Child Welfare’s Iron Cage: Managing Performance in New Zealand’s Child Welfare Agency

The purpose of this paper is to explain the performance management practice in use within one of New Zealand‟s public service agencies – Child, Youth and Family Services. These practices are described with reference to New Zealand‟s formal model of public sector management and the professional social work model understood by the majority of the agency‟s staff. The paper draws on recent research into performance management practices in nine of New Zealand‟s public service agencies that included Child, Youth and Family Services. This involved a number of semi-structured interviews with managers and staff from the national, regional and local levels of each agency together with a review of relevant documentation. It is argued that performance management practices exist on a continuum representing the „rationality of control‟ which extends from a regulative control model of rules and fixed targets to one that is more reliant on shared understandings, learning and flexible targets. It is further suggested that the institutional structures underlying this continuum determines the extent to which performance management practices within individual agencies are loosely coupled with those used for purposes of external accountability. The paper highlights the tension that exists in an organisation that encompasses the substantive logic of “a values based profession” (Ronnau, 2001) but which is bound by the formal rationality implicit in its system of external accountability that, it has been claimed, “reduces a complex reality to something simplistic and one dimensional” (Tilbury, 2004). It, therefore, argues that the formal model of performance measurement and management of the public service should encompass the broader information and rationality used by managers within public service agencies

Child Welfare’s Iron Cage: Managing Performance in New Zealand’s Child Welfare Agency

The purpose of this paper is to explain the performance management practice in use within one of New Zealand‟s public service agencies – Child, Youth and Family Services. These practices are described with reference to New Zealand‟s formal model of public sector management and the professional social work model understood by the majority of the agency‟s staff. The paper draws on recent research into performance management practices in nine of New Zealand‟s public service agencies that included Child, Youth and Family Services. This involved a number of semi-structured interviews with managers and staff from the national, regional and local levels of each agency together with a review of relevant documentation. It is argued that performance management practices exist on a continuum representing the „rationality of control‟ which extends from a regulative control model of rules and fixed targets to one that is more reliant on shared understandings, learning and flexible targets. It is further suggested that the institutional structures underlying this continuum determines the extent to which performance management practices within individual agencies are loosely coupled with those used for purposes of external accountability. The paper highlights the tension that exists in an organisation that encompasses the substantive logic of “a values based profession” (Ronnau, 2001) but which is bound by the formal rationality implicit in its system of external accountability that, it has been claimed, “reduces a complex reality to something simplistic and one dimensional” (Tilbury, 2004). It, therefore, argues that the formal model of performance measurement and management of the public service should encompass the broader information and rationality used by managers within public service agencies

Missing Links

In the context of the worst economic shock that the world has experienced for eighty years, the New Zealand Government has announced a campaign to establish "a more focused, efficient and productive public service" (Whitehead, 2009). As the emphasis of managing the performance of the public service swings away from effectiveness and outcomes back towards efficiency and outputs, the practical and underlying tensions of managing within individual agencies remain. This research explored these tensions in relation to the performance measurement and management practices in three of New Zealand's public service agencies, namely Work and Income, Public Prisons and the Community Probation Service. For each of these agencies, the official performance management models as defined in relevant legislation and the agencies' external accountability documents (primarily their statements of intent and annual reports) are described. Note is also made of the 'formal' frameworks encoded within each agency's computer applications. These frameworks are then compared to an analysis of interviewees' descriptions of the performance measurement and management practices in use within those agencies. A framework by which the official, formal and in use performance management models within public service agencies may be better understood and aligned is then explained. This model utilises a competing values framework composed of two axes. The first of these, the rationality of control is explained in terms of the nature of the major functions involved, the ease with which they may be measured and managed, in what forms information is represented and the nature of the rationality employed. It is argued that these factors support models that exist along a continuum that extends from the use of regulative control to control based on shared understandings. The second axis reflects the locus of control and is explained in terms of the political saliency and perceived complexity of the agency's core functions, the extent to which sensegiving activities are internally and/or externally driven (Maitlis, 2005), and the extent to which management invest in the agency's public capital. These factors are used to explain a continuum on which agencies experience more or less operational autonomy and management discretion. The combination of these factors produces four possible models that may be described as: an administrative control model with a principal focus on managing inputs; a rational goal model employing the language of (quasi) markets and a principal focus on outputs; a multiple constituency model that acknowledges the shared responsibility for outcomes and a need to establish 'joined up' mechanisms with other agencies within government and the community; and a professional service model that seeks to manage specific targets and focuses on the processes or activities that managers manage. This model is then applied to each of the case study agencies to reveal the, at times competing, forces that shape performance management practices

