The Politics of External Debt in Developing Countries

We analyse the determinants of long term external debt for a large sample of developing countries. We ¯nd that, in addition to the stan- dard economic variables, institutional and socio-political variables are a key factor in explaining the level of external debt. Overall the re- sults point to an interpretation based on the presence of binding credit constraints. Such constraints are relaxed in the presence of high qual- ity of institutions and low political risk, while they are tightened when socio-political risk is higher.

Occupational Choice, Financial Market Imperfections and Development

We develop a simple model of occupational choice under financial market im- perfections, in the presence of technological convexities. The aim is to analyze the quantitative effect of these imperfections on the level of income. We find that although their effect is relatively large, financial market imperfections alone are not able to explain the observed cross country difference in income. However, when interacted with the issue of mobility, those imperfections become much more relevant, to the point of pushing the economy into a development trap.

The Impact of Training on Productivity: Evidence from a Large Panel of Firms

This paper investigates the e®ects of training on labor productiv- ity using a unique nationally representative panel of Italian ¯rms for the period 2002 to 2005. We ¯nd that training has a positive and signi¯cant e®ect on productivity. Using a variety of panel estimation techniques, we show that failing to account for unobserved heterogene- ity leads to overestimate the impact of training on productivity, while failing to account for endogeneity leads to substantially underestimate it. Training also has a positive and signi¯cant impact on wages, but this e®ect is about half the size of the e®ect on productivity. Within occupational groups, the e®ect of training on productivity is large and signi¯cant for blue-collars, but small and not signi¯cant for white collars.On-the-Job-Training; Productivity; Wages; Panel Data

Investment decisions and the soft budget constraint: evidence from Hungarian manufacturing firms

This paper investigates the investment behaviour of a large panel of Hungarian firms in the period 1989–99, in order to assess the impact of institutional and regulatory changes on the efficiency of credit allocation. We find that the role of financial factors for investment decisions has changed significantly after the introduction of major financial reforms, and that firms were affected differently depending on their ownership type. Reforms have hardened the budget constraint of private domestic firms, particularly small ones, and reduced informational problems for foreign-owned firms. State-owned firms remained subject to a soft budget constraint. In particular, small state firms became more sensitive to financial conditions, whereas large state firms were unaffected and kept operating under a soft budget constraint.Investment, financial constraints, soft budget constraint, transition

Subsidies, Soft Budget Constraints and Financial Market Imperfections

In this paper we analyze the interaction between subsidies, soft budget con- straints and financial market imperfections in a simple model of occupational choice. The basic message is that the eect of soft budget constraints has to be analyzed jointly with other possible distortions that are affecting the economy. In particu- lar in environments where there are severe forms of financial market imperfections, subsidies and soft budget constraints can ease those imperfections and reduce credit rationing problems. The "positive" effect of soft budget constraints depends also upon the degree of institutional failure of the economy.

Investment Decisions and the Soft Budget Constraint: Evidence from Hungarian Manufacturing Firms

This paper investigates the investment behaviour of a large panel of Hungarian firms during the transition period (1989-1999). We examine the role of financial factors and assess whether financial reforms have succeeded in increasing the efficiency of credit allocation. We find that reforms have hardened budget constraints of small private firms, and reduced informational problems for foreign firms. Small stateowned firms became more sensitive to financial conditions, whereas large state-owned firms were largely unaffected and kept operating under a soft budget constraint.

Reinterpreting social pacts: theory an evidence

Economists have largely neglected the analysis of the relevant factors that induce policymakers and trade unions to sign social pacts, despite their clear implications for economic policies and the functioning of labour markets. In this paper we fill this gap. We build a simple theoretical framework that models social pacts as the outcome of a bargaining process, where the probability of observing a pact is essentially determined by politico-economic factors. Then we test the model using a new and original data set that documents the features of social pacts implemented in advanced economies over the last 30 years.Social pacts, institutions macroeconomic outcomes