7,258 research outputs found
Bargaining for bribes under uncertainty
A corrupt transaction is often the result of bargaining between the parties involved. This paper models bribery as a double auction where a private citizen and a public o¢ cial strategically interact as the po- tential buyer and the potential seller of a corrupt service. Individu- als di¤er in the internalized moral cost generated by corruption, and may have only imperfect information on others.moral cost, i.e. their .corruptibility.. This paper investigates the role that imperfect infor- mation with respect to the .corruptibility.of one.s potential partner in corruption plays in his or her propensity to engage in bribery, and, consequently, the equilibrium level of corruption in a society. We .nd that corruption is lower when potential bribers and potential bribees are uncertain regarding each other.s .corruptibility.. This paper pro- vides therefore theoretical support to anti-corruption strategies, such as sta¤ rotation in public o¢ ces, aimed at decreasing the social close- ness of bribers and bribees.bribery, moral cost, double auction, imperfect information,multiple equilibria
Classification and properties of the -submaximal subgroups in minimal nonsolvable groups
Let be a set of primes. According to H. Wielandt, a subgroup of a
finite group is called a -submaximal subgroup if there is a
monomorphism into a finite group such that
is subnormal in and for a -maximal subgroup
of . In his talk at the well-known conference on finite groups in Santa-Cruz
(USA) in 1979, Wielandt posed a series of open questions and among them the
following problem: to describe the -submaximal subgroup of the minimal
nonsolvable groups and to study properties of such subgroups: the pronormality,
the intravariancy, the conjugacy in the automorphism group etc. In the article,
for every set of primes, we obtain a description of the -submaximal
subgroup in minimal nonsolvable groups and investigate their properties, so we
give a solution of Wielandt's problem
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