Child Welfare’s Iron Cage: Managing Performance in New Zealand’s Child Welfare Agency

The purpose of this paper is to explain the performance management practice in use within one of New Zealand‟s public service agencies – Child, Youth and Family Services. These practices are described with reference to New Zealand‟s formal model of public sector management and the professional social work model understood by the majority of the agency‟s staff. The paper draws on recent research into performance management practices in nine of New Zealand‟s public service agencies that included Child, Youth and Family Services. This involved a number of semi-structured interviews with managers and staff from the national, regional and local levels of each agency together with a review of relevant documentation. It is argued that performance management practices exist on a continuum representing the „rationality of control‟ which extends from a regulative control model of rules and fixed targets to one that is more reliant on shared understandings, learning and flexible targets. It is further suggested that the institutional structures underlying this continuum determines the extent to which performance management practices within individual agencies are loosely coupled with those used for purposes of external accountability. The paper highlights the tension that exists in an organisation that encompasses the substantive logic of “a values based profession” (Ronnau, 2001) but which is bound by the formal rationality implicit in its system of external accountability that, it has been claimed, “reduces a complex reality to something simplistic and one dimensional” (Tilbury, 2004). It, therefore, argues that the formal model of performance measurement and management of the public service should encompass the broader information and rationality used by managers within public service agencies

Missing Links

In the context of the worst economic shock that the world has experienced for eighty years, the New Zealand Government has announced a campaign to establish "a more focused, efficient and productive public service" (Whitehead, 2009). As the emphasis of managing the performance of the public service swings away from effectiveness and outcomes back towards efficiency and outputs, the practical and underlying tensions of managing within individual agencies remain. This research explored these tensions in relation to the performance measurement and management practices in three of New Zealand's public service agencies, namely Work and Income, Public Prisons and the Community Probation Service. For each of these agencies, the official performance management models as defined in relevant legislation and the agencies' external accountability documents (primarily their statements of intent and annual reports) are described. Note is also made of the 'formal' frameworks encoded within each agency's computer applications. These frameworks are then compared to an analysis of interviewees' descriptions of the performance measurement and management practices in use within those agencies. A framework by which the official, formal and in use performance management models within public service agencies may be better understood and aligned is then explained. This model utilises a competing values framework composed of two axes. The first of these, the rationality of control is explained in terms of the nature of the major functions involved, the ease with which they may be measured and managed, in what forms information is represented and the nature of the rationality employed. It is argued that these factors support models that exist along a continuum that extends from the use of regulative control to control based on shared understandings. The second axis reflects the locus of control and is explained in terms of the political saliency and perceived complexity of the agency's core functions, the extent to which sensegiving activities are internally and/or externally driven (Maitlis, 2005), and the extent to which management invest in the agency's public capital. These factors are used to explain a continuum on which agencies experience more or less operational autonomy and management discretion. The combination of these factors produces four possible models that may be described as: an administrative control model with a principal focus on managing inputs;  a rational goal model employing the language of (quasi) markets and a principal focus on outputs; a multiple constituency model that acknowledges the shared responsibility for outcomes and a need to establish 'joined up' mechanisms with other agencies within government and the community; and a professional service model that seeks to manage specific targets and focuses on the processes or activities that managers manage. This model is then applied to each of the case study agencies to reveal the, at times competing, forces that shape performance management practices.</p

