Analysis of a continuous-time model of structural balance

It is not uncommon for certain social networks to divide into two opposing camps in response to stress. This happens, for example, in networks of political parties during winner-takes-all elections, in networks of companies competing to establish technical standards, and in networks of nations faced with mounting threats of war. A simple model for these two-sided separations is the dynamical system dX/dt = X^2 where X is a matrix of the friendliness or unfriendliness between pairs of nodes in the network. Previous simulations suggested that only two types of behavior were possible for this system: either all relationships become friendly, or two hostile factions emerge. Here we prove that for generic initial conditions, these are indeed the only possible outcomes. Our analysis yields a closed-form expression for faction membership as a function of the initial conditions, and implies that the initial amount of friendliness in large social networks (started from random initial conditions) determines whether they will end up in intractable conflict or global harmony.Comment: 12 pages, 2 figure

Simple and Near-Optimal Mechanisms For Market Intermediation

A prevalent market structure in the Internet economy consists of buyers and sellers connected by a platform (such as Amazon or eBay) that acts as an intermediary and keeps a share of the revenue of each transaction. While the optimal mechanism that maximizes the intermediary's profit in such a setting may be quite complicated, the mechanisms observed in reality are generally much simpler, e.g., applying an affine function to the price of the transaction as the intermediary's fee. Loertscher and Niedermayer [2007] initiated the study of such fee-setting mechanisms in two-sided markets, and we continue this investigation by addressing the question of when an affine fee schedule is approximately optimal for worst-case seller distribution. On one hand our work supplies non-trivial sufficient conditions on the buyer side (i.e. linearity of marginal revenue function, or MHR property of value and value minus cost distributions) under which an affine fee schedule can obtain a constant fraction of the intermediary's optimal profit for all seller distributions. On the other hand we complement our result by showing that proper affine fee-setting mechanisms (e.g. those used in eBay and Amazon selling plans) are unable to extract a constant fraction of optimal profit in the worst-case seller distribution. As subsidiary results we also show there exists a constant gap between maximum surplus and maximum revenue under the aforementioned conditions. Most of the mechanisms that we propose are also prior-independent with respect to the seller, which signifies the practical implications of our result.Comment: To appear in WINE'14, the 10th conference on Web and Internet Economic

Modeling self-organization of communication and topology in social networks

This paper introduces a model of self-organization between communication and topology in social networks, with a feedback between different communication habits and the topology. To study this feedback, we let agents communicate to build a perception of a network and use this information to create strategic links. We observe a narrow distribution of links when the communication is low and a system with a broad distribution of links when the communication is high. We also analyze the outcome of chatting, cheating, and lying, as strategies to get better access to information in the network. Chatting, although only adopted by a few agents, gives a global gain in the system. Contrary, a global loss is inevitable in a system with too many liarsComment: 6 pages 7 figures, Java simulation available at http://cmol.nbi.dk/models/inforew/inforew.htm

Prophet Inequalities with Limited Information

In the classical prophet inequality, a gambler observes a sequence of stochastic rewards $V_1,...,V_n$ and must decide, for each reward $V_i$, whether to keep it and stop the game or to forfeit the reward forever and reveal the next value $V_i$. The gambler's goal is to obtain a constant fraction of the expected reward that the optimal offline algorithm would get. Recently, prophet inequalities have been generalized to settings where the gambler can choose $k$ items, and, more generally, where he can choose any independent set in a matroid. However, all the existing algorithms require the gambler to know the distribution from which the rewards $V_1,...,V_n$ are drawn. The assumption that the gambler knows the distribution from which $V_1,...,V_n$ are drawn is very strong. Instead, we work with the much simpler assumption that the gambler only knows a few samples from this distribution. We construct the first single-sample prophet inequalities for many settings of interest, whose guarantees all match the best possible asymptotically, \emph{even with full knowledge of the distribution}. Specifically, we provide a novel single-sample algorithm when the gambler can choose any $k$ elements whose analysis is based on random walks with limited correlation. In addition, we provide a black-box method for converting specific types of solutions to the related \emph{secretary problem} to single-sample prophet inequalities, and apply it to several existing algorithms. Finally, we provide a constant-sample prophet inequality for constant-degree bipartite matchings. We apply these results to design the first posted-price and multi-dimensional auction mechanisms with limited information in settings with asymmetric bidders

