356 research outputs found
Social Protection: Why the EU Needs to Deliver
Conventional wisdom in European studies has long held that social policy is not anarea in which the European Union can make a large difference. Solidarity, it is said, can onlydevelop in societies where clear boundaries exist between individuals. Such is not the casein the EU, where a citizenâs primary allegiance is to his own country. Redistribution being azero-sum game, the majority method of decision-making is required, which may only beviable if the legitimacy of central institutions is clearly established. The legitimacy of the EUinstitutions, however, is said to be weak. In addition, a number of different traditions ofwelfare protection co-exist within the EU, as has been stressed by Gösta Esping-Andersen(1990). Citizens are strongly attached to their national brand of protection: in severalcountries, this is even regarded as a key element of national identity. The history ofEuropean integration has done little to belie these views. Social policy has experiencedrelatively modest progress, and the difficulties inherent in the adoption of European financialperspectives, undermined by the evils of juste retour have shown that redistribution andunanimity are indeed at odds. This contribution purports to examine the problem from a uniquely differentperspective. It does not start by taking an ontological view of Europe, in which the EUâsactivities are determined by reference to what Europe is. Nor does it rest on any normativeviews. Instead, it presents evidence demonstrating that European citizens are becomingincreasingly aware of their standards of living and worried about their childrenâs future, andthat these sentiments nurture a political protest that is a potential source of instability for theEU unless met by an adequate political response.social policy; welfare state; democracy; public opinion
FĂ©dĂ©ralisme, asymĂ©trie et interdĂ©pendance : aux origines de lâaction internationale des composantes de lâĂtat fĂ©dĂ©ral
This article deals with a problem relatively neglected by studies devoted to the foreign relations of federated states, namely the reasons that impel the member Itates of some federations to develop foreign affairs policy independently of each other. Several types of factors are taken into consideration. It appears that the growing interdependence of industrialized countries leads to both an increase and a diversification of international contacts between public authorities, thus undermining he traditional monopoly held by external affairs departments. This phenomenon, however, does not arise to the same degree in all federations, suggesting that internal factors may equally play a major role. The composite character and above all the asymmetry of some federations have, clearly enough, centrifugal effects. But the influence of institutional variables must not be neglected: the combination of a particularly pronounced asymmetry together with weaknesses n the representation accorded at the national level to different regions making up the federation probably explain the activism shown by Belgium's linguistic communities and some Canadian provinces
Social protection
Conventional wisdom in European studies has long held that social policy is not an
area in which the European Union can make a large difference. Solidarity, it is said, can only
develop in societies where clear boundaries exist between individuals. Such is not the case
in the EU, where a citizenâs primary allegiance is to his own country. Redistribution being a
zero-sum game, the majority method of decision-making is required, which may only be
viable if the legitimacy of central institutions is clearly established. The legitimacy of the EU
institutions, however, is said to be weak. In addition, a number of different traditions of
welfare protection co-exist within the EU, as has been stressed by Gösta Esping-Andersen
(1990). Citizens are strongly attached to their national brand of protection: in several
countries, this is even regarded as a key element of national identity. The history of
European integration has done little to belie these views. Social policy has experienced
relatively modest progress, and the difficulties inherent in the adoption of European financial
perspectives, undermined by the evils of âjuste retourâ have shown that redistribution and
unanimity are indeed at odds (...)
Europe at the polls. Lessons from the 2013 Italian elections
The 2013 Italian elections were in several respects a âEuropeanisedâ contest. As a severe institutional crisis unfolded, political parties paid great attention to European issues, broadly defined, and a âEuropean-level partyâ, the European Peopleâs Party (EPP), made an unprecedented attempt to shape the outcome. The election results must therefore be analysed in relation to Europe. Negative aspects appear to have prevailed in both the discourse of parties and the choices of voters. In terms of policy, Italians clearly rejected the fiscal austerity policy advocated by the European Union since the outbreak of the crisis. Regarding EU governance, the predominantly negative character of this Europeanisation process may be a source of instability in the future
The Unmaking of a Constitution: Lessons from the European Referenda
The reference to a so-called âEuropean Constitutionâ rendered recourse to referenda practically inevitable. Because it suggests a radical departure from the past, the term would inevitably affect how the constitutional treaty would be ratified. In a number of countries, the modifications of European treaties must in any case be submitted to a popular vote. In France, the idea of a referendum advanced by a number of personalities such as the president of the European Convention, ValĂ©ry Giscard dâEstaing, received the approval of leaders of all political groups consulted by the President of the Republic. Jacques Chirac underscored that it was âlogicalâ to consult the people on the future of European institutions. In a
period in which distrust in the political class is considerable, opposition to popular consultation risked accusations of elitist arrogance, which no political leader could get away with easily (...)
