INTERNATIONAL TRADE POLICY: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR U.S. AGRICULTURE

International Relations/Trade,

National and Regional Impacts of U.S. Agricultural Exports

International Trade, Output, Employment, Exports, International Relations/Trade, Q10, Q11, Q13, Q17,

The detection of ultra-relativistic electrons in low Earth orbit

Aims. To better understand the radiation environment in low Earth orbit (LEO), the analysis of in-situ observations of a variety of particles, at different atmospheric heights, and in a wide range of energies, is needed. Methods. We present an analysis of energetic particles, indirectly detected by the Large Yield RAdiometer (LYRA) instrument on board ESA's Project for On-board Autonomy 2 (PROBA2) satellite as background signal. Combining Energetic Particle Telescope (EPT) observations with LYRA data for an overlapping period of time, we identified these particles as electrons with an energy range of 2 to 8 MeV. Results. The observed events are strongly correlated to geo-magnetic activity and appear even during modest disturbances. They are also well confined geographically within the L=4-6 McIlwain zone, which makes it possible to identify their source. Conclusions. Although highly energetic particles are commonly perturbing data acquisition of space instruments, we show in this work that ultra-relativistic electrons with energies in the range of 2-8 MeV are detected only at high latitudes, while not present in the South Atlantic Anomaly region.Comment: Topical Issue: Flares, CMEs and SEPs and their space weather impacts; 20 pages; 7 figures; Presented during 13th European Space Weather Week, 201

Phase change in subducted lithosphere, impulse, and quantizing Earth surface deformations

© The Author(s), 2015. This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License. The definitive version was published in Solid Earth 6 (2015): 1075-1085, doi:10.5194/se-6-1075-2015.The new paradigm of plate tectonics began in 1960 with Harry H. Hess's 1960 realization that new ocean floor was being created today and is not everywhere of Precambrian age as previously thought. In the following decades an unprecedented coming together of bathymetric, topographic, magnetic, gravity, seismicity, seismic profiling data occurred, all supporting and building upon the concept of plate tectonics. Most investigators accepted the premise that there was no net torque amongst the plates. Bowin (2010) demonstrated that plates accelerated and decelerated at rates 10−8 times smaller than plate velocities, and that globally angular momentum is conserved by plate tectonic motions, but few appeared to note its existence. Here we first summarize how we separate where different mass sources may lie within the Earth and how we can estimate their mass. The Earth's greatest mass anomalies arise from topography of the boundary between the metallic nickel–iron core and the silicate mantle that dominate the Earth's spherical harmonic degree 2 and 3 potential field coefficients, and overwhelm all other internal mass anomalies. The mass anomalies due to phase changes in olivine and pyroxene in subducted lithosphere are hidden within the spherical harmonic degree 4–10 packet, and are an order of magnitude smaller than those from the core–mantle boundary. Then we explore the geometry of the Emperor and Hawaiian seamount chains and the 60° bend between them that aids in documenting the slow acceleration during both the Pacific Plate's northward motion that formed the Emperor seamount chain and its westward motion that formed the Hawaiian seamount chain, but it decelerated at the time of the bend (46 Myr). Although the 60° change in direction of the Pacific Plate at of the bend, there appears to have been nary a pause in a passive spreading history for the North Atlantic Plate, for example. This, too, supports phase change being the single driver for plate tectonics and conservation of angular momentum. Since mountain building we now know results from changes in momentum, we have calculated an experimental deformation index value (1–1000) based on a world topographic grid at 5 arcmin spacing and displayed those results for viewing

An Examination of the Intelligence Preparation for Operation MARKET-GARDEN, September, 1944