Accountability and Public Governance in New Zealand

This paper provides an insight into an already very substantial, but increasing, body of literature relating to accountability and public governance. Given the size and diversity of that literature what follows is a summary of the main themes or challenges that are currently emerging. Within the literature there are numerous attempts to provide a definition of the concept of accountability. The dominant, economically framed, discourse is reflected in Bovens (2007) frequently cited definition as: … a relationship between an actor and a forum, in which the actor has an obligation to explain and justify his or her conduct, the forum can pose questions and pass judgement and the actor may face consequences. (p. 450) Thus New Public Management models of public governance emphasise hierarchical arrangements of contractual, or quasi-contractual, relationships between a principal and an agent. However, in the twenty-first century new models are emerging that seek to respond to the challenges of heterarchical, networked organisational arrangements. Central to these challenges is “the problem of many eyes” as actors are confronted with multiple forums with different objectives and expectations and differing levels of power. Accountability is not then simply vertical, but is also horizontal and diagonal. To the extent that public governance moves beyond accountability for inputs and outputs, to accountability for outcomes (or results) further challenges of measurement and attribution arise. Again, the literature on performance measurement in the context of the public sector, particularly on the difficulties of defining and measuring performance, is very extensive. But whilst for some functions of government it may be possible to pre-define and subsequently measure both the work and desired results involved, for many functions that is not the case (Wilson, 1989). The practical result has been a continued focus on, management of, and accountability for inputs. Even when able to be measured, the results that governments seek to achieve are seldom the consequence of the activities of a single agency and will seldom be realised in the context of a single budgetary horizon, electoral cycle, or even a generation. As Lowe (2013) has suggested: The key conceptual flaw of this approach is that it is based on the idea that outcomes are the result of a linear process from problem, through intervention to positive outcome. (p.214) To the extent that cause and effect is multi-systemic involving the contributions of a number of, government and non-government, organisations, models accommodating joint accountability are required. Given the plausibly inequitable nature of a model in which individual contributions can not be identified, understanding the distinct but inter-related nature of accountability and responsibility becomes important. A further challenge to the dominant conception of accountability lies in its utilitarian conception of the natural world as a series of resources able to be owned (by individuals) and utilised to provide services and benefits to humans. However, alternative cultural perspectives, including that of te Ao Māori, imbue elements of the environment with a life force, enduring identity and rights. As such they are also due accountability. Such conceptions also inform an increasingly important broadening of the, normally economically framed and financially defined, judgements of organisational (and governmental) performance. They also involve a less transactional and longer-term perspective that encompasses the stewardship role of government to pass on to future generations a strong economy, well-functioning society and a healthy environment. A focus on societal and environmental, as well as economic, criteria is not new but has been given more currency by the United Nations Development Goals, the Global Reporting Initiative and the International Integrated Reporting Council. Broader conceptions of wellbeing and thus a broader framework by which governments should be held accountable, have been discussed by Sen (as basic freedoms) and Nussbaum (as capitals). They have also informed the development of the New Zealand Treasury’s Living Standards Framework. Although, arguably the operational and accountability impacts of that framework have, as yet, been limited, recent announcements by the new Government suggest that may change. Finally, the challenges to accountability in an increasingly dynamic digital environment include: • opportunities to use different forms of information, including narrative and pictures, delivered in a range of different ways; • rather than the passive provision of information, opportunities for public agencies to engage in participatory process that support a well functioning democracy; • the ability to both broaden the scope and accelerate the speed of those processes; and • the potential to facilitate distributed governance across government agencies and between those agencies and service providers in the community and private sectors. As noted, this paper provides an overview of the key challenges currently emerging from the substantial literature on accountability and public governance. It does not propose any solutions for those challenges but will hopefully support a constructive debate on how systems of public accountability might be designed differently in the future

