A Median Voter Theorem for Postelection Politics

We analyze a model of "postelection politics", in which (unlike in the more common Downsian models of "preelection politics") politicians cannot make binding commitments prior to elections. The game begins with an incumbent politician in office, and voters adopt reelection strategies that are contingent on the policies implemented by the incumbent. We generalize previous models of this type by introducing heterogeneity in voters' ideological preferences, and analyze how voters' reelection strategies constrain the policies chosen by a rent-maximizing incumbent. We first show that virtually any policy (and any feasible level of rent for the incumbent) can be sustained in a Nash equilibrium. Then, we derive a "median voter theorem": the ideal point of the median voter, and the minimum feasible level of rent, are the unique outcomes in any strong Nash equilibrium. We then introduce alternative refinements that are less restrictive. In particular, Ideologically Loyal Coalition-proof equilibrium also leads uniquely to the median outcomePostelection politics; Median voter theorem; retrospective voting

Why will the Kuznets Curve always reverse ?

In this paper, we develop a model of innovation-based growth to address the issue of skill-biased technical change over the long run. We show that innovations fluctuate endogenously from skilled to unskilled sectors, thereby generating periods of increasing and decreasing wage inequality. This could contribute to explain that technological progress exerts a non monotonic pressure on wage inequality over the long run.cycles; innovatio; driven growth; Kuznets curve; wage inequality

Why the Kuznets Curve will always Reverse ?

In this paper, we develop a model of innovation-based growth to address the issue of skill-biased technical change over the long run. We show that innovations fluctuate endogenously from skill-intensive to unskilled-intensive sectors, thereby generating periods of increasing and decreasing wage inequality. This could contribute to explain that technological progress exerts a non monotonic pressure on wage inequality over the long run.J31; O31; O41

Labor Earnings Respond Differently to Income-Tax and to Payroll-Tax Reforms

We estimate the responses of gross labor earnings with respect to marginal and average net-of-tax rates in France over the period 2003-2006. We exploit a series of reforms to the income-tax and the payroll-tax schedules that affect individuals who earn less than twice the minimum wage. Our estimate for the elasticity of gross labor earnings with respect to the marginal net-of-income-tax rate is around 0.2, while we find no response to the marginal net-of-payroll-tax rate. The elasticity with respect to the average net-of-tax rates is not significant for the income-tax schedule, while it is close to -1 for the payroll-tax schedule. A plausible explanation is the existence of significant labor supply responses to the income-tax schedule, combined with a short-term rigidity of the hourly taxable wage (i.e. the gross wage minus payroll taxes), casting doubts about public finance analysis that assumes perfect competition on the labor market. Finally, the effect of the net-of-income-tax rate seems to be driven by labor supply participation decisions, in particular those of females.labor earnings, payroll tax, income tax

Search Frictions on Product and Labor markets : Money in the Matching Function

This paper builds a macroeconomic model of equilibrium unemployment in which firms persistently face difficulties in selling their production and this affects their decisions to create jobs. Due to search-frictins on the product market, equilibrium unemployment is a U-shaped function of the ratio of total demand to total supply on this market. When prices are at their Competitive Search Equilibrium values, the unemployment rate is minimized. Yet, the Competitive Search Equilibrium is not efficient. Inflation is detrimental to unemployment.Equilibrium unemployment, Matching, Inflation, Demand Constraints

Credit Constraints and the Persistence of Unemployment

In this paper, we argue that credit market imperfections impact not only the level of unemployment, but also its persistence. For this purpose, we first develop a theoretical model based on the equilibrium matching framework of Mortensen and Pissarides (1999) and Pissarides (2000) where we introduce credit constraints. We show these credit constraints not only increase steady-state unemployment, but also slow down the transitional dynamics. We then provide an empirical illustration based on a country panel dataset of 19 OECD countries. Our results suggest that credit market imperfections would significantly increase the persistence of unemployment.Credit markets, labor markets, unemployment, credit constraints, search frictions.

Optimal income taxation and the shape of average tax rates

We investigate whether the optimal income tax model of Mirrlees (1971) can reproduce the empirically observed increasing average tax rates. We give a necessary condition and exhibit two examples where the optimal average tax rates are increasing.

Credit Constraints and the Persistence of Unemployment

In this paper, we argue that credit market imperfections impact not only the level of unemployment, but also its persistence. For this purpose, we first develop a theoretical model based on the equilibrium matching framework of Mortensen and Pissarides (1999) and Pissarides (2000) where we introduce credit constraints. We show these credit constraints not only increase steady-state unemployment, but also slow down the transitional dynamics. We then provide an empirical illustration based on a country panel dataset of 20 OECD countries. Our results suggest that credit market imperfections significantly increase the persistence of unemployment.credit markets, labor markets, unemployment, credit constraints, search frictions

Optimal Redistributive Taxation with both Extensive and Intensive Responses

This paper characterizes optimal income taxation when individuals respond along both the intensive and extensive margins. Individuals are heterogeneous across two dimensions: specifically, their skill and disutility of participation. Preferences over consumption and work effort can differ with respect to the level of skill, with only the Spence-Mirrlees condition imposed. Employing a tax perturbation approach, we derive an optimal tax formula that generalizes previous results by allowing for income effects and extensive margin responses. We provide a sufficient condition for optimal marginal tax rates to be nonnegative everywhere. We discuss the relevance of this condition with analytical examples and numerical simulations using U.S. data.optimal tax formula, tax perturbation, random participation

Optimal income taxation with endogenous participation and search unemployment

This paper characterizes the optimal redistributive taxation when individuals are heterogeneous in two exogenous dimensions : Their skills and their values of non-market activities. Search-matching frictions on the labor markets create unemployment. Wages, labor demand and participation are endogenous. The government only observed wage levels. Under a Maximin objective, if the elasticity of participation decreases along the distribution of skills, at the optimum, the average tax rate is increasing, marginal tax rates are positive everywhere, while wages, unemployment rates and participation rates are distorted downwards compared to their laissez-farie values. A simulation exercise confirms some of these properties under a general utilitarian objective. Taking account of the wage-cum-labor demand margin deeply changes the equity-efficiency trade-off.Non-linear taxation, Redistribution, Adverse selection, Random participation, Unemployment, Labor market frictions