Impact of Victimization of Bullying on Attitudes of Middle School Students in NCSA Schools in Arkansas

The purpose of this study was to add to the limited research with regard to bullying in private schools in general and specifically to member schools of the National Christian School Association (NCSA). Middle school students in grades 6, 7, and 6 were given a survey concerning bullying and bullying behavior in their schools. The effects by grade level of students in rural school settings versus urban school settings were determined with regard to the responses of the survey in four areas: prevalence of bullying, willingness to seek help, aggressive attitudes about bullying, and the overall results of the survey. The quantitative, non-experimental study was conducted in four NCSA member schools in Arkansas. Two of these schools were in rural settings and two in urban settings as defined by the United States Census Bureau. The data collected were the results of a survey administered by a third party. Students were selected in a stratified random sampling. They were stratified by grade and gender before being randomly selected for the study. A total of 20 students were selected from each grade at each school, when the total number of subjects in that group exceeded 20. In some cases, the number of students in a specific grade was less than the desired sample size. In these instances, the entire group was selected for the sample. A 2 x 3 factorial analysis of variance was used for the analysis of collected data for each of the four hypotheses. The independent variables for each hypothesis were the grade levels of the respondent (sixth, seventh, and eighth) and the location of the school (rural and urban). The dependent variables were the four areas measured by the survey: prevalence of bullying, willingness to seek help, aggressive attitudes about bullying, and the overall results of the survey, respectively

Forced auditor change, industry specialization and audit fees

Purpose: The purpose of this study is to explore the effect of industry specialization on the absorption and competitive pricing (or lack thereof) of audits of large Andersen clients (S&P 1500 companies) who switched to the remaining Big 4 international accounting firms in 2002 due to the demise of Arthur Andersen LLP (Andersen). Did the audit clients pay a premium or discount in audit fees to their new auditor who specialized in their industry? Design/methodology/approach: Ordinary least squares regression is used to test hypothesis of a positive association between industry specialization and audit fees charged to former Andersen\u27s audit clients in 2002 following Andersen\u27s demise. This study provides more control over size effects by design. Test variables are constructed based on national market share of audit fees within an industry. Logistic regression is used to examine the likelihood of choosing new auditor that is an industry specialist. Findings: Results support hypothesis, consistent with auditor differentiation explanation. Proportion of clients that had engaged an industry specialist in 2001 increased from 38 percent (84 clients) to 48 percent (105 clients) in 2002. No evidence of price-gouging in 2002 although clients who aligned with industry specialist paid a 23.2 percent premium in audit fees. Large clients lost bargaining power to negotiate lower fees. Findings are robust to the inclusion of additional alternative measures of company size. Research limitations/implications: Results of logistic regression analysis imply that large audit clients with former auditor of tarnished reputation, long auditor tenure and high leverage are more likely to switch to an industry specialist to possibly signal audit/financial reporting quality. Large sample companies may limit the ability to generalize findings to smaller companies. Practical implications: Mandatory audit firm rotation (currently being debated in the profession) will have costly effect on the pricing of Big 4 audits for companies wanting to signal audit and financial reporting quality to affect market perception, and large companies would likely lose their ability to bargain for lower audit fees. Originality/value: The paper focus on the alignment of Andersen clients and impact on audit fees with Big 4 industry specialists resulting from the sudden increase in audit market concentration. Prior to Andersen\u27s collapse, evidence on the association of audit fees premium and industry specialists was mixed, and little attention has been given to the influence of auditor industry specialization on both audit fees and alignment of former Andersen clients with a Big 4 specialist. This paper fills that void. © Emerald Group Publishing Limited

The Association of Audit and Nonaudit Services Fees between Sec and Non-Sec Investigated Firms

The purpose of this study is to explore the association of audit and nonaudit services fees of firms under SEC investigation relative to firms not under SEC investigation to ascertain whether systematic differences exist. This study is important because the issue of auditor independence raises concerns about auditor objectivity and economic bonding stemming from increasing nonaudit service fees. As gatekeepers to the public securities markets, it is important that the opinion of independent auditors provides investors with needed assurance that the financial statements of a company can be relied upon. If nonaudit fees can proxy for potential independence impairment, then a significant association between these fees and an SEC investigation may suggest that the SEC perceives firms purchasing large amounts of nonaudit services possibly lacking in independence. In OLS regression models of audit and nonaudit fees, an SEC investigation variable is significant indicating higher fees relating to an SEC investigation. Nevertheless, in a logistic regression model of SEC investigated firms audit fees is significant, but nonaudit fees is not after controlling for audit fees. This result suggests that the level of nonaudit service fees alone is not a determinant of the likelihood of an SEC investigation. Further discussion of this and other findings are provided

How audit fees are affected by a client under SEC investigation

We examine the effect of a US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) investigation of the audit client on audit cost. Ordinary least-squares models along with a match-paired design and publicly available auditor fees data are used to analyse the relation between an SEC investigation event and audit fees. The finding of a positive and significant relation supports our hypothesis that the business risk of a client under investigation by this regulatory agency is perceived to be higher than that of a client not under investigation. This finding is important given that certain factors may work against observing an effect. This study contributes to the literature by determining that auditors charge a statistically and economically significant average audit fees premium that ranges from 49.9% to 56.2% to clients under SEC investigation. One implication is that client management has fee-related incentives to avoid regulatory misconduct/scrutiny and produce financial statements free of material misstatement. © 2014 Inderscience Enterprises Ltd

