Teleology and Realism in Leibniz's Philosophy of Science

This paper argues for an interpretation of Leibniz’s claim that physics requires both mechanical and teleological principles as a view regarding the interpretation of physical theories. Granting that Leibniz’s fundamental ontology remains non-physical, or mentalistic, it argues that teleological principles nevertheless ground a realist commitment about mechanical descriptions of phenomena. The empirical results of the new sciences, according to Leibniz, have genuine truth conditions: there is a fact of the matter about the regularities observed in experience. Taking this stance, however, requires bringing non-empirical reasons to bear upon mechanical causal claims. This paper first evaluates extant interpretations of Leibniz’s thesis that there are two realms in physics as describing parallel, self-sufficient sets of laws. It then examines Leibniz’s use of teleological principles to interpret scientific results in the context of his interventions in debates in seventeenth-century kinematic theory, and in the teaching of Copernicanism. Leibniz’s use of the principle of continuity and the principle of simplicity, for instance, reveal an underlying commitment to the truth-aptness, or approximate truth-aptness, of the new natural sciences. The paper concludes with a brief remark on the relation between metaphysics, theology, and physics in Leibniz

Epigenesis/Preformation(ism)

At the end of the nineteenth century, epigenesis and preformationism were presented in An Illustrated Dictionary of Medicine, Biology and allied Sciences as: “epigenesis is in biology, the theory that holds the embryo to be the result of the union of the male and female elements, and the fully formed organism the result of a gradual process of differentiation, in distinction to the theory of encasement, preformation, or evolution, which held the embryo to pre-exist in a minute form within the germ”

Life, Mechanization of

Encyclopaedia entry on the mechanisation of life in early modern natural philosophy. Provides a conceptual and partial historical overview

Blood: From Humor to Hematology

Today blood can be defined simply as the red liquid flowing through the arteries and veins of humans and other animals. But in early modern philosophy and science, blood acquired many different meanings: it transformed from being one of the four cardinal humors – believed to determine a person’s physical and mental qualities – into a raw material which was treated, studied, measured, and investigated. With the development of new methods and instruments, this vital fluid also came in a variety of shapes and sizes: it came to be understood as globules, as consisting of chemical elements, as having various temperatures and weights. Although medical treatments like bloodletting were slow to change, blood itself underwent a major revolution as the result of long and uncertain endeavors of study and experimentation. And considering the discovery of blood circulation as well as the development of hematology and blood chemistry, blood serves as a significant case study for the history of the scientific revolution. This article will discuss these major developments in the early modern study of blood