single antenna users share the same physical channel to transmit its own information to the base station, which is equipped with an antenna array. Two space-frequency multi-user IB-DFE-based processing are considered: iterative successive interference cancellation and parallel interference cancellation. In the first approach, the equalizer vectors are computed by minimizing the mean square error (MSE) of each individual user, at each subcarrier. In the second one, the equalizer matrices are obtained by minimizing the overall MSE of all users at each subcarrier. For both cases, we propose a simple yet accurate analytical approach for obtaining the performance of the discussed receivers. The proposed schemes allow an efficient user separation, with a performance close to the one given by the matched filter bound for severely time-dispersive channels, with only a few iterations

Measurement of the branching fraction and CP content for the decay B(0) -> D(*+)D(*-)

This is the pre-print version of the Article. The official published version can be accessed from the links below. Copyright @ 2002 APS.We report a measurement of the branching fraction of the decay B0→D*+D*- and of the CP-odd component of its final state using the BABAR detector. With data corresponding to an integrated luminosity of 20.4  fb-1 collected at the Υ(4S) resonance during 1999–2000, we have reconstructed 38 candidate signal events in the mode B0→D*+D*- with an estimated background of 6.2±0.5 events. From these events, we determine the branching fraction to be B(B0→D*+D*-)=[8.3±1.6(stat)±1.2(syst)]×10-4. The measured CP-odd fraction of the final state is 0.22±0.18(stat)±0.03(syst).This work is supported by DOE and NSF (USA), NSERC (Canada), IHEP (China), CEA and CNRS-IN2P3 (France), BMBF (Germany), INFN (Italy), NFR (Norway), MIST (Russia), and PPARC (United Kingdom). Individuals have received support from the A.P. Sloan Foundation, Research Corporation, and Alexander von Humboldt Foundation