Marine Protected Areas: Economic and Social Implications

This paper is a guide for citizens, scientists, resource managers, and policy makers, who are interested in understanding the economic and social value of marine protected areas (MPAs). We discuss the potential benefits and costs associated with MPAs as a means of illustrating the economic and social tradeoffs inherent in implementation decisions. In general, the effectiveness of a protected area depends on a complex set of interactions between biological, economic, and institutional factors. While MPAs might provide protection for critical habitats and cultural heritage sites and, in some cases, conserve biodiversity, as a tool to enhance fishery management their impact is less certain. The uncertainty stems from the fact that MPAs only treat the symptoms and not the fundamental causes of overfishing and waste in fisheries.Marine Protected Areas (MPAs), marine reserves, fisheries

To Save Our Species But How Do We Make Collective Decisions?

Throughout human history, havoc has been wrought by just a handful of very powerful leaders. The ultimate catastrophe could also be caused by just a few individuals, by unleashing a nuclear war or by ignoring international agreements on climate change. Donald Trump, for example, may renege on the Paris Agreement and commit other ecological blunders, which could spell the end for everyone. In a nutshell, the current democratic process gives him far too much power. The rights of any one citizen or country must be tempered by the rights of all. Alas, current forms of decision-making often fail to involve everyone in the final decision, the most obvious instances relating to decisions taken by a (simple or weighted) majority vote. If instead decision-making were based on the local, national or international consensus, such exclusive decisions could not be taken so easily. It should also be pointed out that majoritarianism – majority rule based on majority voting – has been and still is problematic in numerous inter-communal conflicts. This paper therefore outlines the flaws involved in binary voting; next, as a better methodology, it proposes a more inclusive voting mechanism; and finally, it advocates a structure to ensure that agreements are implemented, with possible penalties for those individuals, organisations or countries that flaunt the international consensus

Evolving Decision-Making: Exploring the Shift from Binary to Preferential Voting

Covid and Climate Change are telling us that we must all work together But we cannot work well with each other if we are forever taking decisions by voting for or against each other By viewing problems in more detail however by not oversimplifying our controversies and then by expressing our preferences on a range of say half-a-dozen options cooperation and collective decision-making are indeed possible Accordingly this article first looks at a history of decision-making voting procedures from the binary either Option X yes or no or Option X or option Y to the multioptional or better still preferential next it critiques majority voting and considers some of the other more sophisticated mechanisms before concluding that a preferential points procedure is actually the most accurate Finally the text outlines the beneficial consequences that could accrue from developing such a non-binary political structure majority voting leads to majority sic rule whereas preferential decision-making could be is the basis of a quantum polity and real majority rule a non-partisan polity of all-party powersharing Such a structure is often used in post-conflict zones but could also be the basis of cooperation and consensus seeking in the UN s efforts on Climate Chang

MAJORITY RULE: A DYSFUNCTIONAL POLITY CONSENSUS: AN INCLUSIVE DEMOCRACY

Numerous electoral systems have been devised over the years but, in decision-making, many forums still rely on the same procedure that was used in ancient Greece: majority voting. Hence, majority rule. In many plural multi-ethnic and/or multi-religious societies, the effects have often been negative. This article considers voting procedures in three inter-related contexts: decision-making, elections, and governance. With regard to conflicts in Northern Ireland, the Balkans, and Ukraine, it shows, both in decision-making and in elections, how simplistic win-or-lose ballots have exacerbated tensions. And it then suggests a more inclusive polity in which win-win voting systems might help to alleviate these differences. Indeed, if a more accurate measure of the collective will could be deployed, and if that mechanism were non-majoritarian, there would be little or no basis for majority rule. Instead, reliance could be placed on inclusive structures: preference voting in decision-making, and all-party coalitions in government

The Gardener’s Ethic and Other Lessons from Forest Planning [outline]

4 pages. Contains references

The Gardener’s Ethic and Other Lessons from Forest Planning [outline]

4 pages. Contains references

Another short proof of the Joni-Rota-Godsil integral formula for counting bipartite matchings

How many perfect matchings are contained in a given bipartite graph? An exercise in Godsil's 1993 \textit{Algebraic Combinatorics} solicits proof that this question's answer is an integral involving a certain rook polynomial. Though not widely known, this result appears implicitly in Riordan's 1958 \textit{An Introduction to Combinatorial Analysis}. It was stated more explicitly and proved independently by S.A.~Joni and G.-C.~Rota [\textit{JCTA} \textbf{29} (1980), 59--73] and C.D.~Godsil [\textit{Combinatorica} \textbf{1} (1981), 257--262]. Another generation later, perhaps it's time both to simplify the proof and to broaden the formula's reach

Sediment resuspension rates, organic matter quality and food utilization by sea scallops (Placopecten magellanicus) on Georges Bank

Benthic detritus, bacteria, and settled phytoplankton are transported into the water column by resuspension, potentially providing a high quality food source to suspension feeders. Two aspects of resuspension must be considered in relation to food supplies for suspension feeders: the flux of particles from the sediments to the water column and its food value. Sediment resuspension rates on Georges Bank and the role of resuspended sediment in the diet of sea scallops (Placopecten magellanicus) were determined in laboratory flume experiments and shipboard feeding experiments, respectively. Resuspended carbon flux was estimated from flume bedload transport rates and the mass of organic carbon associated with the silt-clay fraction eroded from Georges Bank sediment during transport. A comparison of sand erosion thresholds with the frequency distribution of shear velocity estimated from field current meters indicated that tidal sediment resuspension will occur 62% of the time. Resuspended material had a carbon content of 4–8% and a C:N of 5–8. Rates of resuspension (33–229 mg C m−2h−1) and settling rates indicate that resuspended sediment in a size range available to scallops (\u3e5 μm) remains in suspension for periods of hours to days. Clearance rates of resuspended sediment by scallops were similar to those for water column particles, and filtration rates increased with increasing concentrations of resuspended material. Feeding experiments demonstrated that scallops absorbed organic matter from resuspended sediments with an efficiency of up to 40%. Therefore, in terms of particle retention, ingestion, and digestion, sea scallops are able to exploit resuspended organic matter from a continental shelf habitat. Furthermore, resuspension occurs with sufficient frequency, and resuspended sediment has long enough residence time in the water column to provide a consistent nutritional benefit to scallops

Alliances Versus Federations: An Analysis with Military and Economic Capabilities Distinguished

This essay explores the distinction between federations and alliances and asks the question: When will states choose to federate rather than ally? William Riker (1964) argues that a necessary condition for a federal state's formation is that those offering the federal bargain must seek to "expand their territorial control, usually either to meet an external military or diplomatic threat or to prepare for military or diplomatic aggression and aggrandizement." This argument, though, fails to ask why states sometimes respond to threats by forming federations and at other times by forming alliances. Here, after assuming that states have initial endowments of military and economic resources, where economic resources enter utility functions directly and a.re what states maximize and where military capability influences preference only insofar as it determines a state's ability to counter threats, we offer a. multi-stage game-theoretic model in which states may be compelled to divert economic resources to military spending. Alliances, in turn, are self-enforcing coalitions designed to augment a state's offensive or defensive capabilities. Federations, which serve the same ends as alliances, a.re coalitions that need to be enforced by the "higher authority" established when the federation is formed. Our operating assumption is that states seek to form a. federation in lieu of an alliance if and only if (1) a stable alliance partition does not exist or, if one exists, it is dominated by an unstable partition and (2) if the cost of the loss of sovereignty to each state in the federation is offset by the gains from joining it, relative to what that state secures as its security value