The Allied defeat at Arnhem, Holland in September 1944 marked the end of one of the most bold and audacious, ground and airborne operations ever undertaken. Many military historian have incorrectly labeled Operation MARKET-GARDEN an intelligence failure. This statement is true only in so far as the Allied intelligence structure failed to persuade their commanders to alter the planned invasion despite the voluminous intelligence data acquired. But did these commander have hidden agendas which made intelligence almost irrelevant? The purpose of this research is to investigate the Allied, strategic and operational intelligence preparation for Operation MARKET-GARDEN and determine its adequacy. It also examines the political and military factors that caused the commanders failure to heed the intelligence warnings. The primary focus will be upon the British 1st Airborne Division and the battle for the Dutch town of Arnhem, however to properly examine operational situation one can not ignore the remainder of the First Allied Airborne Army and the ground forces of British XXX Corps. Although there are numerous studies of MARKET-GARDEN, few have focused on the intelligence situation leading to the battle. This study examines political and personal influences in the military command process and it has as important implications today as it did over fifty years ago. By September 1944, the Allies great march across Western Europe began to stall. With their logistical system tremendously overtaxed, the field armies struggled to continue offensive operations. The other great problem was a disagreement within the Supreme Command on how best to exploit their successes, and the apparent collapse of the German Western Group of Forces. The fundamental argument was between Generals Eisenhower and Montgomery, Eisenhower favoring a Broad Front , while Montgomery was opting for a narrow flanking movement which would allow the Allies to roll-up the northern German forces and strike into the industrial Ruhr valley. It was out of this dynamic situation that Operation MARKET-GARDEN was born. Hastily planned, Operation MARKET-GARDEN was to combine airborne (MARKET) and ground (GARDEN) assaults on German-occupied Holland. The plan called for the 1st Allied Airborne Army to seize bridges over major Dutch waterways up to Arnhem, after which XXX Corps would pass over these bridges and strike north. The operation was a failure because commanders at operational levels failed to heed the multitude of intelligence warnings indicating that the 2nd SS Panzer Corps had relocated to the vicinity of Arnhem. The failure to properly direct the intelligence collection, analysis and dissemination can directly be attributed to the overwhelming desire to execute this operation, despite the apparent risks, held by British Generals Montgomery and Browning. Montgomery rightly believed that this was the last opportunity to attempt a narrow front approach to operations in the west. Driven by his belief in the narrow front strategy and a desire for personal and professional fame, Montgomery overtly ignored intelligence and allowed a hastily and inadequately planned operation to be executed, which resulted in the destruction of the British 1st Airborne Division

An Examination of the Intelligence Preparation for Operation MARKET-GARDEN, September, 1944

The Allied defeat at Arnhem, Holland in September 1944 marked the end of one of the most bold and audacious, ground and airborne operations ever undertaken. Many military historian have incorrectly labeled Operation MARKET-GARDEN an intelligence failure. This statement is true only in so far as the Allied intelligence structure failed to persuade their commanders to alter the planned invasion despite the voluminous intelligence data acquired. But did these commander have hidden agendas which made intelligence almost irrelevant? The purpose of this research is to investigate the Allied, strategic and operational intelligence preparation for Operation MARKET-GARDEN and determine its adequacy. It also examines the political and military factors that caused the commanders failure to heed the intelligence warnings. The primary focus will be upon the British 1st Airborne Division and the battle for the Dutch town of Arnhem, however to properly examine operational situation one can not ignore the remainder of the First Allied Airborne Army and the ground forces of British XXX Corps. Although there are numerous studies of MARKET-GARDEN, few have focused on the intelligence situation leading to the battle. This study examines political and personal influences in the military command process and it has as important implications today as it did over fifty years ago. By September 1944, the Allies great march across Western Europe began to stall. With their logistical system tremendously overtaxed, the field armies struggled to continue offensive operations. The other great problem was a disagreement within the Supreme Command on how best to exploit their successes, and the apparent collapse of the German Western Group of Forces. The fundamental argument was between Generals Eisenhower and Montgomery, Eisenhower favoring a Broad Front , while Montgomery was opting for a narrow flanking movement which would allow the Allies to roll-up the northern German forces and strike into the industrial Ruhr valley. It was out of this dynamic situation that Operation MARKET-GARDEN was born. Hastily planned, Operation MARKET-GARDEN was to combine airborne (MARKET) and ground (GARDEN) assaults on German-occupied Holland. The plan called for the 1st Allied Airborne Army to seize bridges over major Dutch waterways up to Arnhem, after which XXX Corps would pass over these bridges and strike north. The operation was a failure because commanders at operational levels failed to heed the multitude of intelligence warnings indicating that the 2nd SS Panzer Corps had relocated to the vicinity of Arnhem. The failure to properly direct the intelligence collection, analysis and dissemination can directly be attributed to the overwhelming desire to execute this operation, despite the apparent risks, held by British Generals Montgomery and Browning. Montgomery rightly believed that this was the last opportunity to attempt a narrow front approach to operations in the west. Driven by his belief in the narrow front strategy and a desire for personal and professional fame, Montgomery overtly ignored intelligence and allowed a hastily and inadequately planned operation to be executed, which resulted in the destruction of the British 1st Airborne Division