Accountability and Public Governance in New Zealand

This paper provides an insight into an already very substantial, but increasing, body of literature relating to accountability and public governance. Given the size and diversity of that literature what follows is a summary of the main themes or challenges that are currently emerging. Within the literature there are numerous attempts to provide a definition of the concept of accountability. The dominant, economically framed, discourse is reflected in Bovens (2007) frequently cited definition as: … a relationship between an actor and a forum, in which the actor has an obligation to explain and justify his or her conduct, the forum can pose questions and pass judgement and the actor may face consequences. (p. 450) Thus New Public Management models of public governance emphasise hierarchical arrangements of contractual, or quasi-contractual, relationships between a principal and an agent. However, in the twenty-first century new models are emerging that seek to respond to the challenges of heterarchical, networked organisational arrangements. Central to these challenges is “the problem of many eyes” as actors are confronted with multiple forums with different objectives and expectations and differing levels of power. Accountability is not then simply vertical, but is also horizontal and diagonal. To the extent that public governance moves beyond accountability for inputs and outputs, to accountability for outcomes (or results) further challenges of measurement and attribution arise. Again, the literature on performance measurement in the context of the public sector, particularly on the difficulties of defining and measuring performance, is very extensive. But whilst for some functions of government it may be possible to pre-define and subsequently measure both the work and desired results involved, for many functions that is not the case (Wilson, 1989). The practical result has been a continued focus on, management of, and accountability for inputs. Even when able to be measured, the results that governments seek to achieve are seldom the consequence of the activities of a single agency and will seldom be realised in the context of a single budgetary horizon, electoral cycle, or even a generation. As Lowe (2013) has suggested: The key conceptual flaw of this approach is that it is based on the idea that outcomes are the result of a linear process from problem, through intervention to positive outcome. (p.214) To the extent that cause and effect is multi-systemic involving the contributions of a number of, government and non-government, organisations, models accommodating joint accountability are required. Given the plausibly inequitable nature of a model in which individual contributions can not be identified, understanding the distinct but inter-related nature of accountability and responsibility becomes important. A further challenge to the dominant conception of accountability lies in its utilitarian conception of the natural world as a series of resources able to be owned (by individuals) and utilised to provide services and benefits to humans. However, alternative cultural perspectives, including that of te Ao Māori, imbue elements of the environment with a life force, enduring identity and rights. As such they are also due accountability. Such conceptions also inform an increasingly important broadening of the, normally economically framed and financially defined, judgements of organisational (and governmental) performance. They also involve a less transactional and longer-term perspective that encompasses the stewardship role of government to pass on to future generations a strong economy, well-functioning society and a healthy environment. A focus on societal and environmental, as well as economic, criteria is not new but has been given more currency by the United Nations Development Goals, the Global Reporting Initiative and the International Integrated Reporting Council. Broader conceptions of wellbeing and thus a broader framework by which governments should be held accountable, have been discussed by Sen (as basic freedoms) and Nussbaum (as capitals). They have also informed the development of the New Zealand Treasury’s Living Standards Framework. Although, arguably the operational and accountability impacts of that framework have, as yet, been limited, recent announcements by the new Government suggest that may change. Finally, the challenges to accountability in an increasingly dynamic digital environment include: • opportunities to use different forms of information, including narrative and pictures, delivered in a range of different ways; • rather than the passive provision of information, opportunities for public agencies to engage in participatory process that support a well functioning democracy; • the ability to both broaden the scope and accelerate the speed of those processes; and • the potential to facilitate distributed governance across government agencies and between those agencies and service providers in the community and private sectors. As noted, this paper provides an overview of the key challenges currently emerging from the substantial literature on accountability and public governance. It does not propose any solutions for those challenges but will hopefully support a constructive debate on how systems of public accountability might be designed differently in the future

Reporting Service Performance – A Message in a Bottle?

Purpose This paper asks what evidence is provided, in the annual reports of New Zealand’s central government departments, of the efficiency and effectiveness of their performance. Approach This study reviewed performance indicators presented in the annual reports by the 28 central government departments of New Zealand for two consecutive years 2015/2016 and 2016/2017. The data were extracted from the Statement of Performance/Summary of Performance, accompanying narratives, highlights and management (CEO) explanations within the annual reports of these departments. An analysis of this information was conducted to determine the type, extent, mix and quality of performance information to indicate organizational performance in terms of efficiency (the relationship between inputs and outputs) and effectiveness (the relationship between outputs and outcomes). Value The paper’s contribution lies in its focus on the performance information provided by individual government departments. In particular, it reveals a paucity of information in respect of the cost, quantity and quality of the outputs delivered by those departments. In acknowledging definitional and measurement problems associated with both outputs and outcomes, it argues for a reconsideration of the role of annual reports in a more flexible and citizen-driven system of public accountability

Reporting Service Performance – A Message in a Bottle?

Purpose This paper asks what evidence is provided, in the annual reports of New Zealand’s central government departments, of the efficiency and effectiveness of their performance. Approach This study reviewed performance indicators presented in the annual reports by the 28 central government departments of New Zealand for two consecutive years 2015/2016 and 2016/2017. The data were extracted from the Statement of Performance/Summary of Performance, accompanying narratives, highlights and management (CEO) explanations within the annual reports of these departments. An analysis of this information was conducted to determine the type, extent, mix and quality of performance information to indicate organizational performance in terms of efficiency (the relationship between inputs and outputs) and effectiveness (the relationship between outputs and outcomes). Value The paper’s contribution lies in its focus on the performance information provided by individual government departments. In particular, it reveals a paucity of information in respect of the cost, quantity and quality of the outputs delivered by those departments. In acknowledging definitional and measurement problems associated with both outputs and outcomes, it argues for a reconsideration of the role of annual reports in a more flexible and citizen-driven system of public accountability