Book Review: Fehr, D.E., Fehr, K. & Keifer-Boyd, K. (Eds.), (2000). Real-world Readings in Art Education: Things Your Professors Never Told You. NY: Falmer Press.

Book Review for Real-World Readings in Art Education: Things Your Professors Never Told You, D.E. Fehr, K. Fehr, and K. Keifer-Boyd (Editors), Falmer Press, New York, 2000

Monitoring and Pay: An Experiment on Employee Performance under Endogenous Supervision

We present an experimental test of a shirking model where monitoring intensity is endogenous and effort a continuous variable. Wage level, monitoring intensity and consequently the desired enforceable effort level are jointly determined by the maximization problem of the firm. As a result, monitoring and pay should be complements. In our experiment, between and within treatment variation is qualitatively in line with the normative predictions of the model under standard assumptions. Yet, we also find evidence for reciprocal behavior. Our data analysis shows, however, that it does not pay for the employer to solely rely on the reciprocity of employees

Earnings distribution, corporate governance and CEO pay

We investigate the relationship between earnings differentials and the pay of CEOs of 190 British companies between 1970 and 1990. We find that (i) changes in the differential between the 90th and 50th weekly earnings percentiles for non-manual adult male workers [90:50] explain changes in the level of real CEO salary and bonus in our sample of companies; (ii) changes in this differential also account for changes in the elasticity of CEO pay to firm size; (iii) a broader measure of earnings inequality does far worse than 90:50 at explaining changes in both the level and the firm size elasticity of CEO pay; (iv) fitting the model on data for 1970-1983 and predicting pay levels for the period starting with the widespread adoption of executive share option schemes in 1984, we find a structural break in the relationship between lower management pay differentials and the pay of the CEO. We conclude first that top executive pay prior to 1984 was a stable function of both firm size and earnings differentials lower on the administrative ladder, consistent with a hypothesis advanced by Herbert Simon in 1957; and second that the use of share options from 1984 onward represents not simply a change in the mode of top executive compensation, but a de -linking of the pay of top executives and that of their subordinates

The resurrection of group selection as a theory of human cooperation

Two books edited by members of the MacArthur Norms and Preferences Network (an interdisciplinary group, mainly anthropologists and economists) are reviewed here. These books in large part reflect a renewed interest in group selection that has occurred among these researchers: they promote the theory that human cooperative behavior evolved via selective processes which favored biological and/or cultural group-level adaptations as opposed to individual-level adaptations. In support of this theory, an impressive collection of cross-cultural data are presented which suggest that participants in experimental economic games often do not behave as self-interested income maximizers; this lack of self-interest is regarded as evidence of group selection. In this review, problems with these data and with the theory are discussed. On the data side, it is argued that even if a behavior seems individually-maladaptive in a game context, there is no reason to believe that it would have been that way in ancestral contexts, since the environments of experimental games do not at all resemble those in which ancestral humans would have interacted cooperatively. And on the theory side, it is argued that it is premature to invoke group selection in order to explain human cooperation, because more parsimonious individual-level theories have not yet been exhausted. In summary, these books represent ambitious interdisciplinary contributions on an important topic, and they include unique and useful data; however, they do not make a convincing case that the evolution of human cooperation required group selection

Marine bivalve geochemistry and shell ultrastructure from modern low pH environments

Abstract. Bivalve shells can provide excellent archives of past environmental change but have not been used to interpret ocean acidification events. We investigated carbon, oxygen and trace element records from different shell layers in the mussels Mytilus galloprovincialis (from the Mediterranean) and M. edulis (from the Wadden Sea) combined with detailed investigations of the shell ultrastructure. Mussels from the harbour of Ischia (Mediterranean, Italy) were transplanted and grown in water with mean pHT 7.3 and mean pHT 8.1 near CO2 vents on the east coast of the island of Ischia. The shells of transplanted mussels were compared with M. edulis collected at pH ~8.2 from Sylt (German Wadden Sea). Most prominently, the shells recorded the shock of transplantation, both in their shell ultrastructure, textural and geochemical record. Shell calcite, precipitated subsequently under acidified seawater responded to the pH gradient by an in part disturbed ultrastructure. Geochemical data from all test sites show a strong metabolic effect that exceeds the influence of the low-pH environment. These field experiments showed that care is needed when interpreting potential ocean acidification signals because various parameters affect shell chemistry and ultrastructure. Besides metabolic processes, seawater pH, factors such as salinity, water temperature, food availability and population density all affect the biogenic carbonate shell archive.</jats:p

(Dis)Advantages of Student Subjects: What is Your Research Question?

In this comment on Henrich et al. (2010) I argue that the right choice of subject pool is intimately linked to the research question. At least within economics, students are often the perfect subject pool for answering some fundamental research questions. Student subject pools can provide an invaluable benchmark for investigating generalizability across different social groups or cultures

Social Preferences and the Efficiency of Bilateral Exchange

Under what conditions do social preferences, such as altruism or a concern for fair outcomes, generate efficient trade? I analyze theoretically a simple bilateral exchange game: Each player sequentially takes an action that reduces his own material payoff but increases the other player’s. Each player’s preferences may depend on both his/her own material payoff and the other player’s. I identify necessary conditions and sufficient conditions on the players’ preferences for the outcome of their interaction to be Pareto efficient. The results have implications for interpreting the rotten kid theorem, gift exchange in the laboratory, and gift exchange in the field