Indications for implant removal after fracture healing: a review of the literature

Introduction: The aim of this review was to collect and summarize published data on the indications for implant removal after fracture healing, since these are not well defined and guidelines hardly exist. Methods: A literature search was performed. Results: Though there are several presumed benefits of implant removal, such as functional improvement and pain relief, the surgical procedure can be very challenging and may lead to complications or even worsening of the complaints. Research has focused on the safety of metal implants (e.g., risk of corrosion, allergy, and carcinogenesis). For these reasons, implants have been removed routinely for decades. Along with the introduction of titanium alloy implants, the need for implant removal became a subject of debate in view of potential (dis)advantages since, in general, implants made of titanium alloys are more difficult to remove. Currently, the main indications for removal from both the upper and lower extremity are mostly 'relative' and patient-driven, such as pain, prominent material, or simply the request for removal. True medical indications like infection or intra-articular material are minor reasons. Conclusion: This review illustrates the great variety of view points in the literature, with large differences in opinions and practices about the indications for implant removal after fracture healing. Since some studies have described asymptomatic patients developing complaints after removal, the general advice nowadays is to remove implants after fracture healing only in symptomatic patients and after a proper informed consent. Well-designed prospective studies on this subject are urgently needed in order to form guidelines based on scientific evidence

CRPS of the upper or lower extremity: surgical treatment outcomes

The hypothesis is explored that CRPS I (the "new" RSD) persists due to undiagnosed injured joint afferents, and/or cutaneous neuromas, and/or nerve compressions, and is, therefore, a misdiagnosed form of CRPS II (the "new" causalgia). An IRB-approved, retrospective chart review on a series of 100 consecutive patients with "RSD" identified 40 upper and 30 lower extremity patients for surgery based upon their history, physical examination, neurosensory testing, and nerve blocks. Based upon decreased pain medication usage and recovery of function, outcome in the upper extremity, at a mean of 27.9 months follow-up (range of 9 to 81 months), gave results that were excellent in 40% (16 of 40 patients), good in 40% (16 of 40 patients) and failure 20% (8 of 40 patients). In the lower extremity, at a mean of 23.0 months follow-up (range of 9 to 69 months) the results were excellent in 47% (14 of 30 patients), good in 33% (10 of 30 patients) and failure 20% (6 of 30 patients). It is concluded that most patients referred with a diagnosis of CRPS I have continuing pain input from injured joint or cutaneous afferents, and/or nerve compressions, and, therefore, similar to a patient with CRPS II, they can be treated successfully with an appropriate peripheral nerve surgical strategy

Effectiveness of Elicitation Techniques in Distributed Requirements Engineering

Software development teams are often geographically distributed from their customers and end users. This creates significant communication and coordination challenges that impact the effectiveness of requirements engineering. Travel costs, and the local availability of quality technical staff increase the demand for effective distributed software development teams. This research reports an empirical study of how groupware can be used to aid distributed requirements engineering for a software development project. Six groups of seven to nine members were formed and divided into separate remote groups of customers and engineers. The engineers conducted a requirements analysis and produced a software requirements specification (SRS) document through distributed interaction with the remote customers. We present results and conclusions from the research including: an analysis of factors that effected the quality of the Software Requirements Specification document written at the conclusion of the requirements process and the effectiveness of requirements elicitation techniques which were used in a distributed setting for requirements gathering

Characterizing the phase diagram of finite-size dipolar Bose-Hubbard systems

We use state-of-the-art density matrix renormalization group calculations in the canonical ensemble to determine the phase diagram of the dipolar Bose-Hubbard model on a finite cylinder. We consider several observables that are accessible in typical optical lattice setups and assess how well these quantities perform as order parameters. We find that, especially for small systems, the occupation imbalance is less susceptible to boundary effects than the structure factor in uncovering the presence of a periodic density modulation. By analyzing the nonlocal correlations, we find that the appearance of supersolid order is very sensitive to boundary effects, which may render it difficult to observe in quantum gas lattice experiments with a few tens of particles. Finally, we show that density measurements readily obtainable on a quantum gas microscope allow distinguishing between superfluid and solid phases using unsupervised machine-learning techniques