Kronecker Graphs: An Approach to Modeling Networks

How can we model networks with a mathematically tractable model that allows for rigorous analysis of network properties? Networks exhibit a long list of surprising properties: heavy tails for the degree distribution; small diameters; and densification and shrinking diameters over time. Most present network models either fail to match several of the above properties, are complicated to analyze mathematically, or both. In this paper we propose a generative model for networks that is both mathematically tractable and can generate networks that have the above mentioned properties. Our main idea is to use the Kronecker product to generate graphs that we refer to as "Kronecker graphs". First, we prove that Kronecker graphs naturally obey common network properties. We also provide empirical evidence showing that Kronecker graphs can effectively model the structure of real networks. We then present KronFit, a fast and scalable algorithm for fitting the Kronecker graph generation model to large real networks. A naive approach to fitting would take super- exponential time. In contrast, KronFit takes linear time, by exploiting the structure of Kronecker matrix multiplication and by using statistical simulation techniques. Experiments on large real and synthetic networks show that KronFit finds accurate parameters that indeed very well mimic the properties of target networks. Once fitted, the model parameters can be used to gain insights about the network structure, and the resulting synthetic graphs can be used for null- models, anonymization, extrapolations, and graph summarization

Degree Distribution of Competition-Induced Preferential Attachment Graphs

We introduce a family of one-dimensional geometric growth models, constructed iteratively by locally optimizing the tradeoffs between two competing metrics, and show that this family is equivalent to a family of preferential attachment random graph models with upper cutoffs. This is the first explanation of how preferential attachment can arise from a more basic underlying mechanism of local competition. We rigorously determine the degree distribution for the family of random graph models, showing that it obeys a power law up to a finite threshold and decays exponentially above this threshold. We also rigorously analyze a generalized version of our graph process, with two natural parameters, one corresponding to the cutoff and the other a ``fertility'' parameter. We prove that the general model has a power-law degree distribution up to a cutoff, and establish monotonicity of the power as a function of the two parameters. Limiting cases of the general model include the standard preferential attachment model without cutoff and the uniform attachment model.Comment: 24 pages, one figure. To appear in the journal: Combinatorics, Probability and Computing. Note, this is a long version, with complete proofs, of the paper "Competition-Induced Preferential Attachment" (cond-mat/0402268

Social Ranking Techniques for the Web

The proliferation of social media has the potential for changing the structure and organization of the web. In the past, scientists have looked at the web as a large connected component to understand how the topology of hyperlinks correlates with the quality of information contained in the page and they proposed techniques to rank information contained in web pages. We argue that information from web pages and network data on social relationships can be combined to create a personalized and socially connected web. In this paper, we look at the web as a composition of two networks, one consisting of information in web pages and the other of personal data shared on social media web sites. Together, they allow us to analyze how social media tunnels the flow of information from person to person and how to use the structure of the social network to rank, deliver, and organize information specifically for each individual user. We validate our social ranking concepts through a ranking experiment conducted on web pages that users shared on Google Buzz and Twitter.Comment: 7 pages, ASONAM 201

Paradoxes in Fair Computer-Aided Decision Making

Computer-aided decision making--where a human decision-maker is aided by a computational classifier in making a decision--is becoming increasingly prevalent. For instance, judges in at least nine states make use of algorithmic tools meant to determine "recidivism risk scores" for criminal defendants in sentencing, parole, or bail decisions. A subject of much recent debate is whether such algorithmic tools are "fair" in the sense that they do not discriminate against certain groups (e.g., races) of people. Our main result shows that for "non-trivial" computer-aided decision making, either the classifier must be discriminatory, or a rational decision-maker using the output of the classifier is forced to be discriminatory. We further provide a complete characterization of situations where fair computer-aided decision making is possible