External Auditor\u27s Ethical Dilemma: Perceived Threat to Auditor\u27s Responsibility Posed by the Auditor\u27s Allegiance to Corporate Management

Major accounting scandals and audit failures (such as Enron and WorldCom) during the turn of the century seriously impaired the public\u27s confidence and trust in audited financial statements. This had cast a shadow on auditor independence, integrity and professional conduct, and led to the collapse of Arthur Andersen (AA), one of the then Big-5 public accounting firms. Some have argued that auditors align their interest with that of corporate management instead of investors and the general public because audit fees are paid by management. This leads to the following question: do auditors appear to compromise their independence and align with their clients\u27 interest rather than shareholders\u27 interest? Our examination of audit fees charged by the Big-5 to a sample of companies investigated by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) reveals that auditors (except for AA) appear to recognize engagement risk at an increased level for SEC investigated audit clients. Accordingly, SEC investigated clients are charged higher audit fees than non-SEC investigated clients. However, AA appeared not to distinguish the engagement risk differences between its SEC investigated and non-SEC investigated clients. Results overall suggest that auditors fulfill their professional responsibility of serving the public interest by maintaining client-auditor independence and objectivity. Although the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 has been implemented, misleading and fraudulent financial reporting persist, which suggests that there is room for improving audit quality. Accordingly, we provide suggestions to strengthen both audit quality and professional conduct (particularly regarding auditor independence) to enhance the public\u27s confidence in audited financial statements

External auditor\u27s ethical dilemma: Perceived threat to auditor\u27s responsibility posed by the auditor\u27s allegiance to corporate management

Major accounting scandals and audit failures (such as Enron and WorldCom) during the turn of the century seriously impaired the public\u27s confidence and trust in audited financial statements. This had cast a shadow on auditor independence, integrity and professional conduct, and led to the collapse of Arthur Andersen (AA), one of the then Big-5 public accounting firms. Some have argued that auditors align their interest with that of corporate management instead of investors and the general public because audit fees are paid by management. This leads to the following question: do auditors appear to compromise their independence and align with their clients\u27 interest rather than shareholders\u27 interest? Our examination of audit fees charged by the Big-5 to a sample of companies investigated by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) reveals that auditors (except for AA) appear to recognize engagement risk at an increased level for SEC investigated audit clients. Accordingly, SEC investigated clients are charged higher audit fees than non-SEC investigated clients. However, AA appeared not to distinguish the engagement risk differences between its SEC investigated and non-SEC investigated clients. Results overall suggest that auditors fulfill their professional responsibility of serving the public interest by maintaining client-auditor independence and objectivity. Although the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 has been implemented, misleading and fraudulent financial reporting persist, which suggests that there is room for improving audit quality. Accordingly, we provide suggestions to strengthen both audit quality and professional conduct (particularly regarding auditor independence) to enhance the public\u27s confidence in audited financial statements

"Grow Your Own" Programs: Examining Potential and Pitfalls for a New Generation of Black, Indigenous, and People of Color Community Teachers

Grow your own (GYO) programs are designed to recruit, prepare, and place community members as teachers in local schools. They do this through partnerships between educator preparation programs, school districts or local educational agencies, and community-based organizations. The nation is currently seeing new and thoughtful uses of the approach. This policy brief examines models with an explicit commitment to advancing justice and equity in teacher development, which can be leveraged to open doors to the profession for Black, Indigenous, and People of Color (BIPOC) teachers with roots in, and understanding of, the community.</p

Communication With The SAS 58 Auditor’s Standard Report: An Exploratory Study

In a field experiment, the authors examine whether three alternative versions of the auditor’s standard report communicate effectively the cognitive dimensions of understand-ability, engagement risk, and needed accommodation to a user group (investment and banking professionals) and an expert group (audit partners and managers). The study focuses on the mandated SAS 58 (AICPA 1988) three-paragraph auditor’s standard report (SR), the previously mandated two-paragraph auditor’s standard report (OSR) and a modified auditor’s standard report (MSR) more in harmony with the stated auditor’s responsibility for detecting fraud, as mandated by SAS 53 (AICPA 1988b) which was subsequently superceded by SAS 82 and SAS 99. The results indicate that both auditors and users are consistent in their belief that the SR represents an enhancement in understandability of the audit message over OSR, and that a format along the lines of MSR would not have represented an improvement over the SR format given the inconsistencies in ratings between auditors and users of the MSR (which contains explicit language relative to fraud). Specifically, auditors’ perception of engagement risk associated with the MSR is much higher than users’ perception and the demand for needed accommodation (additional information) is also greater for auditors than users. Overall, the results suggest that the ASB was effective in responding to the user needs with respect to the message communicated in the auditor’s report, a critical link in the financial information reporting process. This investigation has the potential to inform policy-making bodies concerned with adopting a report standard that fairly communicates the risks borne by both auditor and user groups

South Carolina Bond for money between D. Goudelock and Anderson Pound[?], Union District, February 8, 1860. Signed by States Rights Gist and John R. R. Giles

$5000 South Carolina bond for money between D. Goudelock and Anderson Pound[?], Union District, February 8, 1860. Signed by States Rights Gist, John R. R. Giles, T.W.G. Giles and one other.https://digitalcommons.wofford.edu/littlejohnmss/1243/thumbnail.jp