New Rules to an Old Game: Electoral Reforms and Post-Civil War Stability

One of the most common features found within peace agreements are provisions that call for post-civil war elections. Unfortunately, recent research on post-civil war stability has consistently demonstrated that the initial elections held after civil wars significantly increases the risk for renewed fighting. While this research does highlight a danger posed by post-war elections, it focuses only on one element associated with post-civil war democracy. I argue that by implementing electoral reforms that are called for in peace agreements, post-war countries reduce the risk of renewed civil war. Implementing these peace agreement provisions increases the durability of post-war peace in two ways. First, by implementing costly electoral reforms called for in the peace agreement, the government signals a credible commitment to the peace process which reduces security dilemmas faced by opposition groups. Second, electoral reforms generate new avenues for political participation for disaffected citizens, which reduces the ability of hardliners to mobilize future armed opposition. I examine how implementing post-war electoral reforms impact the risk of renewed conflict from 1989 through 2010. Using duration models, I demonstrate that implementing these electoral reforms substantially reduces the risk of renewed conflict

Electoral Reforms and Peace Duration Following Negotiated Settlements

One of the most common features found within peace agreements is provisions that call for post-civil war elections. Unfortunately, the initial post-war elections often increase the risk of civil war recurrence. While past research has consistently confirmed this finding, it focuses only on one element of the democracy. Rather than focusing solely on elections, this article examines the laws surrounding the electoral process. Specifically, I examine how changes in electoral laws that are called for in peace agreements impacts the risk of renewed civil war. Building on research that examines the context of post-civil war elections, I argue that reforms to electoral laws that precede the initial post-war election substantially reduce the risks associated with that election. This proposition is supported with evidence from survival models of peace failures following the establishment of comprehensive peace agreements from 1989 to 2010, demonstrating that electoral reforms reduce the risk of civil war recurrence

Replication Data for: “Any Press is Good Press?”: Rebel Political Wings, Media Freedom, and Terrorism in Civil Wars

As part of a recent effort to bridge the studies of terrorism and civil war, new research has begun to emerge on the use of terrorism by rebel groups as a strategy of war. Building on these findings, we examine the role of affiliated political wings in shaping the use of terrorism by rebel groups during civil wars. We contend that the presence of an affiliated political wing during the civil war should increase the use of terrorism by rebel groups only in countries where there are relatively few restrictions on the freedom of the press. As political wings are often designed to engage with the civilian population through the dissemination of information, these apparatuses are in a key position to frame the use of terrorism as part of the rebel’s broader war effort. To test this proposition, we examine the use of terrorism by all rebel groups from 1970- 2011. The results from the analysis provide strong support for our argument that political wings increase the use of terrorism by rebel groups only when the press is allowed to independently cover terrorist attacks

Third-party knowledge and success in civil war mediation

Within this article, we explore how third-party knowledge of ongoing conflicts shapes the ability of mediators to successfully end conflicts through negotiated settlements. Since the primary role of mediators is to share information, and combatants have incentives to misrepresent information, contextual knowledge about the conflict and actors is critical. We argue that experienced diplomats with greater knowledge of the civil war state, close knowledge of the combatants, and connections with civil society are less vulnerable and more effective in mediation efforts. We propose that third parties seeking a diplomatic solution to ongoing conflicts may be more successful when they maintain strong diplomatic knowledge of the disputants as well as knowledge of the processes by which previous mediation efforts have attempted to resolve the dispute. Using a seemingly unrelated bivariate probit model on peace agreements from 1989 to 2005, we find strong support that diplomatic knowledge matters significantly

Supplemental Material, JCR-17-0051.R2 - Oil Wealth, Winning Coalitions, and Duration of Civil Wars

<p>Supplemental Material, JCR-17-0051.R2 for Oil Wealth, Winning Coalitions, and Duration of Civil Wars by Krista Wiegand and Eric Keels in Journal of Conflict Resolution</p