Do the right thing: But only if others do so

Social norms play an important role in individual decision making. Bicchieri (2006) argues that two different expectations influence our choice to obey a norm: what we expect others to do (empirical expectations) and what we believe others think ought to be done (normative expectations). Little is known about the relative importance of these two types of expectation in individuals’ decisions, an issue that is particularly important when normative and empirical expectations are in conflict (e.g., high crime cities). In this paper, we report data from Dictator game experiments where we exogenously manipulate dictators’ expectations in the direction of either selfishness or fairness. When normative and empirical expectations are in conflict, we find that empirical expectations about other dictators’ choices significantly predict a dictator’s own choice. However, dictators’ expectations regarding what other dictators think should be done do not have a significant impact on their decisions. Our findings about the crucial influence of empirical expectations are important for those who design institutions or policies aimed at discouraging undesirable behavior.social norms; expectations; dictator game; experimental economis

When Equality Trumps Reciprocity: Evidence from a Laboratory Experiment

Inequity aversion and reciprocity have been identified as two primary motivations underlying human decision making. However, because income and wealth inequality exist to some degree in all societies, these two key motivations can point to different decisions. In particular, when a beneficiary is less wealthy than a benefactor, a reciprocal action can lead to greater inequality. In this paper we report data from a trust game variant where trustees’ responses to kind intentions generate inequality in favor of investors. In relation to a standard trust game treatment where trustees’ responses reduce inequality, the proportion of non-reciprocal decisions is twice as large when reciprocity promotes inequality. Moreover, we find investors expect that this will be the case. Overall, although both motives clearly play a role, we found strong evidence for inequality aversion. Our results call attention to the potential importance of inequality in principal-agent relationships, and have important implications for designing policies aimed at promoting cooperation.

Why Do People Do What They Do? A Social Norms Manual for Viet Nam, Indonesia and the Philippines

The content for this manual was developed thanks to Cristina Bicchieri, Thomas Noah and Ryan Muldoon for a training course on social norms and as part of the Multi Country Study on the Drivers of Violence. The ideas and concepts providing the foundation of the course teachings are from Cristina Bicchieri\u27s Norms in the Wild: how to diagnose, measure and change social norms, Oxford University Press, 2016 and her Penn-UNICEF Lectures on Norms and Social Change, 2010-2015. The manual is available on UNICEF\u27s website here: https://www.unicef-irc.org/research/pdf/442-EAPROmanual04.pd

Trendsetters and Social Change

Trendsetters are the "first movers" in social change. To study the dynamics of change, we need to study the interplay between trendsetters' actions and individual thresholds. It is this interplay that explains why change may or may not occur.Ohio State University. Mershon Center for International Security StudiesEvent web pag

Why Do People Do What They Do? A Social Norms Manual for Zimbabwe and Swaziland

The content for this manual was developed thanks to Cristina Bicchieri, Thomas Noah and Rob Willison for a training course on social norms and as part of the Multi Country Study on the Drivers of Violence. The ideas and concepts providing the foundation of the course teachings are from Cristina Bicchieri\u27s Norms in the Wild: How do Diagnose, Measure and Change Social Norms, Oxford University Press 2016 and her Penn-UNICEF Lectures on Social Norms and Social Change, 2010-2015. The manual is available on UNICEF\u27s website here: https://www.unicef-irc.org/research/pdf/429-Social-Norms-Manual-ESARO.pd

The Rules We Live By

In The Grammar of Society, first published in 2006, Cristina Bicchieri examines social norms, such as fairness, cooperation, and reciprocity, in an effort to understand their nature and dynamics, the expectations that they generate, and how they evolve and change. Drawing on several intellectual traditions and methods, including those of social psychology, experimental economics and evolutionary game theory, Bicchieri provides an integrated account of how social norms emerge, why and when we follow them, and the situations where we are most likely to focus on relevant norms. Examining the existence and survival of inefficient norms, she demonstrates how norms evolve in ways that depend upon the psychological dispositions of the individual and how such dispositions may impair social efficiency. By contrast, she also shows how certain psychological propensities may naturally lead individuals to evolve fairness norms that closely resemble those we follow in most modern societies

Rationality and Indeterminacy

Much of the history of game theory has been dominated by the problem of indeterminacy. The very search for better versions of rationality, as well as the long list of attempts to refine Nash equilibrium, can be seen as answers to the indeterminacy that has accompanied game theory through its history. More recently, the experimental approach to game theory has attempted a more radical solution: by directly generating a stream of behavioral observations, one hopes that behavioral hypotheses will be sharper, and predictions more accurate. This article looks at several attempts to address indeterminacy, including the shift to evolutionary models. However, because its goal is to establish whether rational choice models are inescapably doomed to produce indeterminate outcomes, it pays much more attention to the experimental turn in game theory, the difficulty it encounters, and the promising results obtained by more realistic models of rationality that include a social component

Diagnosing Norms

This short book explores how social norms work, and how changing them--changing preferences, beliefs, and especially social expectations--can potentially improve lives all around the world