The place of strategic environmental assessment in the privatised electricity industry

The private sector has given relatively little attention to the emergence of strategic environmental assessment (SEA); even recently privatised utilities, where SEA might be deemed particularly appropriate, and whose activities are likely to fall within the scope of the European Union SEA Directive, have shown less interest than might be expected. However, the global trend towards the privatisation of state-owned enterprises makes the adaptation of SEA towards these industries all the more pressing. This paper addresses the place that SEA might take within the electricity sector, taking the privatised UK electricity industry as an example. Particular challenges are posed by the radical restructuring of the industry, designed to introduce competitive behaviour, making the development of comprehensive SEA processes problematic, and requiring SEA to be placed in the context of corporate environmental policy and objectives.</p

The regulation of cloud computing: why the European Union failed to get it right

Cloud computing brings important benefits and it is expected to play a key role in facilitating the uptake of emerging technologies and applications, including artificial intelligence, blockchain, and high-performance computing. Despite its potential to deliver cost and time-efficient services, the majority of businesses in the EU have still not implemented cloud computing. This illustrates the need for a more widespread adoption of the technology. Yet, recent regulatory initiatives may obstruct the uptake of cloud services. This is arguably because such initiatives do not reflect a proper understanding of the market, which our paper intends to provide. To that end, the paper examines what cloud computing is and how it works. It subsequently discusses the EU’s attempts to regulate cloud computing, including the Digital Markets Act, the Digital Services Act, and the Data Act proposal. Our analysis demonstrates that the logic of these instruments and the obligations they establish do not fit the characteristics and workings of cloud computing. The paper concludes by noting that future regulation must mirror the specificities of the cloud, which has a value chain and traits that differ significantly from other digital services, most notably online platforms

Comparison and Implementation of a Rigid and a Flexible Multibody Planetary Gearbox Model

We propose algorithms for developing (1) a rigid (constrained) and (2) a flexible planetary gearbox model. The two methods are compared against each other and advantages/disadvantages of each method are discussed. The rigid model (1) has gear tooth reaction forces expressed by Lagrange multipliers. The flexible approach (2) is being compared with the gear tooth forces from the rigid approach, first without damping and second the influence of damping is examined. Variable stiffness as a function of base circle arc length is implemented in the flexible approach such that it handles the realistic switch between one and two gear teeth in mesh. The final results are from modelling the planetary gearbox in a 500 kW wind turbine which we also described in Jørgensen et.al (2013)

Nonlinear Flight Dynamics of Very Flexible Aircraft

Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/77147/1/AIAA-27606-989.pd

A monotone multigrid solver for two body contact problems in biomechanics

The purpose of the paper is to apply monotone multigrid methods to static and dynamic biomechanical contact problems. In space, a finite element method involving a mortar discretization of the contact conditions is used. In time, a new contact-stabilized Newmark scheme is presented. Numerical experiments for a two body Hertzian contact problem and a biomechanical application are reported

Fashioning Entitlements: A Comparative Law and Economic Analysis of the Judicial Role in Environmental Centralization in the U.S. and Europe

This paper identifies and evaluates, from an economic point of view, the role of the judiciary the steady shift of environmental regulatory authority to higher, more centralized levels of government in both the U.S. and Europe. We supply both a positive analysis of how the decisions made by judges have affected the incentives of both private and public actors to pollute the natural environment, and normative answers to the question of whether judges have acted so as to create incentives that move levels of pollution in an efficient direction, toward their optimal, cost-minimizing (or net-benefit-maximizing) levels. Highlights of the analysis include the following points: 1) Industrial-era local (state or national) legislation awarding entitlements to pollute was almost certainly inefficient due to a fundamental economic obstacle faced by those who suffer harm from the over-pollution of publicly owned natural resources: the inability to monetize and credibly commit to repay the future economic value of reducing pollution. 2) When industrial era pollution spilled across state lines in the US, the federal courts, in particular the Supreme Court, fashioned a federal common law of interstate nuisance that set up essentially the same sort of blurry, uncertain entitlements to pollute or be free of pollution that had been created by the state courts in resolving local pollution disputes. We argue that for the typical pollution problem, a legal regime of blurry interstate entitlements - with neither jurisdiction having a clear right either to pollute or be free of pollution from the other - is likely to generate efficient incentives for interjursidictional bargaining, even despite the public choice problems besetting majority-rule government. Interestingly, a very similar system of de facto entitlements arose and often stimulated interjursidictional bargaining in Europe as well as in the U.S. 3) The US federal courts have generally interpreted the federal environmental statutes in ways that give clear primacy to federal regulators. Through such judicial interpretation, state and local regulators face a continuing risk of having their decisions overridden by federal regulators. This reduces the incentives for regulatory innovation at the state and local level. Judicial authorization of federal overrides has thus weakened the economic rationale for cooperative federalism suggested by economic models of principal-agent relationships. As a result of the principle of attribution, there is less risk in Europe that (like in the US) courts would enlarge the federal purview and thereby limit the powers of the Member States. Despite this principle, the power of the European bureaucracy (that is, the European Commission) has steadily increased and led to a steady shift of environmental regulatory competencies to the European level. This shift is only sometimes normatively desirable, and yet there is little that the ECJ can or will do to slow it