Controlling Arms Brokering and Transport Agents: Time for International Action

yesEvidence suggests that many of the arms transfers to the worst affected conflict regions and human rights crisis zones are organised and trafficked by arms brokering and transport agents. Targeting those states with weak national export controls and enforcement, unscrupulous brokers and transportation agents organise the transfer of arms and security equipment to a range of illegitimate end users such as criminals, terrorists and human rights abusers. Arms brokers can be defined as middlemen who organise arms transfers between two or more parties, often bringing together buyers, sellers, transporters, financiers and insurers to make a deal. They generally do so for financial gain, although political or religious motivation may also play a part in some deals. Often such brokers do not reside in the country from which the weapons originate, nor do they live in the countries through which the weapons pass or for which they are destined. As a result, such `third party¿ arms brokering is notoriously diff i c u l t to trace, monitor or control. Arms brokers work very closely with transport or shipping agents. These agents contract transport facilities, carriers and crews in order to move arms cargoes by sea, air, rail or road

Chemical control. Exploring mechanisms for the regulation of riot control agents, incapacitants and related means of delivery.

A holistic arms control (HAC) analytical framework was employed to explore the full range of mechanisms that could potentially be utilised to effectively regulate the development, stockpiling, transfer or use of riot control agents (RCAs), incapacitants and related means of delivery. From this analysis it is clear that the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and its attendant regime are the most appropriate and probably the most receptive mechanisms, at least in the short term, for the discussion of these concerns and the development of appropriate policy responses. However, the response of CWC States Parties to these issues is by no means certain and parallel processes should be established to explore alternative regulatory mechanisms with the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, UN drugs conventions, international and regional human rights instruments, international humanitarian law, and transfer controls potentially yielding positive results in the next five to ten year period. Other regimes that may well prove important in the longer term include: the international criminal court and other international criminal law entities; the UN Secretary General¿s investigation mechanism and other ad hoc UN investigatory mechanisms. A comprehensive HAC strategy for the regulation of RCAs, incapacitants and related means of delivery will also require active involvement of informed and activist civil society in societal verification; development and promotion of norms prohibiting the involvement of scientific and medical communities in weaponisation programmes intended for malign application; and far greater active engagement of such expert communities in relevant State and international policy development processes

Building Comprehensive Controls on Small Arms Manufacturing, Transfer and End-use.

yesSmall arms and light weapons can enter the illicit market at many stages in their lifecycle. From manufacture, to sale/export, to import, and then to final end use, States must establish and enforce stringent and comprehensive licensing and monitoring systems to ensure that small arms and light weapons (SALW) remain under legal control. The UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects and ensuing follow-up process provide States with important opportunities to analyse and compare how existing systems governing the manufacture and trade in SALW are working. They further provide the context in which best practice can be agreed and implemented internationally, and for the discussion of how future trends and developments in SALW manufacture and transfer can be more effectively brought within State control. To this end, this briefing paper covers two separate but closely related issues. The first section of the report will analyse existing State and regional controls on SALW manufacture and examine how international measures, including the UN Conference, can reinforce such controls. In this regard, the growth of licensed production and co-production agreements is highlighted, together with implications for the development of adequate regulations. The second section examines those systems that are currently in place for the authorisation of SALW transfers and for the certification and monitoring of their ultimate end-use. Recommendations for best practice and implications for the UN Conference process are also discussed

Preserving the norm against chemical weapons: A civil society initiative for the 2018 4th review conference of the chemical weapons convention

yesAcceleration of the applications of cutting edge science is often most likely in situations involving conflict and warfare between different groups. That is the focus of this paper. It asks what we know of the past, present and possible future applications of advances in our understanding of the brain in the development of chemical weapons, and what might best be done to moderate the most dangerous aspects of that process at the present time, particularly by members of civil society. The paper therefore begins by examining this possibility of hostile manipulation of the brain in some detail. It then briefly reviews the current state of the chemical and biological arms control and disarmament regime as embodied in the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) following the 2016 8th Five Year Review Conference of the BTWC and in the lead up to the 2018 4th Five Year Review Conference of the CWC. Finally, our civil society initiative to assist in achieving a successful outcome of the 2018 CWC Review Conference is described. This initiative involves the production of a multi-authored edited book, to be published in advance of the Review Conference by the UK Royal Society of Chemistry that explores many of the critical issues facing the CWC States Parties as they seek to agree effective measures to prevent the development and use of chemical weapons, as the life and chemical sciences advance

Private Military Companies and the Proliferation of Small Arms: Regulating the Actors.

