13 research outputs found

    Personal Attributes and Latino Voting Behavior in Congress

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    Objective. Researchers have long examined the nature of representation, paying particular attention to the dynamics of descriptive and substantive representation in racial and ethnic communities. The objective of this article is to determine the extent to which personal attributes influence the voting behavior of Latino members of Congress. Methods. We test the relationship between legislator's personal attributes and Poole and Rosenthal's DW‐NOMINATE scores for Latino members of the 101st–108th Congresses. Results. After controlling for institutional and electoral factors, results show that education, gender, nativity, and generation have significant effects on Latino legislators' voting behavior. Religion and national origin appear not to have an effect. Conclusions. This analysis shows that personal attributes predict Latino congressional voting even when controlling for district and institutional factors. As such, this study demonstrates that Latino legislators have in‐group differences and therefore should not be considered a monolithic group

    Turning Themselves In: Why Companies Disclose Regulatory Violations

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    As part of a recent trend toward more cooperative relations between regulators and industry, novel government programs are encouraging firms to monitor their own regulatory compliance and voluntarily report their own violations. In this study, we examine how enforcement activities, statutory protections, community pressure, and organizational characteristics influence organizations ’ decisions to self-police. We created a comprehensive dataset for the “Audit Policy”, a United States Environmental Protection Agency program that encourages companies to self-disclose violations of environmental laws and regulations in exchange for reduced sanctions. We find that facilities were more likely to self-disclose if they were recently inspected or subjected to an enforcement action, were narrowly targeted for heightened scrutiny by a US EPA initiative, and were larger and thus more prominent in their environment. While we find some evidence that state-level statutory immunity facilitates self-disclosure, we find no evidence that statutory audit privilege does so. The pitched political battles over regulation in the 1970s and 1980s, from deregulation to Reagan’s vow to get government “off the backs ” of industry, have given way in recent years to a ne
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