The Dynamic Effects of an Earnings Subsidy for Long-Term Welfare Recipients: Evidence from the SSP Applicant Experiment

In the SSP Applicant Experiment, a random sample of new welfare entrants was informed that if they remained on welfare for a year they would become eligible for a generous earnings subsidy. Those who satisfied the waiting period and then left welfare and began working full time within the following year were entitled to receive payments for up to 36 months whenever they were off welfare and working full time. A simple optimizing model suggests that the program rules created an unusual sequence of incentives to: (1) prolong the initial spell on welfare for at least 12 months to become eligible for the subsidy offer; (2) establish subsidy entitlement by finding full time work and leaving welfare in the 12 to 24 month period after initial entry; and (3) choose work over welfare during the three years that subsidies were available. Consistent with these implications, comparisons between the experimental treatment group and a randomly assigned control group show that the program increased welfare participation in the first year after initial entry and lowered it over the following 5 years. We develop an econometric model of welfare participation and program eligibility status that allows us to identify the behavioral effects associated with the program rules. We find important responses to all three incentives. We also find that the impact of the program persisted after subsidy payments ended, although the effect decayed over time.

Estimating the Effects of a Time Limited Earnings Subsidy for Welfare Leavers

In the Self Sufficiency Program (SSP) welfare demonstration, members of a randomly assigned treatment group could receive a subsidy for full time work. The subsidy was available for three years, but only to people who began working full time within 12 months of random assignment. A simple optimizing model suggests that the eligibility rules created an 'establishment' incentive to find a job and leave welfare within a year of random assignment, and an 'entitlement' incentive to choose work over welfare once eligibility was established. Building on this insight, we develop an econometric model of welfare participation that allows us to separate the two effects and estimate the impact of the earnings subsidy on welfare entry and exit rates among those who achieved eligibility. The combination of the two incentives explains the time profile of the experimental impacts, which peaked 15 months after random assignment and faded relatively quickly. Our findings suggest that about half of the peak impact of SSP was attributable to the establishment incentive. Despite the extra work effort generated by SSP the program had no lasting impact on wages, and little or no long run effect on welfare participation.

Job Mobility and Wage Dynamics

Matched employer-employee data research has found that workersf wages are affected by the characteristics of the firms they work in, and that higher skilled workers tend to be employed by higher paying firms. This paper examines the contribution of workersf job mobility to their wage dynamics. We focus on the possible trade-off between moving to a better paying firm and losing a firm-tenure specific component of earnings, and examine what types of workers benefit from changing firms, rather than staying with their existing employer. Our analysis provides four main findings. First, although the raw earnings gains to jobmovers and stayers are about the same, we find that, after controlling for observable differences, job-movers have about 1.3 percent lower annual earnings growth than nonmovers. Second, we estimate that job-movers gain 0.3 percent per year on average from moving to higher paying firms, but lose 1.6 percent in transitory earnings associated with changing jobs. The gains from moving to better firms are larger for both younger and new entrant workers, while the transitory earnings losses are smaller. We interpret these findings as being due to an earnings growth trade-off for workers between moving to a higher paying firm and losing their tenure-related earnings at their existing firm. Third, we estimate that, on average, workers gain (almost) all of the change in firm earnings premiums when they change jobs. However, such gains are not equally shared by all workers. In particular, our estimates suggest that it is the higher ability workers (as measured by the estimated worker earnings premiums) whose earnings gain (or lose) the most from moving to a firm with higher (or lower) earnings premiums. Finally, we find that workersf earnings also benefit on average from a change in the average earnings of their co-workers. Controlling for other factors, we estimate that a 1 standard deviation change in the estimated average peer earnings is associated with about 0.25 percent change in a workerfs earnings on average.Earnings, Linked Employer-Employee Data, worker mobility, job turnover

Understanding New Zealand s Changing Income Distribution 1983 98:A Semiparametric Analysis

This paper analyses changes in the distribution of equivalised gross household income and income inequality in New Zealand between 1983 and 1998. We analyse the distributional effects of changes in household structure, National Superannuation (old age pension), household socio- demographic attributes and employment outcomes, and in the economic returns to such attributes and employment outcomes, using a semiparametric kernel density approach, and assess the impact of these factors on alternative summary measures of inequality over the period. We find that changes in household structure and in the socio-demographic characteristics of households are the main factors contributing to the rise in inequality, while the large changes in the employment outcomes had a more modest impact, and there is little evidence of systematic effects of changes in the economic returns. The results are qualitatively robust to a variety of equivalisation, income, and weighting measures.Household income distribution; Inequality; Kernel density estimation

Understanding New Zealand's Changing Income Distribution 1983-98: A Semiparametric Analysis

This paper analyses changes in the distribution of equivalised gross household income and income inequality in New Zealand between 1983 and 1998. We analyse the distributional effects of changes in household structure, National Superannuation (old age pension), household socio-demographic attributes and employment outcomes, and in the "economic returns" to such attributes and employment outcomes, using a semiparametric kernel density approach, and assess the impact of these factors on alternative summary measures of inequality over the period. We find that changes in household structure and in the socio-demographic characteristics of households are the main factors contributing to the rise in inequality, while the large changes in the employment outcomes had a more modest impact, and there is little evidence of systematic effects of changes in the economic returns. The results are qualitatively robust to a variety of equivalisation, income, and weighting measures.Household income distribution; Inequality; Kernel density estimation

Are Protective Labor Market Institutions Really at the Root of Unemployment? A Critical Perspective on the Statistical Evidence

This report debunks the myth that labor market protections, such as unions and unemployment benefits, are responsible for high European unemployment rates.

Earnings Heterogeneity and Job Matching - Evidence from Linked Employer-Employee Data

This paper uses data from Statistics New Zealand’s linked Employer-Employee Database (LEED) over the six-year period April 1999 – March 2005 to derive and analyse estimates of two-way worker and from fixed efforts components of job earnings rates. The fixed effects estimates reflect the portable earnings premium that each worker receives in whichever firm they work for, and the time-invariant premium that each firm pays to all the workers in employs. We focus on three issues. First, how much of the variation in job earnings rates is attributable to observable worker demographic factors (age and gender), unobserved worker effects and unobserved firm effects? Second, how much compositional change occurred during this period of substantial employment growth? Third, what is the aggregate pattern of sorting of workers and firms across jobs

On the distribution of estimators of diffusion constants for Brownian motion

We discuss the distribution of various estimators for extracting the diffusion constant of single Brownian trajectories obtained by fitting the squared displacement of the trajectory. The analysis of the problem can be framed in terms of quadratic functionals of Brownian motion that correspond to the Euclidean path integral for simple Harmonic oscillators with time dependent frequencies. Explicit analytical results are given for the distribution of the diffusion constant estimator in a number of cases and our results are confirmed by numerical simulations.Comment: 14 pages, 5 figure