yesThe 1990s witnessed a change in the way wars were fought as the amount of available weaponry increased and the types of actors engaged in warfare multiplied. The opening up of the international arms trade, in particular with new buyers and more channels of supply, has raised concerns about who purchases weapons and for what use. Afeature of this changing nature of conflict has been the continuing, if not growing, presence of mercenaries and the emergence of private companies contracted to provide military and security services. These range from logistical support and training to advice and procurement of arms and on-the-ground intervention. This briefing highlights how the activities of mercenaries and private military and security companies can contribute to small arms proliferation and misuse and examines steps the international community can take at the UN Small Arms Conference and elsewhere to effectively combat mercenarism and regulate the activities of private military and security companies. The role played by these companies relates not only to provisions contained in the contracts they sign with their clients to provide large amounts of weaponry, but also how the military and security services and training that they provide contributes to the demand for weapons in the regions where they operate. There are a number of ways in which mercenaries and private military and security companies are involved in small arms proliferation. These include: l Arms brokering and transportation activities l Violations of UN arms embargoes l Impact on human rights and humanitarian law l Driving demand for small arms Various measures already exist to ban the activities of mercenaries and regulate some of the activities of private military and security companies either through national legislation or international agreements. However, there is concern these efforts are neither comprehensive nor accepted widely enough to effectively control the activities of mercenaries and private military and security companies

Implementing the UN Action Programme for Combating the Illicit Trafficking in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects.

yesHistorically, UN conferences have been criticised for resulting more in compromises than in commitments to real change, which is also a charge that has been levelled against the UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (UN Small Arms Conference). The consensus-based approach adopted throughout the negotiations had the advantage of binding all participating States to all aspects of the agreed Programme of Action (PoA), but it also ensured that it would be difficult to achieve a sufficiently rigorous and comprehensive agreement on all of the measures required to tackle the trafficking, proliferation and misuse of small arms and light weapons (SALW). Therefore, in spite of the efforts of many governments and NGOs, the UN Small Arms Conference did not agree sufficiently robust agreements in several areas. Nonetheless, it was a valuable and productive process. The resulting PoA includes a reasonably comprehensive set of key principles and commitments, which provide a basis for taking forward action at national, regional and global levels. The PoAwas agreed by all of the participating States, amounting to more than 100, and each are politically bound to adopt and implement it. Given that the UN Small Arms Conference was the first of its kind, its achievement in generating political will and momentum for efforts to control SALW is important. Although many of the commitments are weaker and less comprehensive than hoped for by many governments and organisations, it is significant that the PoAcontains at least some important commitments in all but two of the `core¿ issue areas raised by States. The two exceptions relate to transfers to non-State actors and to civilian trade, possession and use of SALW, restrictions which were strongly opposed by the USA. Equally, human rights related issues were noteworthy by their absence in the PoA. Whilst the process of reaching agreement began with a far-reaching draft PoA in December 2000 (A/Conf.192/L.4), most of the comments that were tabled on this text during the second Preparatory Committee in January 2001 came from countries that sought to weaken its commitments. The subsequent draft (A/Conf.192/L.4/Rev.1) was therefore weaker, with the result that progressive States faced an uphill task in seeking to strengthen its provisions. The next draft PoA emerged at the UN Small Arms Conference itself in the form of a third draft (A/Conf.192/L.5). Although still limited in a number of key areas ¿ such as export criteria and transparency ¿ this document went further than L.4/Rev.1 in a number of respects and included specific international commitments, including on brokering and tracing lines of supply. This, however, proved too ambitious an agenda for a small group of States and in the end the document that was adopted by consensus (A/Conf.192/L.5/Rev.1) represented a lower-level compromise. Despite the difficulties of agreeing the consensus-based PoA, the process culminating in the agreement was perhaps as important as the agreement itself. UN Small Arms Conference represented the first time that all UN Member States had met to discuss the illicit trade in SALW in all its aspects with a view to agreeing a comprehensive set of measures to address the problem. Although many of the commitments contained in the PoAare couched in equivocal language that will allow States to do as much or as little as they like, it is clear that the UN Small Arms Conference has contributed to a much better understanding, amongst all stakeholders, of the nature of the illicit trade in SALW and of the particular concerns and priorities of different countries and sub-regions. It is also clear that although the Programme of Action provides a set of minimum standards and commitments which all states should adopt, it also encourages further action from all States willing to adopt more stringent commitments and stronger programmes. There is a willingness among a number of States to build upon the PoAand take more concrete and far-reaching measures at national, sub-regional, regional and international levels, such as specific arrangements for tracing co-operation, or mechanisms to co-ordinate e fforts to improve stockpile security or weapons destruction. This briefing provides a critical assessment of key provisions in the UN Small Arms Conference PoA. Section 1 measures the overall outcomes of the conference against those that the Biting the Bullet (BtB) project proposed as optimal conclusions, and suggests ways to put the commitments contained in the PoA into practice. Section 2 assesses the implementation and follow-up commitments contained in the PoA, and identifies ways of promoting the implementation of Sections III and IV, as well as options for making the most of the Biennial Meetings of States and the Review Conference in 2006. Section 3 examines funding and resourcing possibilities for the PoA including identifying needs, mobilising resources and matching needs with resources. The final section of the briefing focuses on the way forward, and in particular on how implementation of the PoA could build on existing regional initiatives and develop common international approaches to controlling SALW proliferation, availability and misuse. It also examines how action to prevent and combat the illicit trade in SALW in all its aspects can be taken forward at sub-regional and regional levels in conjunction with all major stakeholders, including civil society, in the period leading up to the first Review Conference

