Reflexions sobre l'holisme

Aquest article és una traducció al català d'un text d'Ernest LePore on aquest recull algunes questions bàsiques sobre les propietats intencionals i si cal tractar-les de forma holística, seguint el plantejament previ que l'autor i en Jerry Fodor van presentar al llibre Holism: A Shopper's Guide. L'article descriu les característiques principals de les propietats funcionals i examina si realment defensar l'existència d'aquestes ens ha de portar a creure en l'holisme semàntic. LePore distingueix entre propietats atòmiques, anatòmiques i holistes, defensant que la postura més raonable és considerar que les propietats intencionals són de caire anatòmic sense necessitat de ser holistes. S'examinen críticament alguns arguments que volen mostrar la viabilitat de l'holisme a partir de la idiosincrisia de les propietats intencionals, es comenten algunes de les crítiques efectuades per altres filòsofs a tesis defensades a Holism : A Shopper's Guide i es critica la posició atomisa pel que fa a les propietats intencionals.This article is a Catalan translation of an Ernest LePore text in which he attemps to describe some of the basic questions related to intentional properties and their relations to holism, following the previous path that the author and Jerry Fodor presented in their book Holism: A Shopper? Guide.The article describes the main charactcristics of intentional properties and examines if once you accept the existence of this kind of properties you are also commited to deffend a semantic holism. LePore makes a distinction between atomic, anatomic and holistic properries, arguing that the more reasonable view is to consider intentional properties as anatomic, without any need to accept holism. Some arguments trying to show the viability of holism by means of the idiosincratic ways of intentional properties are critically examined, some of the critics directed by some philosophers to thesis presented in Holism: A Shopper's Guide are commented and the atomistic posicion regarded to intentional properties is criticised

Fodor and demonstratives in LOT

In this paper, we consider a range of puzzles for demonstratives in the language of thought we had raised in our last philosophical conversation we had with Jerry Fodor. We argue against the Kaplan-inspired indexing solution Fodor proposed to us, but offer a Fodor-friendly account of the demonstratives in the language of thought in its stead, building on our account of demonstrative pronouns in English