The Politics of Delegation in the European Union
Delegation of powers to supranational institutions, once a hallmark of European integration, is increasingly contested by national leaders as well as by the public opinion. At the same time, recent developments suggest that in turbulent times, the technique remains widely used. This article purports to explain this apparent paradox. It proposes a reading of the principal-agent principles that takes into account specificities of the EU system, such as the absence of a strong centre of power or the significant degree of mistrust that may exist among national governments. It argues that the competition between multiple principals may ultimately result in different models of delegation.La dĂ©lĂ©gation des pouvoirs Ă des institutions supranationales, qui Ă©tait une caractĂ©ristique principale de lâintĂ©gration europĂ©enne, est de plus en plus contestĂ©e par les leaders nationaux ainsi que par lâopinion publique. Cependant, les Ă©volutions rĂ©centes tendent Ă montrer que dans les pĂ©riodes de crise actuelles, cette technique est encore largement utilisĂ©e. Cet article vise Ă expliquer ce paradoxe apparent. Il propose une lecture des principes du principal-agent qui prennent en compte les spĂ©cificitĂ©s du systĂšme de lâUE, telles que lâabsence dâun lieu de pouvoir fort ou la grande mĂ©fiance qui rĂšgne entre les gouvernements nationaux. Il soutient que la concurrence entre un grand nombre de « principaux » peut donner lieu Ă terme Ă diffĂ©rents modĂšles de dĂ©lĂ©gation
Le pacte 'budgétaire' : incertitudes juridiques et ambiguïté politique
Quel regard portera-t-on dans vingt ans sur le
projet de « traité sur la stabilité, la coordination
et la gouvernance dans lâUnion Ă©conomique et
monĂ©taire »1, approuvĂ© par les chefs dâĂtat et de
gouvernement le 31 janvier dernier ? Ă lâĂ©vidence,
la réponse dépendra dans une large mesure des
suites qui seront données à cette décision : le
traité en question sera-t-il ratifié par un nombre
suffisant de signataires pour entrer en vigueur ? (...)
The Making of a Transnational Constitution: An Institutionalist Perspective on the European Convention
No matter how one evaluates the product of its work, the Convention on the Future ofEurope has marked a turning point in the history of European integration. This article is divided into three parts. The first presents the different actors who participated in the Convention and the cleavages that existed within the assembly. The secondpart addresses the impact of these cleavages and the logics that shaped the final compromise.In the third part, we will attempt to analyze the respective importance of these variousdecision-making modes and the variables that determined their relative influence. Goingbeyond the classical opposition between deliberation and negotiation often used to describethe work of the Convention, we will argue that the choices made on the composition andfunctioning of the Convention had a strong influence on its work, and therefore, on thesubstance of the draft constitution.Constitution for Europe; European Convention
LâEurope politique a-t-elle encore un avenir ?
On ne peut prĂ©sumer du jugement de lâhistoire sur lâĂ©chec de la Constitution europĂ©enne. Si le verdict des urnes tĂ©moigne bien dâune grande perplexitĂ© Ă lâĂ©gard du prĂ©sent et de lâavenir de la construction europĂ©enne, la demande dâune relance originale de lâintĂ©gration est Ă©galement consĂ©quente. Il est ainsi possible que la crise actuelle soit salvatrice pour la construction dâune Europe politique. Face aux inquiĂ©tudes des citoyens comme aux diverses rĂ©serves des gouvernements, la porte est cependant Ă©troite. Chacun doit avoir conscience que le statu quo est intenable
Naissance d'un constitutionnalisme transnational
AprĂšs avoir inventĂ© le constitutionnalisme sans constitution, lâEurope doit maintenant jeter les bases dâune nouvelle construction : un systĂšme politique qui fasse une plus grande place aux citoyens sans pour autant rĂ©duire le rĂŽle des Ătats, auxquels ces mĂȘmes citoyens sâidentifient toujours, Ă la portion congrue. TĂąche difficile assurĂ©ment, mais nâest-elle pas Ă la mesure des ambitions universalistes des promoteurs de lâintĂ©gration europĂ©enne
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