Preventing chemical weapons as sciences converge

YesStark illustrations of the dangers from chemical weapons can be seen in attacks using toxic industrial chemicals and sarin against civilians and combatants in Syria and toxic industrial chemicals in Iraq, as well as more targeted assassination operations in Malaysia and the United Kingdom, employing VX and novichok nerve agents, respectively. Concerns about such malign applications of chemical technology are exacerbated by the unstable international security environment and the changing nature of armed conflict, “where borderlines between war, civil war, large-scale violations of human rights, revolutions and uprisings, insurgencies and terrorism as well as organized crime are blurred” (1). It is thus essential that the global community regularly review the nature and implications of developments in chemistry, and its convergence with the life and associated sciences, and establish appropriate measures to prevent their misuse. With the parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) convening a Review Conference to address such issues beginning 21 November 2018, we highlight important scientific aspects (2

Meeting the challenges of chemical and biological weapons: strengthening the chemical and biological disarmament and non-proliferation regimes

YesIn this report, we identify some of the key technical and political challenges currently facing the broader Chemical and Biological Weapon (CBW) regime- with a particular emphasis on major forthcoming diplomatic meetings. Most significantly the Ninth Review Conference of the Biological and Toxins Weapons Convention (1972) (BTWC) which will take place in 2022 and preparations for the Fifth Review Conference of the Chemical Weapons Convention (1993) (CWC), expected in 2023. This report is an output of an ongoing project, designed to stimulate thinking and discussion about these issues, within relevant stakeholder communities. The report provides an introduction to this issue area for the general reader before surveying key issues and developing a series of practical policy suggestions for further consideration

Age at first birth in women is genetically associated with increased risk of schizophrenia

Prof. Paunio on PGC:n jäsenPrevious studies have shown an increased risk for mental health problems in children born to both younger and older parents compared to children of average-aged parents. We previously used a novel design to reveal a latent mechanism of genetic association between schizophrenia and age at first birth in women (AFB). Here, we use independent data from the UK Biobank (N = 38,892) to replicate the finding of an association between predicted genetic risk of schizophrenia and AFB in women, and to estimate the genetic correlation between schizophrenia and AFB in women stratified into younger and older groups. We find evidence for an association between predicted genetic risk of schizophrenia and AFB in women (P-value = 1.12E-05), and we show genetic heterogeneity between younger and older AFB groups (P-value = 3.45E-03). The genetic correlation between schizophrenia and AFB in the younger AFB group is -0.16 (SE = 0.04) while that between schizophrenia and AFB in the older AFB group is 0.14 (SE = 0.08). Our results suggest that early, and perhaps also late, age at first birth in women is associated with increased genetic risk for schizophrenia in the UK Biobank sample. These findings contribute new insights into factors contributing to the complex bio-social risk architecture underpinning the association between parental age and offspring mental health.Peer reviewe

Whole-genome sequencing reveals host factors underlying critical COVID-19

Critical COVID-19 is caused by immune-mediated inflammatory lung injury. Host genetic variation influences the development of illness requiring critical care1 or hospitalization2,3,4 after infection with SARS-CoV-2. The GenOMICC (Genetics of Mortality in Critical Care) study enables the comparison of genomes from individuals who are critically ill with those of population controls to find underlying disease mechanisms. Here we use whole-genome sequencing in 7,491 critically ill individuals compared with 48,400 controls to discover and replicate 23 independent variants that significantly predispose to critical COVID-19. We identify 16 new independent associations, including variants within genes that are involved in interferon signalling (IL10RB and PLSCR1), leucocyte differentiation (BCL11A) and blood-type antigen secretor status (FUT2). Using transcriptome-wide association and colocalization to infer the effect of gene expression on disease severity, we find evidence that implicates multiple genes—including reduced expression of a membrane flippase (ATP11A), and increased expression of a mucin (MUC1)—in critical disease. Mendelian randomization provides evidence in support of causal roles for myeloid cell adhesion molecules (SELE, ICAM5 and CD209) and the coagulation factor F8, all of which are potentially druggable targets. Our results are broadly consistent with a multi-component model of COVID-19 pathophysiology, in which at least two distinct mechanisms can predispose to life-threatening disease: failure to control viral replication; or an enhanced tendency towards pulmonary inflammation and intravascular coagulation. We show that comparison between cases of critical illness and population controls is highly efficient for the detection of therapeutically relevant mechanisms of disease