Prices vs. Quantities and the Intertemporal Dynamics of the Climate Rent

This paper provides a formal survey of price and quantity instruments for mitigating global warming. We explicitly consider policies’ impact on the incentives of resource owners who maximize their profits intertemporally. We focus on the informational and commitment requirements of the regulator. Furthermore, we study the interplay between (private) resource extraction rent and (public) climate rent and ask how property and management of the climate rent can be assigned between regulator and resource sector. There are only two instruments that unburden the regulator from the complex intertemporal management of the climate rent and associated commitment problems: in the cost-benefit world, we derive a stock-dependent tax rule; in the cost-effective (carbon budget) world, only an emissions trading scheme with free banking and borrowing can shift intertemporal timing decisions completely to the market.resource extraction, climate rent, intertemporal policy instruments, prices vs. quantities, Hotelling

Adapt, Mitigate, or Die? The Fallacy of a False Trade-off by Ottmar Edenhofer and Steffen Brunner

Klimaveränderung; Internationale Umweltpolitik; Welt

Mitigation Strategies and Costs of Climate Protection: The effects of ETC in the hybrid Model MIND

MIND is a hybrid model incorporating several energy related sectors in an endogenous growth model of the world economy. This model structure allows a better understanding of the linkages between the energy sectors and the macro-economic environment. We perform a sensitivity analysis and parameter studies to improve the understanding of the economic mechanisms underlying opportunity costs and the optimal mix of mitigation options. Parameters representing technological change that permeates the entire economy have a strong impact on both the opportunity costs of climate protection and on the optimal mitigation strategies, e.g. parameters in the macro-economic environment and in the extraction sector. Sector-specific energy technology parameters change the portfolio of mitigation options but have only modest effects on opportunity costs, e.g. learning rate of the renewable energy technologies. We conclude that feedback loops between the macro-economy and the energy sectors are crucial for the determination of opportunity costs and mitigation strategies.Endogenous technological change, Climate change mitigation costs, Integrated assessment, Growth model, Energy sector, Integrated assessment

Learning or Lock-in: Optimal Technology Policies to Support Mitigation

We investigate conditions that aggravate market failures in energy innovations, and suggest optimal policy instruments to address them. Using an intertemporal general equilibrium model we show that “small” market imperfections may trigger a several decades lasting dominance of an incumbent energy technology over a dynamically more efficient competitor, given that the technologies are very good substitutes. Such a “lock-in” into an inferior technology causes significantly higher welfare losses than market failure alone, notably under ambitious mitigation targets. More than other innovative industries, energy markets are prone to these lock-ins because electricity from different technologies is an almost perfect substitute. To guide government intervention, we compare welfare-maximizing technology policies in addition to carbon pricing with regard to their efficiency, effectivity, and robustness. Technology quotas and feed-in-tariffs turn out to be only insignificantly less efficient than first-best subsidies and seem to be more robust against small perturbations.renewable energy subsidy, renewable portfolio standard, feed-in-tariffs, carbon pricing

Avoiding Carbon Lock-In: Policy Options for Advancing Structural Change

A major obstacle for the transformation to a low-carbon economy is the risk of a carbon lock-in: fossil fuel-based ('dirty') technologies dominate the market although their carbon-free ('clean') alternatives are dynamically more efficient. We study the interaction of learning-by-doing spillovers and the substitution elasticity between the clean and the dirty sector in an intertemporal general equilibrium model. We find that the substitution possibilities between the two sectors have an ambivalent effect: although a high substitution elasticity requires less aggressive mitigation policies than a low one, it creates a greater lock-in in the absence of regulation. The optimal policy response consists of a permanent carbon tax as well as a learning subsidy for clean technologies. A single policy instrument can also avoid high welfare losses, but a more stringent mitigation target can only be achieved at painful costs. We demonstrate that the policy implication of [Acemoglu et al. 2012] is limited in scope. Our numerical results also highlight that infrastructure provision is crucial to facilitate the low-carbon transformation.structural change, low-carbon economy, carbon lock-in, mitigation policies, learning-by-doing

Renewable Energy Subsidies: Second-Best Policy or Fatal Aberration for Mitigation?

