Temperature dependence of thermal conductivity in 1D nonlinear lattices

We examine the temperature dependence of thermal conductivity of one dimensional nonlinear (anharmonic) lattices with and without on-site potential. It is found from computer simulation that the heat conductivity depends on temperature via the strength of nonlinearity. Based on this correlation, we make a conjecture in the effective phonon theory that the mean-free-path of the effective phonon is inversely proportional to the strength of nonlinearity. We demonstrate analytically and numerically that the temperature behavior of the heat conductivity $\kappa\propto1/T$ is not universal for 1D harmonic lattices with a small nonlinear perturbation. The computer simulations of temperature dependence of heat conductivity in general 1D nonlinear lattices are in good agreements with our theoretic predictions. Possible experimental test is discussed.Comment: 6 pages and 2 figures. Accepted for publication in Europhys. Let

The Comparative Political Economy of Basel III in Europe

The Basel III Accord was the centrepiece of the international regulatory response to the global financial crisis, setting new capital requirements for internationally active banks. This paper explains the divergent preferences on Basel III of national regulators in three countries that approximate what are frequently presented as distinct varieties of capitalism in Europe — Germany, the United Kingdom and France. It is argued that national regulators setting post crisis capital requirements had to reconcile three inter-related and potentially conflicting objectives: banking sector stability, the competitiveness of national banks and short to medium term economic growth. The different national preferences on Basel III reflected how different national regulators defined and pursued these objectives, which in turn reflected the structure of national banking systems — specifically, systemic patterns of bank capital and bank-industry ties

Global Governance Behind Closed Doors : The IMF Boardroom, the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility, and the Intersection of Material Power and Norm Change in Global Politics

Up on the 12th floor of its 19th Street Headquarters, the IMF Board sits in active session for an average of 7 hours per week. Although key matters of policy are decided on in the venue, the rules governing Boardroom interactions remain opaque, resting on an uneasy combination of consensual decision-making and weighted voting. Through a detailed analysis of IMF Board discussions surrounding the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF), this article sheds light on the mechanics of power in this often overlooked venue of global economic governance. By exploring the key issues of default liability and loan conditionality, I demonstrate that whilst the Boardroom is a more active site of contestation than has hitherto been recognized, material power is a prime determinant of both Executive Directors’ preferences and outcomes reached from discussions. And as the decisions reached form the backbone of the ‘instruction sheet’ used by Fund staff to guide their everyday operational decisions, these outcomes—and the processes through which they were reached—were factors of primary importance in stabilizing the operational norms at the heart of a controversial phase in the contemporary history of IMF concessional lending

The 'ebb and flow' of transatlantic regulatory cooperation in banking

Do financial crises promote or hamper transatlantic regulatory cooperation in banking? This article argues that financial crises have an impact upon the alignment of regulatory preferences of the United States (US) and the European Union (EU), causing an 'ebb and flow' in transatlantic cooperation. When EU-US preferences are broadly aligned in periods of financial stability, transatlantic regulatory cooperation is intense. It is relatively easy for the EU and US to agree on market-friendly regulation promoted by banks. When preferences are different, especially in the context and aftermath of the exogenous shock of financial crises, transatlantic cooperation is more problematic because crises re-assert the importance of nationally embedded patterns of market organisation

Club model politics and global financial governance: the case of the Group of Thirty

Eleni Tsingou onderzocht de transnationale elites die de internationale financiële sector besturen. Ze bekeek hoe deze elites en instituties met elkaar omgaan en hoe instituties en elites zich verhouden tot de bredere sociale structuur waarin zij elk hun rol spelen. Tsingou deed dit aan de hand van een analyse van het werk en de opzet van de Groep van Dertig (G-30). De G-30 is een organisatie die mensen uit de publieke, private en academische wereld bij elkaar brengt en wiens lidmaatschap vergelijkbaar is met een ‘wie is wie’ in de internationale financiële wereld. Ze concludeert dat de G-30 kan worden beschouwd als onderdeel van een ‘club-model’ in internationaal financieel bestuur. Binnen clubs bevinden zich verschillende professionele identiteiten, terwijl clubs tegelijk een gemeenschappelijk doel bieden dat niet afhangt van abstract gedeelde vaardigheden zoals een eenduidige hang naar winst. Het clubmodel brengt de actoren samen die de regels schrijven, het vergroot hun gedeelde prestige, verdedigt hun idee van eervol gedrag, en het bemoedigt en beschermt hen