Process-Tracing as a Tool to Analyse Discretion

status: publishe

Contested world order: The delegitimation of international governance

This article argues that the chief challenge to international governance is an emerging political cleavage, which pits nationalists against immigration, free trade, and international authority. While those on the radical left contest international governance for its limits, nationalists reject it in principle. A wide-ranging cultural and economic reaction has reshaped political conflict in Europe and the United States and is putting into question the legitimacy of the rule of law among states

Introduction. Use and limitations of the principal-agent model in studying the European Union

Given the omnipresence of delegation and control in the EU, the principal–agent model has become a popular analytical framework to study the design and effects of delegation and control. Yet, with the ascendance of governance as a mode of decision-making, the contemporary relevance of the principal–agent model became contested. We argue that the model still retains its relevance to study contemporary EU politics, but it requires researchers to follow a two-step approach. First, the hierarchical, dyadic relationship under study has to be clearly defined amidst a complex web of relations. Second, the conditions that have led to the observed pattern of delegation and/or the consequences of this pattern on the distribution of power between the principals and the agent can be inquired

Conclusion. Opportunities and Challenges for the Principal–Agent Model in Studying the European Union

This chapter examines whether the principal–agent model will mature by accommodating the new empirical reality or whether it will become outdated as the practical challenges narrow the researcher’s focus to the simplest of hierarchical relations. We address this question by covering the three main components of the research process. We distinguish (1) the formulation of research questions; (2) the contribution one can deliver to the existing literature; and (3) the required methodology. Each section questions the opportunities that are to be gleaned from applying the principal–agent model to an ever-more complex setting, and confronts it with practical challenges that may emerge in the research process. In so doing, we derive guidelines that may help to ensure the contemporary relevance of the principal–agent model

The new architects: Brazil, China, and innovation in multilateral development lending

Recent academic works have shed light upon the motives and negotiation dynamics leading to the creation of the New Development Bank (NDB) and Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). We know less about their day-to-day activities and if (and if so why) they are being innovative in the field of multilateral development lending. This article evaluates novelty in the two banks. It uncovers and suggests an explanation to the puzzle of why the NDB appears more innovative (in terms of institutional design, staffing, and lending policy guidelines) than the AIIB by exploring the cases of China and Brazil. The two countries played central roles in the set-up of each the AIIB and NDB. Drawing on extensive field research, the article proposes that their preferences and capability to engage in institutional innovation depend on interests, status, economic power, and regulatory capacity

Effects of contestation within a collective agent in EU Trade policy-making

First Online: 18 October 2017This chapter argues that conceiving the Commission as a unitary actor is a legitimate simplification of empirical reality for most research purposes. Recently, the principal–agent literature has started examining collective-actor features of agents and suggested that internal conflict is as disadvantageous to agents as it is to principals. By contrast, I argue that intra-agent conflict occurs less frequently and with a lower intensity than is typically the case for collective principals. The Commission-as-agent can overcome conflict quickly due to its hierarchical setup and less stringent decision-making procedures. It may even harness conflict through inter-service consultations to draft better initial proposals. On the political level, open conflict among Commissioners can earn it the reputation of credibly defending controversial sectoral interests in the eyes of affected stakeholders. I develop my argument by focusing on five bilateral trade agreements negotiated from 1970–2007. Generalizing it beyond the case of EU trade policy-making, I focus on empirical, theoretical and methodological reasons justifying many scholars’ choice to model agents such as the Commission as unitary actors.Is based on chapter of EUI PhD thesis, 201

The European parliament’s role in monitoring the implementation of EU trade policy

Most of the recent literature on the European Parliament’s (EP) role in trade policy focuses on the new, post-Lisbon, legislative and ratification powers. This contribution instead analyses the monitoring role and argues that the EP’s incentive to monitor the implementation of EU trade policy has increased significantly after the Lisbon Treaty. Adopting an interdisciplinary approach, the chapter examines the rationale for the EP’s monitoring of EU trade policy implementation and links this to the different monitoring instruments at the institution’s disposal. It concludes with some of the key findings from a survey conducted on the EP’s monitoring of three areas of trade policy, namely free trade agreements, trade defence instruments and the Generalized Scheme of Preferences