This paper evaluates the consequences of renewable energy policies on welfare, resource rents and energy costs in a world where carbon pricing is imperfect and the regulator seeks to limit emissions to a (cumulative) target. We use a global general equilibrium model with an intertemporal fossil resource sector. We calculate the optimal second-best renewable energy subsidy and compare the resulting welfare level with an efficient first-best carbon pricing policy. If carbon pricing is permanently missing, mitigation costs increase by a multiple (compared to the optimal carbon pricing policy) for a wide range of parameters describing extraction costs, renewable energy costs, substitution possibilities and normative attitudes. Furthermore, we show that small deviations from the second-best subsidy can lead to strong increases in emissions and consumption losses. This confirms the rising concerns about the occurrence of unintended side effects of climate policy { a new version of the green paradox. We extend our second-best analysis by considering two further types of policy instruments: (1) temporary subsidies that are displaced by carbon pricing in the long run and (2) revenue-neutral instruments like a carbon trust and a feed-in-tariff scheme. Although these instruments cause small welfare losses, they have the potential to ease distributional conflicts as they lead to lower energy prices and higher fossil resource rents than the optimal carbon pricing policy.Feed-in-Tariff, Carbon Trust, Carbon Pricing, Supply-Side Dynamics, Green Paradox, Climate Policy

Low-Carbon Development through International Specialization

A major concern in climate negotiations is that decarbonization may signi cantly hurt the development process. This paper shows that international specialization can contribute to making environmental and economic objectives compatible. When carbon effi ciency di ffers between two trading partners, environmental policy a ffects production cost di fferentially, so that the comparative advantage in technology is endogenous. Under a global climate agreement, a universal carbon tax would shift the production of energy intensive goods towards carbon effi cient economies. Once emissions are correctly internalized, trade becomes unambiguously bene cial for the environment and allows pursuing both environmental objectives and fast economic growth. Even in the absence of a climate agreement, free trade provides the option of indirectly accessing carbon e fficient technology abroad. This improves the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and environmental quality and thus achieves emission reductions even without international cooperation

The Globalization Paradox Revisited

According to the Globalization Paradox, globalization limits the freedom of choice for national governments. Capital mobility in particular induces tax competition, thus putting downward pressure on capital taxes. However, while capital mobility introduces the inefficiency of tax competition, it makes the allocation of capital more efficient. Whether national welfare and tax-financed public good provision increase or decrease through capital mobility depends on country characteristics. These characteristics include the relative capital endowment, the availability of taxes on fixed factors such as land and the preference for the public good. We compare the two second best settings of a closed economy and an economy with capital mobility to show that the relative capital endowment determines whether the net effect of capital mobility is positive. Fixed factor taxes have the potential to improve welfare by defusing the globalization trilemma through a reduction in the need for capital taxation

Deforestation, Land Taxes and Development

This paper combines neoclassical growth theory with the von Th nen approach of land conversion to model deforestation and land allocation decisions in an intertemporal general equilibrium context suitable for developing countries. Analyzing the impact of several forest conservation policies, including international transfers under a REDD+ scheme, emphasized the role of taxes on non-forest land as effective and powerful policy that has been largely neglected so far.The findings of our equilibrium analysis are in stark contrast to the conventional economic wisdom that taxes on land are allocation neutral. As we model deforestation as one investment decision besides investment into physical capital stocks, land taxes may not only increase forest conservation levels but also overall capital stocks and output. We identify the conditions that lead to this double-dividend effect and apply them to data for a set of countries, concluding that forest conservation, e.g. implemented by land taxes, can have this positive effect for many developing countries. Additionally, we reassess Borlaug s hypothesis and Jevons paradox in a general-equilibrium context and design a land tax scheme that is robust to agricultural yield increases