Essays on Economic Mobility and Inequality in the United States

How does economic mobility over the individual life course shape population-level trends in economic inequality, and, in turn, how does this inequality influence individuals' economic mobility prospects? Historically, allowing opportunities for economic mobility has been seen as an American alternative to equalizing incomes. However, after decades of rising inequality across the population and persistent disparity between racial groups, many academics and policymakers have come to question how neatly we can separate the two

Cohort change and racial differences in educational and income mobility

Policy reforms and rising income inequality transformed educational and economic opportunities for Americans approaching midlife in the 1990s. Rising income inequality may have reduced mobility, as income gaps increased between rich and poor children. Against the effects of rising inequality, Civil Rights reforms may have increased mobility, as opportunities expanded across cohorts of black students and workers. We compare educational and income mobility for two cohorts of black and white men, the older born in the late 1940s and the younger born in the early 1960s. We find that educational mobility increased for black men, but income mobility declined for both races. Economic mobility declined despite unchanged or improved educational mobility because of increased returns to schooling and increased intergenerational income correlations, independent of schooling

Is the effect larger in group A or B? It depends: understanding results from nonlinear probability models

Demographers and other social scientists often study effect heterogeneity (defined here as differences in outcome-predictor associations across groups defined by the values of a third variable) to understand how inequalities evolve between groups or how groups differentially benefit from treatments. Yet answering the question "Is the effect larger in group A or group B?" is surprisingly difficult. In fact, the answer sometimes reverses across scales. For example, researchers might conclude that the effect of education on mortality is larger among women than among men if they quantify education's effect on an odds-ratio scale, but their conclusion might flip (to indicate a larger effect among men) if they instead quantify education's effect on a percentage-point scale. We illuminate this flipped-signs phenomenon in the context of nonlinear probability models, which were used in about one third of articles published in Demography in 2018-2019. Although methodologists are aware that flipped signs can occur, applied researchers have not integrated this insight into their work. We provide formal inequalities that researchers can use to easily determine if flipped signs are a problem in their own applications. We also share practical tips to help researchers handle flipped signs and, thus, generate clear and substantively correct descriptions of effect heterogeneity. Our findings advance researchers' ability to accurately characterize population variation.Published versionWe gratefully acknowledge support from the Eunice Kennedy Shriver National Institute of Child Health and Human Development (research grant P01HD087155 and center grant P2CHD041028)

Tenancy, Marriage, and the Boll Weevil Infestation, 1892-1930.

In the early twentieth century, the cotton-growing regions of the U.S. South were dominated by families of tenant farmers. Tenant farming created opportunities and incentives for prospective tenants to marry at young ages. These opportunities and incentives especially affected African Americans, who had few alternatives to working as tenants. Using complete-count Census of Population data from 1900-1930 and Census of Agriculture data from 1889-1929, we find that increases in tenancy over time increased the prevalence of marriage among young African Americans. We then study how marriage was affected by one of the most notorious disruptions to southern agriculture at the turn of the century: the boll weevil infestation of 1892-1922. Using historical Department of Agriculture maps, we show that the boll weevil's arrival reduced the share of farms worked by tenants as well as the share of African Americans who married at young ages. When the boll weevil infestation altered African Americans' opportunities and incentives to marry, the share of African Americans who married young fell accordingly. Our results provide new evidence about the effect of economic and political institutions on demographic transformations

Trends in income insecurity among U.S. children, 1984-2010

Has income insecurity increased among U.S. children with the emergence of an employment-based safety net and the polarization of labor markets and family structure? We study the trend in insecurity from 1984-2010 by analyzing fluctuations in children's monthly family incomes in the Survey of Income and Program Participation. Going beyond earlier research on income volatility, we examine income insecurity more directly by analyzing income gains and losses separately and by relating them to changes in family composition and employment. The analysis provides new evidence of increased income insecurity by showing that large income losses increased more than large income gains for low-income children. Nearly one-half the increase in extreme income losses is related to trends in single parenthood and parental employment. Large income losses proliferated with the increased incidence of very low incomes (less than $150 per month). Extreme income losses and very low monthly incomes became more common particularly for U.S. children of nonworking single parents from the mid-1990s