Regulatory Constructivism: Application of Q Methodology in Italy and China

Conventional view holds that beliefs play an important role in the development of regulations but there is little evidence to support this claim. We use Comparative Q Methodology to systematically map out and compare the beliefs of public officers in China and Italy, two countries with contrasting sets of institutions but have both adopted similar ideas about integrated water resource management. We find some similarities and differences in the beliefs of public officers in both countries. In particular, we find that in both countries beliefs on the regulation of water utilities are diverse and fragmented on issues such as ownership structure of water utilities, how water infrastructure development should be funded, and how tariffs should be regulated. Our findings have two implications for theory, methods and practice. First, the Q methodology is a useful tool for systematically mapping out the beliefs of regulators and managers. Second, systematically mapping out beliefs will help facilitate the development of an alternative regime of regulation such as negotiated rule making. This alternative regime can provide substantial benefits such as more efficient rule making, more cost effective enforcement and compliance, and more equitable in terms of balancing the interests of stakeholders

Water Governance 2.0: A Review and Second Generation Research Agenda

10.1007/s11269-013-0389-xWater Resources Management27113945-395

Ecos popperianos na metodologia econômica de Elinor Ostrom

Resumo O artigo procura apresentar e analisar a discussão metodológica em economia empreendida por Elinor Ostrom, buscando identificar nela a influência da epistemologia popperiana. A ênfase voltou-se para os conceitos de Princípio da Racionalidade e de Análise Situacional, com os quais Popper contribuiu para a metodologia das Ciências Sociais. O artigo mostrou que esses conceitos encontraram equivalentes na análise da autora, e que Ostrom não apenas reconhece a importância da contribuição popperiana, mas dela faz o ponto de partida para sua proposta metodológica aplicada à governança de recursos comuns. O artigo refere-se, também, ao fato de que ao longo do tempo a metodologia dessa autora gradativamente abre a uma interlocução metodológica mais plural, conservando, no entanto, aspectos essenciais do projeto popperiano para a metodologia em Ciências Sociais, entre os quais a adesão ao individualismo metodológico

AI, Robots and Jobs: Estimation and Implications [Presentation]

Future Readiness – Policies and Practices Seminar by NU Graduate School of Public Polic

The Asian Dilemma

The East Asian growth story is a familiar narrative of prosperity but the same forces that drive such progress also induce widespread poverty and inequality in the region. The image of the East Asian region has greatly transformed. It is no longer a region simply wrought with narratives of colonialism or “barbarism” owing to their distinctively different culture; but is host to the greatest number of megacities. This transformation is evident in the rise of skyscrapers, young Vietnamese workers on motorbikes making their way to work in economic zones, and the presence of European cars and fancy restaurants. However, this prosperity comes with a price: injustice, dehumanization, environmental degradation, land grabbing, and the rise of slums. Technological developments and market reforms have changed work environments and expectations but have given rise to a widening urban/rural divide. While this tremendous development of the region is commendable, the less-documented underbelly of the Asian growth story is as much a part of this growth story culminating in this Asian dilemma we need not be stuck in

AI, Robots and Jobs: Estimation and Implications [Presentation]

Future Readiness – Policies and Practices Seminar by NU Graduate School of Public Polic

The Strategic Games that Donors and Bureaucrats Play: An Institutional Rational Choice Analysis

ABSTRACT Foreign aid plays an important role in developing countries, but little is empirically known how it affects incentives of recipient bureaucracies. I provide a model and analytic case study to understand the strategic games that donors and bureaucrats play. My findings are broadly consistent with the theoretical expectations of institutional rational choice: bureaucrats attempt to ensure bureaucratic survival, whereas donors ensure growth of loan portfolio. These findings, however, are not consistent with the Samaritan's Dilemma and the Patron's Dilemma

Festschrift

International Journal of Water Resources Development362-3226-22